Williams v. Belknap

• Decision Date: 24 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 00-40183.,CIV. 00-40183.
• Citation: 154 F.Supp.2d 1069
• Parties: Britt WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Pittsfield Township Police Officer John BELKNAP, in his individual capacity, and Washtenaw County Deputy Paula Donnelly, in her individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Page 1069

154 F.Supp.2d 1069

Britt WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Pittsfield Township Police Officer John BELKNAP, in his individual capacity, and Washtenaw County Deputy Paula Donnelly, in her individual capacity, Defendants.

No. CIV. 00-40183.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

July 24, 2001.

Juliet M. Brodie, Bridget M. McCormack, Michigan Clinical Law Program, Ann Arbor, MI, for plaintiff.

James A. Fink, Cynthia L. Reach, Ian J. Reach, Reach, Ranney, Ann Arbor, MI, G. Gus Morris, Cox, Hodgman, Troy, MI, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GADOLA, District Judge.

Before the Court are the motions for summary judgment of Defendant Belknap [docket entries 62 and 88] and Defendant Donnelly [docket entry 89], as well as Defendant Donnelly's motion to impose sanctions on Plaintiff's counsel, filed on July 17, 2001. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(e), the Court concludes that a hearing would not aid in the disposition of these motions. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny each of these motions. The Court will also order attorney Cynthia L. Reach to show cause in writing as to why she is not in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b).

I BACKGROUND

Defendants are law enforcement officers who were present when a group of police officers arrested Plaintiff's paramour, Mr. Brian Bogan, on May 17, 1998. While police were arresting Mr. Bogan, Plaintiff arrived on the scene. For reasons that remain in dispute, police also took Plaintiff into custody. Although Plaintiff faced charges of resisting arrest and obstruction of an officer pursuant to M.C.L. 750.479, those charges have since been dismissed.

On April 4, 2001, Plaintiff filed her second amended complaint ("SAC"). In it, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated her right to be free of an unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant "threw Plaintiff to the ground," "used Plaintiff's hair to pull back her head," and then "sprayed Plaintiff's face and eyes excessively with pepper spray." (SAC at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that these actions constituted excessive force. (SAC at ¶ 11.)

Each Defendant now moves for summary judgment, and Defendant Donnelly moves for the Court to impose sanctions on Plaintiff's counsel.

II MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an essential element of the nonmoving party's case on which the nonmoving party would bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 968 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir.1992).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987). The Court is not required or permitted, however, to judge the evidence or make findings of fact. Id. at 1435-36. The moving party has the burden of showing conclusively that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1435.

A fact is "material" for purposes of summary judgment where proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or a defense advanced by the parties. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984). A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Accordingly, where a reasonable jury could not find that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.; Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 654 (6th Cir.1993).

Once the moving party carries the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts to prove that there is a genuine issue for trial. To create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must present more than just some evidence of a disputed issue. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the [nonmoving party's] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Consequently, the nonmoving party must do more than raise some doubt as to the existence of a fact; the nonmoving party must produce evidence that would be sufficient to require submission of the issue to the jury. Lucas v. Leaseway Multi Transportation Service, Inc., 738 F.Supp. 214, 217 (E.D.Mich.1990), aff'd, 1991 WL 49687, 929 F.2d 701 (6th Cir.1991). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 106 S.Ct. 2505; see Cox v. Kentucky Department of Transportation, 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir.1995).

The crux of Plaintiff's case is that Defendants "threw Plaintiff to the ground," "sprayed Plaintiff's face and eyes excessively with pepper spray," and arrested Plaintiff, even though Plaintiff did not resist or interfere with the officers. Thus, Plaintiff contends, have Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of police officers' use of excessive force.¹

To succeed on a claim of excessive force, a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the officers' actions, considering the totality of the circumstances, were objectively unreasonable. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Relevant to this inquiry is "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. One must assess these factors "from the perspective of the reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. "Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment." Id.; Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir.2001).

Regarding "the severity of the crime at issue," Plaintiff adduces evidence in the form of her deposition testimony to the effect that there was no crime at issue. That is, Plaintiff testified that she was peacefully standing on the steps to Mr. Bogan's apartment, and in no way interfering with police, when Defendants threw her to the ground and sprayed her eyes with an irritant. (Williams Dep. 121-25.) Plaintiff also provides her deposition testimony to the effect that she was not posing a risk to anyone, and that she was not resisting or evading arrest. (Williams Dep. 122-25.) According to her deposition testimony, despite Plaintiff's passivity before and during her physical contact with police, police nonetheless threw Plaintiff to the ground, sprayed an irritant in Plaintiff's eyes, and then arrested Plaintiff. (Williams Dep. 122:15-25.) Plaintiff also adduces evidence that implicates each specific Defendant in these acts.

Plaintiff puts forth evidence that Defendant Belknap threw her to the ground and held her down without justification. Specifically, Plaintiff points to Defendant Belknap's admission that he forced Plaintiff to the ground and pinned Plaintiff down. (Belknap Dep. 59-71.) That evidence, combined with Plaintiff's own deposition testimony, would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Defendant Belknap threw Plaintiff to the ground and held her down without justification.

As to Defendant Donnelly, Plaintiff adduces evidence that she pinned Plaintiff down and sprayed an irritant in Plaintiff's eyes. For this proposition, Plaintiff relies most persuasively upon the deposition testimony of an eyewitness, Mr. John W. Mailey, Jr. Mr. Mailey testified to the effect that a "fat, short, stocky" female officer pinned Plaintiff to the ground and sprayed an irritant in Plaintiff's eyes. (Mailey Dep. at 78:1-7). Plaintiff also adduces Defendant Donnelly's deposition testimony to the effect that Defendant Donnelly is no more than "[f]ive, five and-a-half" feet tall, and weights roughly 150 pounds (Donnelly Dep. at 42:12) and the testimony of Defendant Belknap that the only other female officer on site was tall and thin (Pl. Exh. 1 at 143). A reasonable juror could conclude from this evidence that Defendant Donnelly pinned Plaintiff and sprayed an irritant in Plaintiff's eyes.

Despite the evidence that Plaintiff has adduced, Defendants move for summary judgment. Both Defendants argue that the doctrine of qualified immunity insulates them from suit, and Defendant Donnelly argues that the Court should grant summary judgment in her favor because Plaintiff has adduced no evidence that would show that Defendant Donnelly (1) "had any involvement in [Plaintiff's arrest]" or (2) ...