Williams v. Brennan
| Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO: 3:17CV253-M-P,: 3:17CV253-M-P |
| Citation | 528 F.Supp.3d 472 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Pamela Kay WILLIAMS, Deceased, BY AND THROUGH Administrator, Cooper WILLIAMS, II. and Next Friend, Jeremy A. William, Plaintiffs v. Megan J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. Postal Service, and the U.S. Postal Service, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Philip Halbert Neilson, Philip Halbert Neilson Attorney at Law, Oxford, MS, Tommy Wayne Defer, Law Office of Tommy W. Defer, PLLC, Water Valley, MS, for Plaintiffs.
Stuart Davis, Joseph Luke Benedict, U.S. Attorney'S Office, Oxford, MS, for Defendants.
This cause comes before the court on the motion of defendant U.S. Postal Service ("USPS") to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiff Estate of Pamela Kay Williams has responded in opposition to the motion, and the court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, concludes that it is well taken and should be granted.
This is a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") case with a tragic fact pattern and an unusual procedural history. Pamela Kay Williams was a mail carrier for the USPS in Pope, Mississippi. [Docket 1, ¶ 7]. Ms. Williams separated from her husband, Cooper Clemons Williams, on June 12, 2016, and, less than two weeks later, she received an Emergency Protection Order against her husband, based on alleged threats to kill her. [Id. at ¶ 10].
Ms. Williams notified her supervisors at USPS of the protective order and requested that she not be required to deliver mail to her estranged husband's residence. [Id. at ¶ 14.] USPS denied the request. [Id. at ¶15]. Ms. Williams filed for divorce on October 27, 2016, and she told the USPS that if her husband saw her delivering mail to his house then he would kill her. [Id. at ¶17.] Again the USPS denied Ms. Williams’ request for a route reassignment. [Id. at ¶ 18]. While Ms. Williams delivered mail in Cooper Williams’ neighborhood on December 23, 2016, he shot and killed her and then shot and killed himself. [Id. at ¶ 20, 21].
Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 18, 2017, seeking recovery under the FTCA for Ms. Williams’ death. Plaintiff only filed this action after the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) had initially determined that her claims were not compensable under the Federal Employees Compensation Act ("FECA"). FECA is the federal version of workers’ compensation benefits, and, like its state counterpart, it includes an exclusive remedy provision precluding subsequent lawsuits after an award of benefits. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). On March 4, 2019, this court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, in an order in which it expressed considerable sympathy for plaintiff's FTCA claims. [Slip op. at 6]. Soon afterwards, this case took an unusual procedural turn.
In the fall of 2019, the OWCP, citing newly discovered evidence developed during discovery in this case, reconsidered, on its own motion, its previous denial of FECA benefits and initiated a process for the awarding of statutory benefits to plaintiff. The OWCP requested that plaintiff submit any evidence of statutory FECA beneficiaries, along with evidence of any funeral expenses, but plaintiff only submitted information regarding her funeral expenses. [Exhibit 7 at 1]. Based on this submission, the OWCP issued an order on February 6, 2020 awarding plaintiff $800 for funeral expenses, but, citing her failure to submit any evidence of statutory FECA beneficiaries, awarded no additional damages. [Award of compensation at 3]. Plaintiff appealed the OWCP's decision, but the award of damages was affirmed, and she concedes that she has exhausted her administrative remedies in this regard. [Response to motion to dismiss at 3].
Defendant presently seeks dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, on the basis of the award of FECA benefits in this case. It is well settled that FECA is the exclusive remedy against the United States for a federal employee who sustained damages because of work-related injuries within the scope of FECA's coverage. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). Indeed, Congress has unambiguously provided that liability under FECA "is exclusive and instead of all other liability ... to the employee [and her family]." 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). With this authority in mind, this court turns to the motion to dismiss.
In the court's view, the central fact of this motion is that the government has submitted extensive authority indicating that it lacks jurisdiction following the award of $800 in FECA benefits in this case, and plaintiff has offered no authority suggesting otherwise. In its brief, the government writes that:
FECA provides compensation for a federal employee's personal injuries sustained while in the performance of his duty. 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq. ; White v. United States , 143 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) ); Benton v. United States , 960 F.2d 19, 22 (5th Cir. 1992) (); Gill v. United States , 641 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1981) (). The Supreme Court has recognized that FECA's exclusive liability provision was adopted by Congress as a "quid pro quo" compromise commonly found in workers’ compensation legislation where employees are guaranteed the right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without the need for litigation but, in return, lose the right to sue the Government. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States , 460 U.S. 190, 193-194 (1983) (citations omitted). Courts have upheld this well-settled provision that "where other federal policies, express or implied, preclude what would otherwise be a potential cause of action, no action against the government may stand." In re All Maine Asbestos Litig. , 772 F.2d 1023, 1029 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Johansen v. United States , 343 U.S. 427, 436-40 (1952) ; Laird v. Nelms , 406 U.S. 797, 802-03, 92 S.Ct. 1899, 32 L.Ed.2d 499 (1972) ).
[Motion to dismiss at 6].
This court's own review of Fifth Circuit authority confirms that FECA's exclusive remedy provision has been consistently applied in this circuit, so much so that few plaintiffs appear to even try to get past it. In the rare occasions where they attempt to do so, the Fifth Circuit has duly applied FECA's exclusive remedy provision. See, e.g. Dallas v. United States , 678 F. App'x 212, 213 (5th Cir. 2017). In a 1993 decision, for example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction following the awarding of FECA benefits, writing that:
To the extent that Carreon seeks to recover damages for his injuries from the accident, his suit is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the FECA. Carreon requested and received compensation under the FECA for the injury he sustained in the 1981 accident. The FECA provides for the payment of compensation to employees of the United States who, subject to certain exceptions, are disabled in the performance of duty. 28 U.S.C. § 8102. Receiving compensation under FECA limits the employee's right to pursue certain other avenues for obtaining compensation. * * * Accordingly, Carreon is barred from recovering damages for injuries sustained in the accident because he has already been compensated under the FECA.
Carreon v. Siegler , 12 F.3d 1099 (5th Cir. 1993).
Once again, plaintiff offers this court no authority casting doubt upon this very clear precedent, instead emphasizing the very limited nature of the FECA benefits which were awarded in this case. However, she offers this court no authority suggesting that FECA's exclusive remedy provision is any less operative in a case in which the benefits awarded are small. In this court's view, this essentially ends the matter as a question of law, and it could reasonably conclude its order here and simply dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, given the unique procedural circumstances of this case, this court determined to take a closer look at the OWCP's actions in this case, even if it lacks jurisdiction to do anything about them. This court admits that it initially regarded the OWCP's actions in re-opening this case and awarding minor FECA benefits with considerable skepticism, since this served to deprive it of jurisdiction in a case where it had previously expressed considerable sympathy for plaintiff's claims.
Objectively speaking, however, this court concludes that the OWCP appears to have had good legal reasons for re-opening its consideration of plaintiff's claims and for making the very minor financial award which it did. There is no question regarding the OWCP's legal authority to reconsider its earlier denial of benefits on its own motion, since federal law provides that:
5 U.S.C.A. § 8128. Defendant argues that this statute clearly authorized the Secretary of Labor, acting through the OWCP, to reconsider its earlier denial of benefits on its own motion, and plaintiff offers no arguments to the contrary.
In the court's view, the government has submitted a reasonable explanation for the OWCP's decision to re-open its consideration of plaintiff's claim for FECA benefits, namely that discovery in this case revealed evidence of an administrative error by the post office which had not been submitted to the agency originally. Specifically, the government writes that:
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