Williams v. Beto

• Decision Date: 02 October 1973
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 72-H-432.
• Citation: 364 F. Supp. 335
• Parties: Harry Lee WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Dr. George J. BETO, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

364 F. Supp. 335

Harry Lee WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Dr. George J. BETO, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Civ. A. No. 72-H-432.

United States District Court, S. D. Texas, Houston Division.

October 2, 1973.

Ben L. Aderholt, Houston, Tex., for petitioner.

John L. Hill, Atty. Gen. of Texas, Joe B. Dibrell, E. Bruce Curry, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

CARL O. BUE, Jr., District Judge.

This petition for a writ of habeas corpus is one of two applications before this Court based upon the same legal issue: the effect of a trial in jail clothing upon a conviction. Consecutive evidentiary hearings were held in this and in a companion case, Dennison v. Beto, Civil Action No. 70-H-702. Both petitions stem from criminal trials conducted in Harris County, Texas, and involve consideration of the alleged local practice of trying certain defendants in jail clothing.

The Factual Background

Petitioner Williams was tried in the 177th District Court of Harris County, Texas, in November, 1970, for assault to murder in connection with a knifing incident in which he inflicted severe wounds on his ex-landlord. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of assault to murder with malice; he was sentenced to ten years by the Honorable Miron A. Love, confinement to be not less than two years nor more than ten. The conviction was affirmed in a written opinion on appeal. Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The specific issues before this Court, ineffective assistance of counsel at the state trial and trial in jail clothes, were decided adversely to petitioner on direct appeal. For reasons outlined hereafter, it is important to comprehend the gravity of the circumstances surrounding the offense as extracted primarily from the transcript of the state trial.

On May 29, 1970, a fight took place between the petitioner and one Ray Neatherlin, the landlord of an apartment complex on East 7th Street in Houston, Texas. The petitioner had previously been a resident of this complex and had been asked to move out as a consequence of some unspecified difficulty. (Transcript at 142). At the time of the incident at issue, the landlord was 58 years old (Tr. 129) and weighed approximately 200 to 215 pounds (Tr. 125). The petitioner was approximately 64 years of age (Tr. 237) and was characterized by defense counsel as being of "frail body" (Tr. 17). A witness to the incident stated that the landlord was larger, more robust and physically stronger than the petitioner (Tr. 194). The landlord was not called as a witness before this Court at the petitioner's evidentiary hearing, but both men were present before the jury at the state trial.

The petitioner had gone to the apartment complex to visit a Mrs. Kay Tolley who was a witness to the fight. She did not testify at the trial, as she had moved out of state. Neighbors and subsequent trial witnesses were sitting outside of their apartments nearby, and they advised the petitioner that Mrs. Tolley was at the landlord's apartment. The petitioner awaited her return with the neighbors. The landlord testified that Mrs. Tolley was at his apartment to pay her rent and that she had told him the petitioner had returned to cause trouble (Tr. 200). The landlord promptly left his apartment to speak to the petitioner and also to inquire about certain allegedly bad checks used by petitioner to pay his rent while still living there (Tr. 113-14).

As the landlord left his apartment, he called to a neighbor, Bill Stacy, to accompany him (Tr. 133). The tone in the landlord's voice was evidently such that Stacy, expecting trouble, grabbed his pistol and stuck it in the back of his trousers as he hurried to accompany the landlord (Tr. 140-41). Mrs. Tolley and the two men reached the petitioner at about the same time (Tr. 170), Stacy testifying that he was only about a step behind the landlord (Tr. 149). The petitioner was described as appearing nervous upon seeing the landlord, and he put his hand into his right pocket and fumbled around a bit (Tr. 170-71, 185). He stepped forward to meet the landlord, his hand reportedly "cupped" (Tr. 171). The landlord characterized the petitioner's attitude as being belligerent (Tr. 117).

Words were exchanged over the checks with the petitioner denying that he owed anything (Tr. 115-16). The landlord then asked petitioner to leave (Tr. 116). Stacy testified that he quickly realized that a man-to-man confrontation was about to take place, so he assumed the role of ensuring that no one else interfered (Tr. 149, 152). The fight began when the petitioner jumped or first moved toward the landlord, striking or pushing at his neck (Tr. 117, 143, 172, 186) and continued for several minutes (Tr. 150, 174, 189) with considerable pushing, scuffling and hitting taking place (Tr. 150, 177, 190). Although the petitioner was apparently knocked down by the landlord several times, he only received a few marks and scratches (Tr. 161) and exhibited no signs of facial swelling according to the arresting police officer (Tr. 195-99). The petitioner repeatedly got up and hit the landlord (Tr. 176, 179). The landlord stated that the petitioner repeatedly tried to get in close and clinch with him (Tr. 92); Stacy stated much the same thing (Tr. 144). Only after the fight had continued for a period of time did Stacy realize that the petitioner had a knife. Stacy then pulled his gun on the petitioner, yelled a warning to the landlord (Tr. 146) and stopped the fight. At the trial witnesses testified the petitioner had been fighting with his hand cupped (Tr. 171, 186), and Stacy characterized the petitioner as appearing to be an experienced knife fighter (Tr. 144-45).

The landlord was badly cut. His testimony (Tr. 117, 119-22, 132) and that of Stacy (Tr. 146) indicate that the landlord had been cut in the throat, stabbed in the chest, cut three times over the heart and once in the stomach causing his intestines to hang out. He was taken to a hospital where he received a total of 58 stitches, his condition being listed as "critical" (Tr. 120).

The Evidentiary Hearing

At the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing held in this Court, counsel for petitioner offered evidence in affidavit form from the Clerk of the 177th District Court that during the months of October and November, 1970, there were a total of six "jail cases", i. e., defendants not released on bond, tried before juries in Judge Miron A. Love's court of which petitioner's case was one. Counsel for petitioner also introduced depositions upon written questions taken in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 31 wherein counsel for each of the five remaining "jail cases" testified that to the best of their knowledge their clients had been tried in jail clothes.

Counsel for respondent introduced several exhibits, including an affidavit from the Honorable Miron A. Love which in pertinent part recited:

I have been asked about my policy in regard to defendants who were tried in jail clothing. I can state unequivocably that if at any time a defendant or his attorney made known to me either before or during the trial that he did not wish to be tried in jail clothing, I would have granted his request, and permitted him time to obtain civilian clothing to wear at his trial.

. . . on numerous occasions I have granted requests by defendants or their attorneys for them to be allowed to obtain civilian clothes to wear at their trials. I have never compelled a defendant to go to trial in jail clothes, and on every occasion when a defendant or his attorney requested that he be allowed to wear civilian clothes at his trial I have granted the request.

Recognition of this policy was acknowledged by James Skelton, the district attorney who prosecuted petitioner at his state trial and who was a witness at this Court's evidentiary hearing. To the same effect was an affidavit obtained from one of the defense attorneys questioned by petitioner's counsel which was introduced into evidence.

Mr. Chester. Darnell, defense counsel for petitioner at the state trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that to his knowledge and belief all non-bailed defendants were tried in jail garb at that time. He testified that he never raised an objection to trial in jail clothes because a similar objection had been denied by the Honorable Wendell Odom, then a state district judge in Harris County, and counsel felt that such an objection before Judge Love would be denied as well. Counsel was unaware of Judge Love's practice as set forth above. The petitioner testified before this Court that he explicitly asked one Captain Cleveland, a Deputy Sheriff, to permit him to change clothes before his state trial, but the request was denied. He did not thereafter raise the issue with attorney Darnell or before Judge Love.

Attorney Darnell's general trial strategy in the state trial had been to try to raise the issue of self defense, but he had been unsuccessful because the petitioner would not take the stand. Darnell had conferred with the petitioner on several occasions prior to trial and had reviewed the case and evidence with the prosecutor. He had apprised the petitioner of the difficulties in the case and the progress of the trial, but the petitioner had continued to refuse to testify.

Former District Attorney Skelton testified at the evidentiary hearing that, as an experienced criminal lawyer, he would have kept the petitioner off the stand. He characterized the evidence in the case against the petitioner as highly favorable for the prosecution. He also testified that following the state trial he had ascertained that the jury was affected primarily by three factors: (1) the severity of the injuries inflicted upon the landlord; (2) the fact that the petitioner had wielded the knife like an experienced knife fighter; and (3) the fact that the victim was the landlord seeking to remove the petitioner from his own premises.

The...