Williams v. Bradley
| Decision Date | 25 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-267-HSO-JCG |
| Parties | ROBERT WILLIAMS, #167195 PLAINTIFF v. JODY BRADLEY, Warden RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
BEFORE THE COURT is the Application of Petitioner Robert Williams for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). Respondent Jody Bradley, Warden of the Wilkinson County Correctional Facility in Woodville, Mississippi, has filed a Motion to Dismiss Williams' Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Respondent asserts that the Petition was filed over four months late and is barred by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 12). The undersigned United States Magistrate Judge recommends that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) be granted because Williams' habeas claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Williams' habeas claims are also procedurally barred because Williams failed to exhaust available remedies in State court before filing suit in federal court.
Petitioner Williams is a postconviction inmate in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Williams pleaded guilty and was convicted on April 18, 2011, in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi. Williams pleaded guilty to one count of receiving stolen property in Cause No. B2401-2010-394, one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in Cause No. 2401-2010-123, and one count of malicious mischief in Cause No. B2402-2010-612. (ECF No. 12-1). Williams was sentenced to a term of ten (10) years in Cause No. B2401-2010-394, ten (10) years in Cause No. B2401-2011-123, and five (5) years in Cause No. B2402-2010-612, all to run consecutive for a total of twenty-five years. Id. Williams was ordered to attend and complete the Regimented Inmate Discipline Program and the Long Term Drug and Alcohol Program and to be brought back before the Circuit Court for possible resentencing upon completion of those programs.
Williams completed the programs and was resentenced on February 13, 2012, to his original sentence of twenty-five years, suspended, with three years of reporting probation. However, on March 26, 2013, the Circuit Court revoked Williams' probation for probation violations, ordering:
The Defendant shall participate in the Therapeutic Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Program and shall not be released until he successfully completes this program. Upon completion, the Defendant shall be brought back before this court for possible reconsideration of sentence.
(ECF No. 1-1).1
Nearly a year later, Williams received a Rule Violation while incarcerated. During a shakedown, he "was found to have a Samsung Cellphone in his pocketalong with 2 pks, of what appeared to be spice, and two packs of cigarettes." (ECF No. 1-1).2 On March 24, 2014, the Circuit Court found that Williams had not successfully completed the Therapeutic Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation program because he had been kicked out of the program. The Circuit Court resentenced Williams to his original sentence of twenty-five years, with credit for time served. Williams' motion to reconsider his sentence was denied. (ECF No. 12-9, 12-10).
On July 6, 2015, over a year after he was resentenced, Williams filed a Motion for Postconviction Collateral Relief in the Circuit Court. (ECF No. 12-11). The Motion was denied on July 29, 2015. The Circuit Court found that the Motion was, in essence, another request for reconsideration of Williams' sentence because Williams did not allege Id. at 3. Williams complained that he started the drug and alcohol program at one facility but was transferred to another facility and forced to start the program from the beginning. (ECF No. 12-11, at 2-3). During the resentencing hearing, Williams did not have paperwork to prove that this had occurred, but he received the paperwork after the hearing. In his Motion for Postconviction Collateral Relief, Williams argued that the paperwork was new evidence warranting postconviction collateral relief. The Circuit Court found Williams' argument irrelevant to the issue:
[Williams] states that he has now received proof that he started the Alcohol and Drug class at another facility. First, this is not new evidence. Williams knew that he had started the class at another facility before being transferred. . . . [T]he fact that he began the program at one facility and then was transferred to another facility makes no difference. . . . The point was that Williams did not complete the Alcohol and Drug program because he violated the rules of the program.
Shortly after the Circuit Court denied his Motion for Postconviction Collateral Relief on July 29, 2015, Williams filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 20, 2015, reurging the "new evidence" argument that was rejected by the Circuit Court and asserting for the first time that his conditional release and probation were unlawfully revoked. Williams asks the Court to reinstate his probation or grant him a lesser sentence. (ECF No. 1, at 15).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, applies in this case and provides in part as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
Under subsection (d)(1)(A), the "one-year period begins to run from the date on which the state court judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." Mark v. Thaler, 646 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2011)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
"An order revoking a suspension of sentence or revoking probation is not appealable." Griffin v. State, 382 So.2d 289, 290 (Miss.1980) (quoting Pipkin v. State, 292 So.2d 181, 182 (Miss.1974)). Williams' new sentence pursuant to the March 2014 revocation became final on the day that Williams was resentenced - March 24, 2014. Applying the AEDPA's one-year period of limitation, Williams' habeas petition was due to this Court on or before March 24, 2015. Williams did not sign his Petition until August 13, 2015. Under the prisoner mailbox rule, Williams' Petition is deemed filed on the date that Williams delivered the Petition to prisonofficials for mailing to the district court. Richards v. Thaler, 710 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 2013). Williams' Petition was "filed" sometime between the date it was signed on August 13, 2015, and the date it was received by the Court on August 20, 2015.3 Accordingly, Williams' Petition was filed some 142 to 149 days beyond the March 24, 2015, deadline.
Williams concedes that his Petition is late:
Although the Petition for habeas corpus was untimely filed, the state postconviction motion was filed in time. It was filed within the three-year statute of limitations of a postconviction motion.
Neither statutory nor equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is warranted. None of the statutory tolling provisions listed in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(B-D) apply. Williams' filing of a postconviction motion for collateral relief in the Circuit Court did not toll the one-year statute of limitations because the postconviction motion was filed on July 6, 2015, after Williams' March 24, 2015, deadline for filing a § 2254 habeas petition. Williams attempts to proceed under §2244(d)(1)(D), alleging new evidence, but for the same reasons articulated by the Circuit Court, the evidence offered by Williams is not new nor relevant. The fact that Williams began the alcohol and drug program at one facility and thentransferred to another facility, where he was required to restart the program, makes no difference. What is pertinent is that Williams did not successfully complete the program. He was kicked out for possessing major contraband, which prompted his March 2014 resentencing.
"To be entitled to equitable tolling, a petitioner has the burden of showing (1) that he had been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Clarke v. Rader, 721 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2013). Williams submits that he merely made a mistake filing his Petition late. He has not shown diligence nor pointed to any extraordinary circumstances hindering or preventing a timely filing. "[E]quity is not intended for those who sleep on their rights." In re Johnson, 325 F. App'x 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2009).
The AEDPA requires that "[a]n application for a writ...
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