Williams v. Artuz
Decision Date | 29 August 2000 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 99-2195 |
Citation | 237 F.3d 147 |
Parties | (2nd Cir. 2001) JAMES WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER ARTUZ, Respondent-Appellee. August Term 2000 Argued: |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Appeal from the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Allen G. Schwartz, Judge). We hold that: (i) a state prisoner's conviction becomes final for purposes of the one-year AEDPA limitations period when certiorari has been denied by the United States Supreme Court or the time for seeking certiorari has expired; and (ii) a state appellate court does not issue a ruling contrary to, nor unreasonably apply, clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it rules that a trial court's order limiting courtroom access to prevent juror distraction during the testimony of a key witness, but not excluding the public from any portion of the trial, does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.
We therefore affirm.
JONATHAN C. SCOTT, Scott & Scott, LLP, Melville, New York, for Petitioner-Appellant.
MICHAEL S. MORGAN, Assistant District Attorney (Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York County, Morrie I. Kleinbart, Assistant District Attorney, of counsel), New York, New York, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: NEWMAN, WINTER, and SACK, Circuit Judges.
James Williams appeals from Judge Schwartz's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Appellant contends that the state trial court's restrictions on entering and exiting the courtroom during a key witness's testimony deprived him of a constitutionally required public trial under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), even though the court did not exclude the public from any portion of the trial. The state argues, first, that the petition was untimely and, second, that no closure within the meaning of Waller took place. We hold that appellant's petition was timely because a state prisoner's conviction becomes final for purposes of the one-year limitations period under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) ("AEDPA"), when a writ of certiorari has been denied by the United States Supreme Court or the time for seeking such a writ has expired. As to the merits, we hold that the state appellate court did not issue a ruling contrary to, nor did it unreasonably apply, Waller when it ruled that the trial court's order limiting courtroom entrance and exit during the testimony of a key witness, but not excluding the public from any portion of the trial, does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. We therefore affirm.
Appellant was charged with murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees under N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.25(1)-(2), 265.03, and 265.02(4). The case went to trial before a jury in New York Supreme Court on January 23, 1991. On the morning of January 28, the state called Nicole Powell, the sole witness connecting appellant to the murder. Early in Powell's testimony, the trial judge found it necessary to admonish spectators in the courtroom to Shortly before the afternoon session of Powell's testimony, the trial judge instructed court officers to control entry to or exit from the courtroom during the remainder of Powell's testimony by locking the courtroom doors. Spectators were informed by the court officers that anyone who wished to enter or leave the courtroom before Powell's testimony could do so, but once her testimony began, spectators would be permitted to enter or leave only during breaks. However, the trial judge made no announcement of the closure on the record at that time. Whether a court officer informed the parties of the intended procedure off the record is disputed.
Appellant claims that he and his attorney learned of the closure only after the afternoon session of Powell's testimony had been completed, at which time his trial attorney's Legal Aid supervisor informed them that he had been denied access to the courtroom because the doors were locked. The following morning, January 29, appellant moved for a mistrial on the ground that he had been denied a public trial. The trial judge, in denying the motion, stated:
When Miss Powell began her testimony yesterday morning on direct examination there was a constant flow of people in and out of this courtroom. . . . Every time the door was opened and closed by people going into and out of the courtroom many if not all of the jurors turned their heads in the direction of the door and away from the witness, Miss Powell. It was my observation that the attention of the jurors was consistently distracted from the witness who was testifying. . . . [D]isruption occurred . . . consistently and persistently throughout the morning.
The trial judge further stated that the court officers had been instructed to make a public announcement as to the intended closure and that he was going to follow the same procedure for the remaining sessions of Powell's testimony. Appellant's counsel responded that he had a continuing objection to the locking of the courtroom doors but did not suggest alternative means of reducing juror distraction during Powell's testimony.
Appellant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of 25 years to life, 7½ to 15 years, and 3½ to 7 years, and is currently incarcerated. Appellant's conviction was unanimously affirmed by the First Department on January 30, 1996. See People v. Williams, 637 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1st Dept. 1996). He was twice denied leave to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals -- once on March 12, 1996, see People v. Williams, 666 N.E.2d 1074 (N.Y. 1996) and once on May 28, 1996, see People v. Williams, 668 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 1996) -- and his petition to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied on October 21, 1996, see Williams v. New York, 519 U.S. 952 (1996).
On October 17, 1997, appellant filed the instant petition pro se, raising four grounds for relief. The magistrate judge assigned to the case concluded that the petition had been timely filed, that two of appellant's claims should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted, and that the remaining two claims -- including the Sixth Amendment claim of a denial of a public trial -- were meritless. With respect to appellant's Sixth Amendment claim, the magistrate found that the trial judge's locking of the courtroom doors "did not amount to a 'closure' for Sixth Amendment purposes." Williams v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 8740, slip op. at 23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1998) (unpublished report & recommendation).
The district judge adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation in its entirety, dismissed the petition, and denied a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), stating that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. See Williams v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 8740, slip op. at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1999) (unpublished order). Appellant filed a notice of appeal and sought a certificate of appealability and the assignment of counsel. We assigned counsel and granted a certificate of appealability limited to the Sixth Amendment claim.
"We review a district court's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus de novo." Farrington v. Senkowski, 214 F.3d 237, 240 (2d Cir. 2000).
Appellant's Sixth Amendment claim does not purport to arise from a decision of the United States Supreme Court rendered subsequent to his conviction. AEDPA imposes a one-year limitations period for petitions based on law existing at the time of the conviction, such as appellant's, starting from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Although appellant filed his habeas petition within one year of the Supreme Court's denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari, more than one year had elapsed after the New York Court of Appeals' final denial of leave to appeal. The state contends that the petition was untimely under AEDPA because the limitations period ran from the conclusion of direct review in the state courts. We disagree.
We have stated in dicta that "direct review," as used in Section 2244(d)(1)(A), refers to direct review by both the state courts and the United States Supreme Court, so that a petitioner's "conviction bec[omes] final for [AEDPA] purposes when his time to seek direct review in the United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari expire[s]." Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1998); accord Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 15 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2000).1 Earlier, we took the opposite view in dicta in Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).2
The circuits that have addressed this precise issue -- as well as several district courts in this circuit -- have held that "direct review," as used in Section 2244(d)(1)(A), includes direct review by the United States Supreme Court via writ of certiorari, and that the limitations period for state prisoners therefore begins to run only after the denial of certiorari or the expiration of time for seeking certiorari. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-60 (9th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1187 (1999); Leslie v. Artuz, 72 F. Supp. 2d 267, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Carracedo v. Artuz, 51 F. Supp. 2d 283, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Manley v. Kelley, 60 F. Supp. 2d 121, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
We agree and conclude that appellant's...
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