Williams v. Belleque
| Decision Date | 09 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | 3: 03-cv-01678-JO |
| Parties | JEFFERY RAY WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. BRIAN E. BELLEQUE, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Michael R. Snedeker
Lisa R. Short
Snedeker, Smith & Short
PMB 422, 4110 S.E. Hawthorne Blvd.
Portland, Oregon 97214
Attorneys for Petitioner
Ellen F. Rosenblum
Attorney General
Timothy A. Sylwester
Michael S. Shin
Assistant Attorneys General
Department of Justice
1162 Court Street NE
Salem, Oregon 97301
Attorneys for Respondent
Petitioner brings this capital habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges his convictions and death sentence for aggravated murder. In this Opinion and Order, I resolve on the merits: (1) claims the parties agree were fairly presented to the Oregon courts; (2) claims for which the State waives its procedural default defense; and (3) certain claims I deem can be denied on the merits regardless of whether they are defaulted. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1997)(federal habeas court may bypass question of procedural default to deny claim on the merits); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)("An application for writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State."). I reserve my examination of the remaining claims, including whether Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) excuses the default of certain claims or subclaims, pending final briefing from the parties.1
Petitioner was initially tried, convicted and sentenced to death in 1989. On direct review, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld petitioner's convictions but remanded the case for a new penalty-phase trial. See State v. Williams, 313 Or. 19, 828 P.2d 1006 (Williams I), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 858 (1992).
In August 1993, the second penalty-phase jury again sentenced petitioner to death. On direct review, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the death sentence. See State v. Williams, 322 Or. 620, 912 P.2d 364 (Williams II), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 854 (1996).
Petitioner next filed for post-conviction relief ("PCR") in state court. The PCR court held an evidentiary trial and denied relief. Respondent's Exhibits 168 & 169. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Williams v. Palmateer, 184 Or. App. 761, 58 P.3d 244 (2002), rev. denied, 335 Or. 656, 75 P.3d 899 (2003).
On March 16, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [85]. At my request, the parties briefed several of petitioner's strongest claims in an effort to determine whether I could summarily resolve one or more of those claims in petitioner's favor on the current record and without further extensive proceedings. I denied petitioner's partial summary judgment motion on September 8, 2008. Thereafter, on September 13, 2010, I granted in part and denied in part the State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on procedural default grounds and directed further briefing from the parties on exceptions to procedural default. See Opinion and Order [199]. Due to a conflict bearing on the Oregon Federal Public Defender's ability to continue to represent petitioner, I appointed current counsel.
On February 18, 2014, I granted petitioner's unopposed motion for leave to file an amended petition. The Amended Petition [314] raises twenty-one (21) claims and numerous sub-claims. The parties have briefed the merits of these claims.
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An application for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless adjudication of the claim in state court resulted in a decision that was: (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's findings of fact are presumed correct and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A state court decision is "contrary to . . . clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant relief "if the state court identifies the correct legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. The "unreasonable application" clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. A federal habeas court reviews the state court's "last reasoned decision." Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991).
For petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance, discussed in sections A, B, C and H of this opinion, the Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether a petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the petitioner must show that his lawyer'sperformance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). Due to the difficulties in evaluating counsel's performance, courts must indulge a strong presumption that the conduct falls within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Second, the petitioner must show that his lawyer's performance prejudiced the defense. The appropriate test for prejudice is whether the defendant can show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.
When considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), "it is the habeas applicant's burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)(per curium). Moreover, where a state court has adjudicated an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits, a habeas court's review of a claim under the Strickland standard is "doubly" deferential. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88-89 (2011); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).
As noted above, the Amended Petition raises 21 claims, along with numerous sub-claims.
1. Claim 1(A)(1) - Guilt-phase counsel failed to fully investigate both the guilt and sentencing phases of the case in order to prepare an adequate defense for petitioner's capital trial. No capital defense team can make a reasonable tactical decision about how to pursue a defense at either phase without first conducting an adequate investigation
The parties agree that petitioner fairly presented this claim to the Oregon courts. However, for the reasons set forth in my prior Opinion and Order [120], pp. 14-31, I conclude that he cannot prevail on this claim which generally alleges that guilt-phase counsel failed to fully investigate both phases of the case in order to prepare an adequate defense for petitioner's capital trial because he cannot demonstrate as a general matter that the PCR court's denial of this claim involved an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. I note that in several of petitioner's discreet guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") subclaims set forth below he alleges specific investigative failings on counsel's part and challenges specific factual findings by the PCR court related to these alleged investigative failures. I will address those subclaims individually.
Similarly, I have considered petitioner's arguments that no deference is due any of the PCR court's findings of fact or conclusions of law because that court improperly minimized its role in the post-conviction process and placed arbitrary limitations on petitioner's PCR counsel which created a wholly defective process. Having reviewed petitioner's extensive arguments, I decline to find that the entire post-conviction process was constitutionally defective. However, in the context of particular claims, where petitioner specifically challenges certain of the PCR court's findings of fact or conclusions of law on the basis that the process afforded him during his PCR proceedings denied him a constitutionally adequate avenue for presentation of particular claims, I will examine whether deference to the PCR court is warranted as to those individual claims.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the PCR court's denial of this subclaim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Court, or that it was based on an unreasonabledetermination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State court. Accordingly, I deny it on the merits.2
2. Claim 1(A)(2)(e) - Guilt-phase counsel failed to move to ensure that all bench conferences were recorded and failed to object when they were not. Counsel also failed to make a record of topics and results of the unrecorded bench conferences
Relevant to this claim is the following PCR court finding of fact: "[t]he trial court did not discuss...
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