Williams v. Banks

• Decision Date: 13 November 1862
• Citation: 19 Md. 22
• Parties: NATHANIEL WILLIAMS, and others, v. DANIEL B. BANKS, and others.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

19 Md. 22

NATHANIEL WILLIAMS, and others, v. DANIEL B. BANKS, and others.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

November 13, 1862

In cases remanded under the Act of 1832, ch. 302, where the opinion of the Court of Appeals has been pronounced on the several questions involved in the first appeal, the decision of that Court, thus pronounced, is, by the terms of that Act made conclusive as to the points finally decided and no error can be imputed to the Court below, if its subsequent proceedings have been in conformity with that decision.

Where a claim has been allowed by the Court of Appeals, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, it is too late to plead to such claim, for the first time, the statute of limitations.

Where the defence of usury is set up to the claims of the complainants, the affirmative of this charge by the defendants rests upon them under the Act of 1845, ch. 352 and must be sustained by evidence, which can enable the Court to decide that less than the nominal amount of a promissory note has been paid for it, and how much less, so that under the 3rd sect. of the Act, the Court may ascertain the amount really due, and decree accordingly.

A complainant in a bill in equity alleges an indebtedness to him by one as maker or endorser of " certain promissory notes, " describing one of the notes filed as an exhibit with the bill; and the respondents, in their answer, make defence against " any note or notes " of the party indebted--HELD: that any promissory notes of such party, held by the complainant at the time the bill was filed, are embraced within its allegations, though filed as claims, for the first time after the cause was remanded; and also, that the plea of limitations cannot be sustained as to such of said claims as were not barred by limitations when the bill was filed.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Baltimore city.

This cause was on a former occasion before this Court. The proceedings and decision of the Court upon the first appeal, will be found reported in 11 Md. Rep., 198, & c. Subsequently to the remanding of the cause, additional claims were filed by the complainant, Banks, under a new commission, and further testimony taken, not only in reference to said additional claims, but also to those before this Court on the first appeal. Under the new commission, the complainant, Banks, as holder thereof, filed four additional promissory notes, drawn by Hannah K. Chase, and endorsed by William Chase Barney, marked D. B. B., Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, amounting to the sum of seven thousand dollars, dated on the 25th and 30th of July 1844, respectively, all of them payable two years after date; and proved by Joshua Cockey that the signatures thereto were in the handwriting of said Hannah K. Chase, and by Levi K. Bowen that the endorsements were in the handwriting of William Chase Barney; and also proved the handwriting of the signatures and endorsements to the notes filed under the original commission, prior to the first appeal. The complainants also proved by George W. Earhart, that in the Spring of 1846, at the instance of William Chase Barney, he negotiated the said four notes with Daniel B. Banks, and that he recollected meeting with Hannah K. Chase about that time, and that she stated to him that the notes were good, that they were her notes, and that she had given them to her grand-son, William Chase Barney. The defendants excepted to the declarations of Mrs. Chase as inadmissible.

The complainants also filed, under the commission, the following exhibits: 1st. Exhibit A, being the record of proceedings in a suit at law in the Superior Court of Baltimore city, wherein Richard G. Berford is plaintiff, and Nathaniel Williams and Joseph B. Williams, exrs. of Hannah K. Chase, are defendants. 2nd. Exhibit B, the record of proceedings in a suit at law in the Superior Court of Baltimore city, wherein Daniel B. Banks is plaintiff, and the said executors are defendants; to the admissibility of both of which, as evidence, the defendants excepted.

The defendants then proved, by Mrs. Mary Barney, certain declarations of William Chase Barney, and also filed three letters written by him to said witness, who was his mother, tending to show fraud on the part of the said William Chase Barney, in obtaining the said notes, and usury on the part of those by whom they were negotiated. To the admissibility of which declarations and letters, as evidence, the complainants excepted.

To claims D. B. B., No. 3 and No. 5, filed under the original commission, and claims D. B. B. Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, filed under the remanded commission, the defendants plead the statute of limitations, and also to the notes bearing date subsequent to the date of the deed of trust, and to the claims of Renwick, Mills and Elion, which were, on the former hearing, allowed by the Court of Appeals--the complainants objecting to the right of the defendants to file the plea of limitations to said claims. The defendants also excepted to all of the claims of the said Banks: 1st, " because the same and each of them were originated in usury, to which said Banks was a party; " and 2nd, " because the same were ante-dated, and were in fact, if executed by the said Hannah K. Chase, dated, as they purport to be, with the fraudulent purpose of avoiding the effect of the said deed of trust of the 2nd of August 1844, and were, in fact, signed and executed long subsequently to the execution and recording of said deed, and this was well known to said Banks."

The complainant, Daniel B. Banks, being afterwards examined, in pursuance of a petition of the defendants, to certain interrogatories therewith filed, testified that he purchased the notes, filed since the cause was remanded, from Earhart, in the early part of 1846, and that he did not recollect what he paid for them, and had no memorandum showing the amount; that he was not aware, at the time of purchasing them, that William Chase Barney had received the notes without consideration from Mrs. Chase; that he had filed a list of all the notes held by him, which were signed by Hannah K. Chase, amounting to the sum of $2,250, and that he was unable to say what proportion the respective sums paid by him bore to the notes and property, but that, to the best of his belief, the sums paid were a great deal more than one-third of the value of said notes and property.

The 5th of the interrogatories propounded to the said Banks, is in the following words: " If you held or possessed the said notes, now produced by you, since the mandate of the Court of Appeals, why did you not produce or file them before this cause was appealed on?" In reply, he testified that he did hold the said notes at the time of filing the bill of complaint, but did not then file them, because he was told by D. Stewart, his counsel, at that time, that it was unnecessary to do so, he, Stewart, having made an arrangement with N. Williams, a defendant in this cause, that they were to abide the decision of this case, and that he, Banks, was not aware it was necessary to file them, until so informed by his present counsel. The defendants excepted to the admissibility in evidence of so much of said answer as relates to the statement of D. Stewart, and also to the answers generally, " as being vague, evasive, incomplete and unsatisfactory."

The Court below, (KREBS, J.,) by its decree, overruled the defendants' exceptions and plea of limitations to the complainants' claims heretofore established by the Court of Appeals, and also the exceptions of the defendants to the claim D. B. B., No. 4, under the original commission, and to the claims D. B. B., No. 1, No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4, filed by Daniel B. Banks, under the remanded commission, in which were set up the defences of usury, ante-dating and limitations; and sustained the defendants' exceptions to Banks' answers to interrogatory No. 5. The complainants' exceptions to so much of Mrs. Mary Barney's testimony as related to conversations between her and William Chase Barney, were also sustained by the decree, and the property covered by the deed of trust of Hannah K. Chase, was thereby directed to be sold, for the payment of the claims allowed. From this decree the defendants appealed.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, GOLDSBOROUGH and COCHRAN, J.

Henry May, for the appellant:

The decree now under review, overrules our exceptions to such of the antecedent claims, as were established by this Court, in 11 Md. Rep., 228. The claims thus said to be established are:

1. Elion's judgment rendered against Mrs. Chase the 26th of March 1846. It is true, that this Court say in 11 Md Rep., 236, that limitations cannot bar this claim, as Elion obtained judgment against Mrs. Chase on the 28th of March 1846, nearly two years after the deed of trust to the appellant; but surely this Court never meant to say, that such subsequent judgment by confession against the grantor, Mrs. Chase, could prevent her prior grantees of August the second, 1844, from pleading limitations to the cause of action, as held by Elion at the date of this deed of trust. That cause of action was the note of Mrs. Chase to Elion, which matured on the 5th of January 1845, and her other note for $350, due the 7th of January 1845. No subsequent acknowledgment or confession of judgment by Mrs. Chase, could affect the right of her prior grantees to plead limitations against the cause of action, as it stood on the day of the assignment of all her property to the appellants. Owings & Piet, vs. Low, 5 G. & J., 145. These notes were filed for the first time before the commissioner, on the 17th of February 1851, some six years after their maturity. We excepted to these notes on two grounds, viz: limitations, and the payment of dividends...