Williams v. Bell, s. 76-1833

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before McGOWAN, TAMM and ROBINSON; Opinion for the Court filed by SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III; SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III
• Citation: Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 190 U.S.App.D.C. 343 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
• Decision Date: 19 September 1978
• Docket Number: 76-1994,Nos. 76-1833,s. 76-1833
• Parties: 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1662, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8605, 190 U.S.App.D.C. 343 Diane R. WILLIAMS v. Griffin B. BELL et al., Harvey Brinson, Appellant. Diane R. WILLIAMS v. Griffin B. BELL, Individually and as Attorney General, et al., Appellants.

Page 1240

587 F.2d 1240 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1662, 17 Empl. Prac.
Dec. P 8605,
190 U.S.App.D.C. 343 Diane R. WILLIAMS
v.
Griffin B. BELL et al., Harvey Brinson, Appellant.
Diane R. WILLIAMS
v.
Griffin B. BELL, Individually and as Attorney General, et
al., Appellants. Nos. 76-1833, 76-1994. United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit. Argued Oct. 20, 1977.
Decided Sept. 19, 1978.

Page 1241

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil Action No. 74-186).

Paul Blankenstein, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Barbara Allen Babcock, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Kopp, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellants Griffin B. Bell et al.

Lawrence J. Speiser, Washington, D. C., for appellant Harvey Brinson.

Michael D. Hausfeld, Washington, D. C., with whom Jerry S. Cohen, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before McGOWAN, TAMM and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge.

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:

After exhausting her administrative remedies unfruitfully, appellee brought suit in the District Court alleging gender-based employment discrimination in violation of Title VII, § 717(a), of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ¹ The gravamen of her complaint was that she was harassed and ultimately dismissed from her position in the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice because she repulsed her supervisor's sexual overtures. Following a remand to the Department under instructions to apply specified standards of proof, the court, confining its consideration to the administrative record, rejected the Department's final decision finding no unlawful discrimination, perceived substantial evidentiary support for the contrary finding in the recommended decision of the Department's complaints examiner and granted appellee's motion for judgment. ²

The Department ³ subsequently moved for a trial de novo, invoking the Supreme Court's holding in Chandler v. Roudebush on that score. ⁴ Contemporaneously, appellee's supervisor, Harvey Brinson, sought intervention to urge that the judgment be vacated and a new trial awarded. Upon denial of these requests, the Department and Brinson initiated separate appeals. ⁵

Page 1242

We conclude that the judgment cannot be sustained on the District Court's review of the administrative record and accordingly remand for a trial of appellee's claim de novo. ⁶ We vacate the order denying Brinson's intervention and leave to the District Court the definition of his role in the de novo proceedings. ⁷ I

Appellee commenced employment with the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice as a public information specialist under a temporary appointment not to exceed one month. Within three weeks, she was elevated to career-conditional status at a higher grade, subject to completion of a one-year probationary period. Appellee maintains that during the first five months of her employment she experienced a favorable working relationship with Brinson but that thereafter he made sexual advances toward her which she rebuffed. In retaliation, her allegations continue, Brinson undertook to harass and humiliate appellee by castigating her without proper cause, refusing to entertain her recommendations, denying her information necessary to the performance of her duties, and ultimately terminating her employment. The Community Relations Service, on the other hand, insists that appellee increasingly exhibited a negative attitude and did unsatisfactory work, which together eventually necessitated her discharge.

After Brinson apprised appellee of his intention to dismiss her, she filed a formal complaint asserting sex discrimination. An equal employment opportunity officer investigated but found no unlawful discrimination. ⁸ Appellee was afforded an administrative hearing and in due course the Department's complaints examiner issued his recommended decision to dismiss the charge as unfounded. ⁹ That proposal was adopted by the Department's complaint adjudication officer. ¹⁰

Appellee then brought her action in the District Court, alleging discrimination predicated on her gender, and seeking back pay and declaratory and injunctive relief. She contended that her case should be heard by the court de novo. At that time, and until the Supreme Court decided Chandler v. Roudebush, ¹¹ the Department maintained that federal employees could not obtain de novo judicial consideration of Title VII claims but only a determination whether, strictly on the basis of the administrative record, the agency decision was rational. Addressing the litigation on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, and without expressly deciding whether appellee's claim of sex harassment was cognizable under Title VII, the District Court held that the administrative record revealed "proof suggestive of discrimination" and that the Department "had failed to come forward and affirmatively establish the absence of discrimination by the clear weight of the evidence." ¹² Accordingly, the court denied the summary-judgment motions and remanded the case to the Department for additional administrative hearings wherein it would have the burden of demonstrating in that fashion that the discrimination appellee charged had in fact not been practiced. ¹³

A new administrative hearing was then conducted, and testimony was elicited from Brinson and another witness, Ms. Ruth Spencer, who had been employed at the Community Relations Service contemporaneously with appellee. A new complaints examiner subsequently issued a recommended

Page 1243

decision, which this time concluded that the Department had not discharged its burden, and that appellee "was discriminated against because of sex and the acts of her immediate supervisor in intimidating, harassing, threatening and eventually terminating her." ¹⁴ The complaint adjudication officer, who had rendered the agency's decision when the case had previously been presented for administrative review, ¹⁵ rejected that position and again held that appellee was not a victim of sex discrimination. ¹⁶

The parties then returned to the District Court. Without further effort to secure a trial de novo, ¹⁷ appellee moved for judgment on the merits, urging the court to reject the Department's ultimate decision and to reinstate that of the complaints examiner. The Department, however, renewed its motion for summary judgment, asserting that the record established that appellee's discharge was nowise connected with her supervisor's advances. Although by that time we had held that federal employees who are plaintiffs in Title VII suits are entitled to trials de novo, ¹⁸ the court declined to consider the case de novo because both parties had sought judgment on the administrative record. ¹⁹

Allocating the burden of proof in the manner earlier announced, ²⁰ the District Court deemed evidence in that record suggestive of discrimination sufficient to compel the Department affirmatively to establish the absence of discrimination by the clear weight of the evidence. ²¹ Characterizing the decision of the complaint adjudication officer as "wholly...