Williams v. Bench

• Decision Date: 21 August 2008
• Docket Number: No. 20070029-CA.,20070029-CA.
• Parties: ShaRon WILLIAMS and Lynn Williams, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Dennis BENCH; Brent Bodily; Adam Christofferson; Craig Christofferson; Robert Eames; Devon Ellis; Mickey Ellis; Jerry Fulmer; Jimmy Germer; Dale Hammon; Scott Hammon; Mike Howell; Brent Keyes; Ray Page; Don Palfreyman; Dave Squires; Greg Warg; Mac White; Bruce Woolsey; Ryan Woolsey; B.J. Burkdoll; Jim Burkdoll; Gary McDaniel; Jim Vowles; John Elwess; Harold Luni; Bill New; Scott New; John New; Jack Harris; Bruno Perry; Lyle Mason; Bob Larvee Jr.; Stags Car Club, a voluntary unincorporated association; and Ralph S. Wiggins, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

193 P.3d 640

2008 UT App 306

ShaRon WILLIAMS and Lynn Williams, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Dennis BENCH; Brent Bodily; Adam Christofferson; Craig Christofferson; Robert Eames; Devon Ellis; Mickey Ellis; Jerry Fulmer; Jimmy Germer; Dale Hammon; Scott Hammon; Mike Howell; Brent Keyes; Ray Page; Don Palfreyman; Dave Squires; Greg Warg; Mac White; Bruce Woolsey; Ryan Woolsey; B.J. Burkdoll; Jim Burkdoll; Gary McDaniel; Jim Vowles; John Elwess; Harold Luni; Bill New; Scott New; John New; Jack Harris; Bruno Perry; Lyle Mason; Bob Larvee Jr.; Stags Car Club, a voluntary unincorporated association; and Ralph S. Wiggins, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20070029-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

August 21, 2008.

Bradley L. Booke and Jacque M. Ramos, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.

Gary L. Johnson and Michael K. Woolley, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.

Before GREENWOOD, P.J., THORNE, Associate P.J., and McHUGH, J.

OPINION

GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Plaintiffs ShaRon and Lynn Williams appeal the district court's grant of Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.¹ Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in (1) concluding that they had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and (2) refusing to allow them to amend their complaint upon granting Defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs also contend that it was procedurally improper for the trial court to certify its dismissal of Defendants as a final order pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the trial court failed to make appropriate factual findings supporting such a determination. We affirm.

BACKGROUND²

¶ 2 On September 12, 2004, Stags Car Club (the Club)—a voluntary, unincorporated association —held a "steak fry" at George Whalen Park in Roy, Utah, for members and their invited guests.³ Mrs. Williams attended the steak fry with her husband, Lynn Williams. Shortly after arriving at the park, Mrs. Williams "lay down on the grass between two trees and fell asleep." Not long after, the secretary of the Club, Ralph S. Wiggins, climbed into his pickup truck "to drive to get a cooler for use by Defendant Stags Car Club in the course of [the steak fry] and for the benefit of its members, including Defendants." Upon driving away, Wiggins drove over and severely injured Mrs. Williams as she lay sleeping.

¶ 3 Plaintiffs originally filed suit against Wiggins, the Club, and John Does 1-100, alleging that the John Does were both directly and vicariously liable for Mrs. Williams's injuries due to their membership in the Club, their responsibilities related to hosting the steak fry, and their receipt of the privileges and benefits of Club membership. Upon stipulation, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint naming the Club, Wiggins, and Defendants, all of whom are Club members.

¶ 4 The Amended Complaint likewise alleged that Defendants were each individually liable for Mrs. Williams's injuries because they, as members of the Club and as persons responsible for the event, owed a duty "to exercise a reasonable lookout and reasonable care for persons present at and participating in the event, including without limitation a duty to observe the movement of vehicles at the event and to warn persons of the presence of moving motor vehicles." In addition, the Amended Complaint alleged that Defendants were "vicariously liable for the negligent acts of [Wiggins] ... [b]y virtue of their status as members of [the Club] ... and as recipients of the privileges and benefits of membership [in the Club]."

¶ 5 Several of the named defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although defendant Jimmie Germer had earlier filed and briefed a motion for summary judgment, all of the named defendants—except Wiggins and the Club—ultimately joined in the motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. On November 30, 2006, the trial court signed an order (the Order) dismissing Defendants pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) and certifying the dismissal as final pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. R. 54(b). After the Order was issued, Defendants filed proposed findings of fact and rationale for the trial court's consideration. Plaintiffs filed a notice of objection to the proposed findings and rationale, but then filed this appeal prior to the trial court having ruled on the objection. The trial court subsequently issued Findings and Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final Per Rule 54(b). Plaintiffs appeal.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 6 Plaintiffs raise three claims on appeal.⁴ First, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erroneously dismissed their complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) is a question of law that we review for correctness, affording the trial court's decision no deference. See Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ¶ 53, 116 P.3d 323 (citing St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)).

¶ 7 Second, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in failing to grant them leave to amend their complaint. "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend a complaint absent a clear abuse of discretion." Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994). A trial court will be deemed to have abused its discretion where "`the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Id. (additional internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994)).

¶ 8 Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in certifying the Order as a final, appealable order pursuant to rule 54(b). The propriety of a trial court's determination that an order is amenable to rule 54(b) certification is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991). The related question of whether there is no just reason for delay is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984). We address the certification argument first because it has jurisdictional implications. See Utah R.App. P. 3(a); Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 649 (noting that an appeal is generally improper unless taken from a final judgment or order).

ANALYSIS

I. Rule 54(b) Certification

¶ 9 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in certifying its dismissal of Defendants as a final, appealable order pursuant to rule 54(b) because the trial court did not enter findings supporting its certification until after the notice of appeal was filed. Plaintiffs do not, however, present any fully developed arguments that certification was substantively improper. As a result, we do not engage in an in-depth analysis of the substantive propriety of certification. See e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (stating that appellate courts will generally not address an argument that is inadequately briefed); see also Dimick v. OHC Liquidation Trust, 2007 UT App 73, ¶ 5 n. 4, 157 P.3d 347 (stating that court would not address claim of error regarding a 54(b) certification when claim was withdrawn at oral argument).

¶ 10 After the trial court entered the Order, Defendants submitted Proposed Findings and Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final Per Rule 54(b). Plaintiffs responded by filing a Notice of Objection to Defendants['] Proposed Findings and Rationale. This Notice did not specifically address the substance of the proposed findings and rationale, but requested an opportunity to file a responsive brief. About twelve days later, and before the trial court had responded to their objection, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on January 8, 2007. On January 17, the trial court entered Findings and Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final Per Rule 54(b) (Findings and Rationale). Neither party filed motions to remand or to dismiss on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. In fact, Plaintiffs filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal with numerous documents filed in the trial court, including the trial court's Findings and Rationale regarding the 54(b) certification. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs now argue that certification was in error because the Findings and Rationale was not entered prior to the notice of appeal. Plaintiffs assert that the trial court lacked jurisdiction at that point. They further contend that certification was erroneous because Plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to brief their objections to the proposed findings and rationale.

¶ 11 We have previously noted that, as a general rule, "[a]n appeal is improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that is not final." Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 649. However, rule 54(b) provides a limited exception to the final judgment rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b); Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 12, 5 P.3d 649. In a case involving multiple parties and/or claims, rule 54(b) allows a trial court to certify as final "one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the [trial] court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added).

¶ 12 The Utah Supreme Court discussed the intricacies and purposes of rule 54(b) certification in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984), and Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). In Pate, the court identified three requirements for proper rule 54(b) certification as follows:

First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an order that would be appealable but...