Williams v. Baptist Healthcare Sys.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:16-CV-236-CHB |
| Parties | WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Several matters are presently before the Court. The first is Defendant Baptist Healthcare System, Inc.'s Objection [R 293] to Plaintiff William Williams's Bill of Costs [R 291]. The second is Baptist's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment. [R. 294]. Plaintiff did not respond to Baptist's Objection to his Bill of Costs or to Baptist's Motion to Stay. The third is Baptist's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b), for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), or for Remittitur under Rule 59(e). [R. 296]. Plaintiff responded in opposition [R. 306], and Baptist replied [R 312].[1] These matters are ripe for consideration.
On April 4, 2015, Plaintiff William Williams was working as a tow truck driver when he began to experience chest pain. [R. 300 (Trial Transcript, Testimony of Plaintiff William Williams), Vol. 3, p. 141]. He decided to go to the Paris-Bourbon County fire station, where he was administered an EKG. Id. at 145-47. Because the EKG readings did not show any dire concerns, Plaintiff left the fire station and continued about his business. Id. Later that evening, Plaintiff experienced additional chest pains and returned to the same fire station seeking treatment. Id. An EMT placed Plaintiff in an ambulance, where he was again administered an EKG. Id. This time, the EKG indicated Plaintiff was having a suspected ST-Elevation Myocardial Infraction (“STEMI”), known colloquially as a heart attack. Id. Plaintiff was taken in an ambulance to Central Baptist Hospital, now known as Baptist Health Lexington. Id. at 150.
Unbeknownst to EMS personnel transporting Plaintiff, Baptist Health Lexington was under diversion of inbound transported heart attack patients because it had no on-call cardiothoracic surgeons between April 3, 2015 and April 5, 2015. [R. 170 (Joint Statement of the Case), p. 1]; see also [301 (Trial Transcript, Testimony of Dr. Stephen Toadvine), Vol. 4, pp. 152-57]. According to Baptist, its diversion plan did not include diverting heart attack patients who had actually arrived at the hospital, but the plan was miscommunicated to the ER staff who mistakenly believed they were diverting all heart attack patients. [R. 170 (Joint Statement of the Case), p. 1]. Indeed, Baptist acknowledged that the diversion decision was not communicated in a “consistent and uniform” manner in its official response to the Office of Inspector General (OIG). [Joint Exhibit 61 (OIG Report), p. 4].
When the ambulance transporting Plaintiff was roughly ten minutes away, EMS personnel in the ambulance called Baptist to inform it of Plaintiff's arrival and his suspected STEMI. [R. 299 (Trial Transcript, Testimony of Ashley McBride), Vo. 2, p. 135]. This call was received by Nurse Micki Blankenship, who testified that she believed Baptist was only on diversion the previous Friday night, and not Saturday,, and told the ambulance to proceed to Baptist. Id. at pp. 7-8.
Following this call, Nurse Blankenship informed her Charge Nurse, Nicolas Newsome, that a STEMI patient was inbound. Id. at 52. Nurse Newsome reminded Nurse Blankenship that Baptist was unable to care for STEMI patients and that Plaintiff would need to be diverted to another hospital. Id. Nurse Blankenship then tried unsuccessfully to contact EMS personnel in the ambulance to inform them of Baptist's inability to care for Plaintiff. Id. at 16. Shortly thereafter, the ambulance carrying Plaintiff was met at the door of Baptist by Nurse Blankenship, who informed the EMS personnel that Baptist would be unable to care for Plaintiff and directed them to take him to a nearby hospital. Nurse Blankenship testified that she sent them to the University of Kentucky Medical Center. [R. 299 (Trial Transcript), Vol. 2, pp. 28-29]. However, EMS personnel testified that Nurse Blankenship directed them to Good Samaritan Hospital, and their records reflect this. [Joint Exhibit 1 (Paris-Boubon County EMS Records, p. 11]; [R. 298 (Trial Transcript), Vol. 1, p. 92]. Knowing that hospital did not have a catheterization lab, EMS personnel proceeded to University of Kentucky Medical Center. [Joint Exhibit 1 (Paris-Boubon County EMS Records, p. 11]. Once at UK Medical Center, Plaintiff underwent a successful five-vessel coronary bypass procedure. Although Plaintiff suffered no permanent damage to his heart, see [R. 248, p. 3]; [R. 298 (Trial Transcript), Vol. 1, p. 34], Plaintiff alleged his physical pain was increased and prolonged by the diversion and that he feared he would die when turned away by Baptist, worried he may not receive emergency treatment in time at UK Medical Center.
On April 1, 2016, Plaintiff sued Baptist in Jefferson County Circuit Court, asserting claims for medical negligence, negligence per se, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395DD, otherwise known as the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”). See [R. 1-1 (“Complaint”), ¶¶ 14-28]. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 8. On April 22, 2016, Baptist removed the case to this Court. See [R. 1 (“Notice of Removal”)]. After a lengthy discovery period, on September 30, 2019, the Court granted summary judgment to Baptist on some of Plaintiff's claims, including Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, leaving only claims for common law medical negligence and EMTALA violations and the issue of damages for trial. [R. 143]. At a pretrial conference held October 25, 2021,[2] the Court reconsidered that decision and reinstated Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. See [R. 204]; [R. 205]. On Baptist's motion [R. 226], the Court then continued generally the jury trial originally set for November 29, 2021. [R. 227].
The case ultimately proceeded to trial on September 6, 2022. At the close of proof, Baptist stipulated to liability on Plaintiffs' remaining claims and the jury was instructed as a matter of law that Baptist violated EMTALA and the standard of care a reasonably competent hospital staff had a duty to meet. [R. 248, p. 3]; [R. 287 (Jury Instructions), pp. 17, 18]. The jury was therefore left to consider the issue of gross negligence and what damages, if any, Plaintiff was entitled to for the emotional distress and pain and suffering caused by Baptist's EMTALA violations and medical negligence. The jury ultimately awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $545,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $1,850,000. The Court entered Judgment of $2,395,000 on September 13, 2022. [R. 290].
Plaintiff filed his Bill of Costs with the Court on September 14, 2022. [R. 291]. Baptist timely objected to certain fees, including a $3,325 deposition fee for Baptist's expert witness Dr. John Hyde, a $2,000 deposition fee for Defendant's expert witness Dr. Jeffrey Breall, and a $499.55 fee for a transcript of the October 25, 2021 Pretrial Conference. [R. 293, p. 1]. Baptist asks the Court to set aside the deposition fees of Drs. Hyde and Breall because expert witness fees are not permitted to be taxed as costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and to reduce the transcript fee for the Pretrial Conference because Baptist split the cost of obtaining the transcript with Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not respond to Baptist's Objections.
Rule 54 provides that “costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). Costs under Rule 54(d) “are confined to the costs itemized in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 481 F.3d 355, 359 (6th. Cir. 2007) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)). Section 1920 dictates that a judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
28 U.S.C. § 1920. The Sixth Circuit has clarified that “expert witness fees may not be taxed as costs at a court's discretion under Rule 54(d) because § 1920 does not provide for them.” L & W Supply Corp. v. Acuity, 475 F.3d 737, 741 (6th. Cir. 2007). “Therefore, [a prevailing party] is not entitled to recover expert witness fees (i.e., the hourly rate charged for the expert's time and services).” Id.
Baptist is correct, therefore, that the deposition fees for Drs. Hyde and Breall cannot be taxed as costs. As Baptist notes, the deposition transcript fees may properly be taxed as costs, see 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), but the fees paid to the experts themselves cannot be unless the experts are court appointed, see id. at § 1920(6). For this reason, the Court sustains Baptist's objections with respect to those fees and will direct the Clerk of Court to set aside the $3,325 deposition fee for expert witness Dr. John Hyde and the $2,000 deposition fee for expert witness Dr. Jeffrey Breall.
Baptist also asks the Court to reduce by one-half the transcript fee claimed by Plaintiff from the October 25, 2021 Pretrial Conference since the...
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