Williams v. Berry

• Decision Date: 19 July 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:13CV38TSL–JMR.
• Citation: 977 F.Supp.2d 621
• Parties: Elizabeth WILLIAMS, Individually, and as Class Representative of All Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs v. Richard “Rickey” BERRY, in His Official Capacity, and Mississippi Department of Human Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

977 F.Supp.2d 621

Elizabeth WILLIAMS, Individually, and as Class Representative of All Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs

v.Richard “Rickey” BERRY, in His Official Capacity, and Mississippi Department of Human Services, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:13CV38TSL–JMR.

United States District Court,

S.D. Mississippi,

Jackson Division.

Signed July 19, 2013.

Lisa Mishune Ross, Attorney, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiffs.

Douglas T. Miracle, Mississippi Attorney General's Office, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the motion of defendant Richard “Rickey” Berry, in his official capacity, and the Mississippi Department of Human Services, to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Elizabeth Williams has responded to the motion and the court, having considered the memoranda of authorities submitted by the parties, concludes that the motion should be granted.

Plaintiff Elizabeth Williams, individually and purporting to act on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals who rely on government-provided certificates to pay for child care, has brought the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Mississippi eChildcare program, a technology-based fingerscanning method used to issue payments to child care providers and track child care attendance for individuals who participate in the Mississippi Child Care Payment Program.

The Mississippi Child Care Payment Program (Program) is a federally-funded program designed to provide assistance with child care tuition to low-income parents who meet prescribed income and work requirements. Parents who are eligible for participation in the program may choose any type of child care, licensed or unlicensed, while participating in the program. For those who meet the guidelines, the program pays a part of the tuition cost, i.e., a subsidy payment, and the participant pays a portion, i.e., the family co-pay. Both payments go directly to the child care provider. According to the complaint, Williams has been a recipient of childcare assistance since 2009.

Defendant Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS) adopted a new rule implementing the eChildcare program, which is set to go into effect October 1, 2013. At present, attendance of children in enrolled families is tracked via sign-in/sign-out sheets maintained at the child care facilities. The eChildcare program replaces the sign-in/sign-out sheets with electronic fingers canning.¹ The eChildcare program requires that licensed child care facilities and their enrolled families utilize Point of Service (POS) machines where a parent or household designee will be fingerscanned upon dropping off or picking up the child as a way of documenting the child's attendance at the child care facility on a daily basis. For unlicensed providers, the POS system involves the use of a land-line telephone system by a parent or household designee to document attendance at the child care facility on a daily basis. Unlicensed providers and their enrolled families will utilize a telephone-based Interactive Voice Response system to track child attendance.

Each family participating in the eChildcare program is permitted up to five household designees that may drop off and pick up children at the day care provider. Parents are responsible for identifying up to four household designees that will be allowed to check the child(ren) in and out of care daily. Parents will enter the legal names of their selected household designees by logging into the Child Care Payment Program website upon completion of mandatory training. Parents and household designees must present themselves to be fingerprinted, and then must be fingerscanned each time the child is dropped off or picked up from the provider. Parents are ultimately responsible for ensuring that child attendance is recorded at the child care provider site.

According to the complaint, plaintiff Elizabeth Williams is a 23–year old single mother of two children who currently attends Mississippi State University. Williams applied for and was awarded a child care certificate beginning in September 2009 for her then one-year-old son to attend a child care center while she pursues her college degree and works to get off of government assistance. Williams alleges that she is unable to drop off and/or pick up her son from the child care center, and her mother, on whom she has thus far relied to drop off and pick up her son from the child care center, is unwilling to voluntarily undergo fingerprinting and repeated fingerscanning. Williams contends that since under MDHS policy, she must comply with all MDHS policies in order to remain eligible to receive the childcare certificate, she is thus at risk of losing her child care certificate. She alleges that the eChildcare program (1) constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment; (2) violates her reasonable expectation of privacy in her status as a recipient of government assistance; (3) interferes with her fundamental right to direct the care of her child; (4) violates her rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) violates her rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (6) violates the Supremacy Clause under Art. VI, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution. Williams seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants' enforcement of the fingerprinting and fingerscanning requirement. Defendants seek dismissal of each of plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for one or more of a number of reasons, which will be addressed herein.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Williams has named as defendants Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS) and Richard Berry, in his official capacity as Director of MDHS. Defendants initially seek dismissal of the complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that the MDHS and Director Berry, in his official capacity, are not “persons” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and on the basis that Director Berry and MDHS are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants are only partially correct. The claim against MDHS is due to be dismissed, as MDHS, an arm of the State, is not a “person” under § 1983, and has immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that a state agency is not a person for purposes of § 1983); Stewart v. Jackson County, Miss., Civil Action No. 1:07cv1270WJG–JMR, 2008 WL 4724009, *2 (S.D.Miss. Oct. 25, 2008) (finding that MDHS is an arm of the State entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). However,

[u]nder the principles established in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), “the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit in federal court against a state official to enjoin his enforcement of a state law alleged to be unconstitutional.” American Bank and Trust Co. v. Dent, 982 F.2d 917, 920 (5th Cir.1993). Moreover, “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’ ” American Bank, 982 F.2d at 921 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304).

Horton v. Mississippi State Senate, No. 95–60307, 1995 WL 581642, *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 30, 1995). See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 n. 10 (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’ ”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); See Bryant v. Starr, Civil Action No. H–11–4483, 2013 WL 1855891, *1 (S.D.Tex. Apr. 30, 2013) (“Thus, while declaratory and prospective injunctive relief cannot be pursued against the State in federal court, it can be pursued against a state official sued in his official capacity.”).²

Standing

Defendants next argue that Williams lacks prudential standing to maintain suit in federal court. “[S]tanding jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement, and prudential standing, which embodies‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction [.]’ ” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). “Constitutional standing requires that the plaintiff personally suffered some actual or threatened injury that can fairly be traced to the challenged action and is redressable by the courts.” Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 496–497 (5th Cir.2007). See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 560 (5th Cir.2001) (to satisfy constitutional standing requirement, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant and (3) that likely will be redressed by a favorable decision). Defendants do not challenge Williams' constitutional standing and have no basis for doing so. ³ With respect to each of her claims, Williams alleges that she faces the prospect of termination of her child care certificate, i.e., an injury, caused by the eChildcare program administered by defendants, which would be redressed by a favorable decision in the case.

“Prudential standing requirements exist in addition to ‘the immutable requirements of Article III,’ as an integral part of ‘judicial self-government,’ [t]he goal of [which] is to determine whether the plaintiff ‘is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute...