Williams v. Beemiller, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2013
• Parties: Daniel WILLIAMS and Edward Williams, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. BEEMILLER, INC., Doing Business as Hi–Point, Charles Brown, MKS Supply, Inc., Defendants–Respondents, et al., Defendants, and The United States, Respondent. (Appeal No. 1.)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

103 A.D.3d 1191
962 N.Y.S.2d 834
2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 00670

Daniel WILLIAMS and Edward Williams, Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
BEEMILLER, INC., Doing Business as Hi–Point, Charles Brown, MKS Supply, Inc., Defendants–Respondents, et al., Defendants,
and
The United States, Respondent. (Appeal No. 1.)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Feb. 1, 2013.

[962 N.Y.S.2d 835]

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.

[103 A.D.3d 1191]We reject the alternative contention of MKS in support of affirmance that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for common-law negligence or public nuisance under New York law ( see generally Parochial Bus Sys. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 N.Y.2d 539, 545–546, 470 N.Y.S.2d 564, 458 N.E.2d 1241). With respect to the common-law negligence cause of action, although “ ‘[a] defendant generally has no duty to control the conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from harming others' ” ( Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055, quoting D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 88, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 896), “[a] duty may arise ... where there is a relationship ... between defendant and a third-person tortfeasor that encompasses defendant's actual control of the third person's actions” ( id.). In Hamilton, the Court of Appeals determined that no such relationship existed because the plaintiffs were unable to draw any connection between specific gun manufacturers and the criminal wrongdoers ( id. at 233–234, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055). Indeed, Stephen Fox, one of the plaintiffs in Hamilton, did not know the source of the gun used to shoot him, and thus plaintiffs were unable to show “that the gun used to harm plaintiff Fox came from a source amenable to the exercise of any duty of care that plaintiffs would impose upon defendant manufacturers” ( id. at 234, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055). Here, by contrast, plaintiffs

[962 N.Y.S.2d 836]

have alleged that defendants sold the specific gun used to shoot plaintiff to an unlawful straw purchaser for trafficking into the criminal market, and that defendants were aware that the straw purchaser was acting as a conduit to the criminal gun market. Thus, unlike in Hamilton, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that defendants “were a direct link in the causal chain that resulted in plaintiffs' injuries, and that defendants were realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs” (...