Williams v. Artus
| Decision Date | 04 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | 11-CV-5541 (JG) |
| Parties | ERIC WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. DALE ARTUS, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY
MEMORANDUMAND ORDERAPPEARANCES :
JANE SIMKIN SMITH
Attorney for Petitioner1
District Attorney of Suffolk County
Criminal Courts Building
By: Michael Blakey
Assistant District Attorney
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In the early morning hours of May 15, 2001, petitioner Eric Williams and his girlfriend, Rebecca Madigan, were involved in a high-speed car chase. Williams was driving his car; Madigan was his passenger. They were chasing a car driven by Melissa Singh; Candace Arena and Melissa Weiner were her passengers. A shot was fired from Williams's car at Singh'scar, which lost control and crashed spectacularly, killing Arena and seriously injuring Singh and Weiner.
Williams was charged with depraved indifference murder, and the entire focus of the trial was who fired the shot: was it Williams or Madigan? Madigan testified for the prosecution that it was fired by Williams. According to both Madigan and Williams, Williams was angry at Weiner because she owed him approximately $300 for some cocaine; Weiner was supposed to sell the cocaine for Williams but she used it instead. Williams and Madigan were chasing Weiner, who was riding in Singh's car. Madigan testified that as she and Williams pursued Singh's car at a speed of 80-90 miles per hour, Williams reached out the driver's side window with his left hand and fired the shot. For his part, Williams testified that Madigan, motivated by jealousy and a desire to both deal drugs for him and collect the debt owed to him, fired the shot out the passenger side window of the speeding car.
The trial was indisputably afflicted by serious error. Specifically, in her direct examination, Madigan testified that Williams had told her on multiple occasions that Tr. 1005.2 Even the prosecution now concedes that this testimony was so obviously inadmissible that it would have been "beyond the pale" to elicit it deliberately. OA Tr. 13.3
The events that followed this testimony were unusual and remarkable. The trial court strongly suggested that Madigan's testimony that Williams had admitted to committing an uncharged murder was so inflammatory that a mistrial would be warranted if the prosecutor had deliberately elicited it. After some dissembling, the prosecutor made it clear that she had, in fact,deliberately elicited the testimony and indeed still thought it was admissible. She also stated that the testimony was not that prejudicial because she intended to further elicit from Madigan that she did not know whether Williams had actually killed someone or was just saying he had.
Instead of declaring a mistrial, the trial judge, seemingly persuaded by this latter argument, decided the prosecutor could "soften[] the blow," Tr. 1009, of the "highly prejudicial" testimony, Tr. 1010, by allowing Madigan to testify that she had "no idea" (apart from the admission) whether Williams had in fact killed someone, Tr. 1011.
The trial judge then gave a curative instruction that was worse than the disease. In his instruction, he essentially informed the jury that it should decide if Madigan was telling the truth about Williams's admission to murder. When defense counsel pointed out the defect in the curative instruction, the judge, after a testy exchange, alighted upon what he termed the "final explanation" to the jurors on the subject, informing them: Tr. 1022.
But that instruction did not keep the prejudicial evidence out of the case. Within seconds of resuming direct examination, the prosecutor elicited the supposed "softening the blow" testimony that Madigan did not know if Williams's admissions to a prior uncharged murder were true. Tr. 1023. And later, when Williams testified in the defense case, he denied ever killing anyone or telling Madigan that he had.
Lastly, in a stunt that the prosecution now admits was "outrageous," OA Tr. 16, the prosecutor raised the issue a final time in summation. Misstating the stricken evidence to Williams's disadvantage and using it to maximum prejudicial effect, the prosecutor flatly asserted to the jury that Williams had told Madigan that "he had killed people before." Tr. 2063.
A person unfamiliar with our system would find it odd that the prosecution could candidly admit that beyond-the-pale prejudicial evidence was erroneously adduced at trial and that its prejudicial effect was made worse by an outrageously improper summation, yet still oppose relief that would have the simple effect of ordering a new, fairer trial. But under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), it is not enough for Williams to show that the state court incorrectly rejected his claims that there were multiple constitutional defects in the state court proceedings. He must further show that there is "no possibility fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" Supreme Court case law. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (emphasis added). "If this standard is difficult to meet," the Court observed in Harrington, leaving little doubt that it is, "that is because it was meant to be." Id. at 783.
Few petitions can withstand the heavy weight of AEDPA deference to state court decisions that erroneously reject federal constitutional challenges to state court convictions. But in my view this is one of them, and so, for the reasons discussed below, I grant the petition.
The facts set forth here relate principally to the grounds for habeas relief I find meritorious, which are that Williams (1) was deprived of his right to a fair trial by (a) the prosecutor's misconduct in deliberately eliciting inadmissible evidence of a prior uncharged murder by Williams and (b) the inadequate curative instruction by the trial judge when striking that evidence, resulting in its improper admission into the record; and (2) received inadequate assistance of appellate counsel who failed to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's use of Madigan's stricken testimony during summation constitutedineffective assistance of counsel. Williams has raised various other challenges to his conviction; the facts relating specifically to those claims are set forth where relevant in the "Discussion" section of this Memorandum and Order.
The following facts were undisputed at trial. Williams was a small-time drug dealer. Tr. 998 (Madigan Test.), 1888 (Williams Test.).4 He was twenty-six years old at the time of trial. Tr. 1874 (Williams Test.). He had formerly served in the Army. Tr. 1876 (Williams Test.). He owned two guns that he kept in his apartment, a Ruger P 96 and a Hi-Point 9mm. Tr. 1885 (Williams Test.). He shot guns for target practice at his parents' house in upstate New York. Tr. 1878 (Williams Test.).
At the time of the shooting, Weiner owed Williams approximately $300 for cocaine he had given her to sell. Tr. 997 (Madigan Test.), 1883 (Williams Test.). Weiner had used rather than sold that cocaine. Tr. 997 (Madigan Test.). Williams tried unsuccessfully to collect this debt and he became angry at Weiner. Tr. 999-1000, 1002 (Madigan Test.), 1887 (Williams Test.).
Madigan, who was twenty-five at the time of trial, was dating Williams. Tr. 993-94 (Madigan Test.). Madigan also served in the military, but in the Air Force. Tr. 1099-1100 (Madigan Test.). She had experience firing weapons, including handguns. Tr. 1076, 1095-98 (Madigan Test.). She had previously fired Williams's handguns at his parents' house in upstate New York. Tr. 1095-98, 1100-02, 1144-45 (Madigan Test.).
Madigan did not live with Williams but frequently stayed at his apartment. Tr. 1081 (Madigan Test.). She worked as a bartender on-and-off for five years, but was working fora construction company at the time of trial. Tr. 1072-73 (Madigan Test.). She had a history of multi-drug abuse. Tr. 1073-74 (Madigan Test.). She formerly accused an individual of rape but subsequently walked away from the case.5 Tr. 1079 (Madigan Test.).
Madigan was aware of the debt that Weiner owed Williams. Tr. 1886-87 (Williams Test.). Once, when they were discussing the issue, Madigan said to Williams, "That's what you get - that's because you let little sparkly bitches sell drugs for you."6 Tr. 1887 (Williams Test.).
In the early morning hours of May 15, 2001, Jose Morales, who was a friend of Williams, Tr. 996 (Madigan Test.), called Williams and informed him that he had spotted Weiner at a party, Tr. 1881-82 (Williams Test.). Williams and Madigan then left together in search of Weiner. Tr. 1026 (Madigan Test.), 1889 (Williams Test.). They found Weiner and two of her friends, Singh and Arena, sitting in a car in the parking lot of a 7-11 on Deer Park Avenue. Tr. 1031-32 (Madigan Test.), 1427-30 (Singh Test.), 1525-26 (Weiner Test.), 1890 (Williams Test.). Singh was in the driver's seat, Arena was next to her in the front passenger seat, and Weiner was behind Arena in the rear. Tr. 1428-29 (Singh Test.), 1526 (Weiner Test.).
When Williams and Madigan arrived at the 7-11, Singh pulled out of the parking lot and drove away. Tr. 1033 (Madigan Test.), 1430-31 (Singh Test.), 1527-28 (Weiner Test.), 1891-93 (Williams Test.). Williams and Madigan pursued them south down Deer Park Avenue, then turned off and followed them through some residential neighborhoods, and then turned back onto Deer Park Avenue headed south. Tr. 1034-36 (Madigan Test.), 1431-35 (Singh Test.),1893-96 (Williams Test.). Williams was...
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