Williams v. Arizona

• Decision Date: 17 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. CV-17-03390-PHX-DJH,CV-17-03390-PHX-DJH
• Parties: James Lee Williams, Plaintiff, v. State of Arizona, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

James Lee Williams, Plaintiff, v. State of Arizona, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-17-03390-PHX-DJH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

December 17, 2018

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ORDER

Pending before this Court are the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant State of California ("California") (Doc. 50); the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant State of Arizona ("Arizona") (Doc. 52); the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ("Metropolitan") (Doc. 54); the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 57) and the Motion to Transfer (Doc. 60) filed by Defendant United States; and the Motion for Default (Doc. 62) and the document titled "Motion for Subpoena, FRCP, Rule 45(d)" (Doc. 69) filed by Pro Se Plaintiff James Lee Williams ("Plaintiff"). Plaintiff has not filed a response to any of the Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 50, 52, 54, and 57) or the Motion to Transfer (Doc. 60) and the time to do has expired. See LRCiv. 7.2(c). Defendants Metropolitan, California, United States each filed a timely Response (Docs. 63, 64, and 68) to Plaintiff's Motion for Default; Plaintiff did not file a Reply and the time to do so has expired. See LRCiv. 7.2(c). Metropolitan and the United States have each filed a Response to Plaintiff's "Motion for Subpoena, FRCP, Rule 45(d)" (Docs. 70 and 71). While the time for Plaintiff to file a Reply in support of his "Motion for Subpoena, FRCP, Rule 45(d)" has not expired, the Court finds a Reply unnecessary.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a resident of Yuma, Arizona, initiated this action on October 2, 2017. (Doc. 1). The Court has already granted Arizona's and California's prior Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 13 and 22), finding that "Plaintiff's claims lack statutory authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity and neither Arizona nor California consent to this Court's jurisdiction." (Doc. 44 at 4). Additionally, the Court granted Metropolitan and the United States' Motions for More Definite Statement (Docs. 25 and 32). The Court instructed Plaintiff, that if he chooses to file an amended complaint, he:

must (1) state what rights he believes were violated, (2) the name of the person, persons, or entities who committed each violation, (3) what that individual did or failed to do, (4) how the action or inaction of that person is connected to the violation of Plaintiff's rights, (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of the person's conduct, and (6) why the Court is the proper venue for his claim.

(Doc. 44 at 7). On July 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 45); each Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments when they fraudulently took the water rights from an African American community living on an area known as Yuma Island. (Doc. 45 at 1). Yuma Island includes approximately 2,800 acres¹ of land located in California that Arizona owns and manages. (Doc. 54 at 7). The Arizona State Lands Department currently leases this land to approximately seventeen (17) lessees, including Plaintiff. (Id.) Metropolitan provides that, because the waters underlying Yuma Island come from the Colorado River, legal use of ground water requires a contract pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's 2006 Consolidated Decree. (Id.) The 2006 Consolidated Decree was the result of over seventy (70) years of litigation in Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006).

II. DISCUSSION

The Court may construe Plaintiff's failure to respond to all of Defendants' motions to dismiss as consent to the Court granting these motions. See LRCiv. 7.2(i) (failure to file a response to a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of it summarily); see also Wystrach v. Ciachurski, 267 F. App'x 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The court also did not abuse its discretion in applying its local rule summarily to grant defendants' motion to dismiss because plaintiffs failed timely to respond."); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Failure to follow a district court's local rules is a proper ground for dismissal."); Garcia v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 2009 WL 2782791, at * 1 (D. Ariz. 2009) ("If an argument is not properly argued and explained, the argument is waived."); Doe v. Dickenson, 2008 WL 4933964 at *5 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("[t]he Court is entitled to treat Plaintiffs' failure to respond as waiver of the issue and consent to Defendants argument"); Currie v. Maricopa County Cmty. College Dist., 2008 WL 2512841, at * 2 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("Plaintiff does not respond to this argument, and her failure to do so serves as an independent basis upon which to grant [the] motion"). Nonetheless, the Court will review the motions on their merits.

The Court will first address Arizona's and California's Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 50 and 52).

A. Arizona's and California's Motions to Dismiss

Arizona and California have moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Docs. 50 and 52). Here, Arizona and California argue that this Court cannot adjudicate Plaintiff's claims against them because the Eleventh Amendment grants sovereign immunity to states. (Doc. 50 at 3; Doc. 52 at 1). Under the Eleventh Amendment, "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, Missouri v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973). Arizona and California have made clear that they do not consent to this Court's jurisdiction. (Doc. 50 at 3; Doc. 52 at 1). Therefore, Plaintiff must providestatutory authority that abrogates state sovereign immunity for his claims.

As previously noted, Plaintiff did not respond to Arizona and California's Motions to Dismiss; however, in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, he provides that:

Arizona and California colluded in the fraudulent taking of the water rights authorized for land on the Yuma Island. Their actions violated the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Statute 2000d-7 for racial discrimination in deprivation of Civil Rights that violated the 14^th Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Section (5) of the 14^th Amendment id [sic] invoked for abrogating the 11^th Amendment Sovereign Immunity protection.

(Doc. 45 at 2). However, claiming that a constitutional right has been violated does not automatically side-step the Eleventh Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) ("Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."). Furthermore, while Plaintiff references the Civil Rights Act, he does not identify the Title of the Civil Rights Act under which he brings his claim. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims lack statutory authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and neither Arizona nor California consented to this Court's jurisdiction. Because Arizona and California maintain their sovereign immunity, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against them. The Court, therefore, grants the Motions to Dismiss filed by California and Arizona. (Docs. 50 and 52). These defendants are hereby dismissed from this action.

B. The State of Arizona is a Necessary and Indispensable Party

As the Court has determined that Arizona is entitled to sovereign immunity, the Court must now address Metropolitan's claim that if Arizona is entitled to sovereign immunity—and therefore is dismissed from this action—then Plaintiff's entire case must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), because Arizona, as the landowner, is a necessary and indispensable party to this litigation under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 19(b). (Doc. 54 at 16); see Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1964) (explaining that a motion to dismiss is the appropriate vehicle to decide dismissal for failure to join a party).

The framework for determining whether a party is necessary and indispensable is provided by Rule 19. The inquiry is a practical, fact-specific one, designed to avoid the harsh results of rigid application. Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 19 provides a three-step process for determining whether the Court should dismiss an action for failure to join a purportedly indispensable party. United States v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1999). First, the Court must determine whether the absent party is "necessary."² Rule 19(a) provides that a party is "necessary" in two circumstances: (1) when complete relief is not possible without the absent party's presence, or (2) when the absent party claims a legally protected interest in the action. See Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing those two circumstances). If the absent party is "necessary," the Court must then determine whether joinder is "feasible." Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a) & (b). Joinder is not feasible in three circumstances: (1) when venue is improper, (2) when the absentee is not subject to personal jurisdiction, and (3) when joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); see also Tick v. Cohen, 787 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir. 1986) (listing the three factors that may make joinder unfeasible). Finally, if joinder is not "feasible," the Court must then decide whether the absent party is "indispensable," i.e., whether in "equity and good conscience" the action can continue without the party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b) (listing factors for courts to consider).

Here, the crux of Plaintiff's claims is that Defendants fraudulently took the "[w]ater [e]ntitlements authorized for the land on the Yuma Island" and that he "was denied the right to acquire the water...