Williams v. Brewer

• Decision Date: 30 September 2020
• Docket Number: Case Number 17-10737
• Parties: RONALD EARL WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SHAWN BREWER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

RONALD EARL WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. SHAWN BREWER, Respondent.

Case Number 17-10737

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

September 30, 2020

Honorable David M. Lawson

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Ronald Earl Williams, a parolee under the supervision of the Michigan Department of Corrections, filed a habeas petition pro se on March 1, 2017. Williams was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct at a bench trial in the Detroit Recorder's Court in 1977. He absconded before sentencing and served a lengthy term of incarceration in the state of Georgia for crimes committed there. Williams finally was sentenced in 2011 to a prison term of one to twenty years for the 1977 Michigan conviction.

Williams raises twenty-seven claims in his petition. These include allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel by both trial and appellate attorneys; errors by the trial court, including violations of his rights at sentencing; prosecutorial misconduct; and challenges to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Because none of the claims have merit, the petition will be denied.

I.

The Michigan Court of Appeals provides the following procedural history:

At a bench trial in 1977 in the former Detroit Recorder's Court, the court convicted defendant of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b. Defendant failed to appear for his scheduled sentencing in 1978 and the trial court entered a capias ordering law enforcement to take him into custody. Defendant fled to Georgia, committed new crimes in that state, and then served a prison sentence in Georgia for those crimes from June 1981 to October 2008. In June 2011, defendant arrived in custody in Wayne County for his prior failure to appear at sentencing. On July 14, 2011, the trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 1 to 20 years. The trial court denied defendant's post-judgment motion to set aside the sentence and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, and it also denied defendant's motion for a new trial or to settle the record.

People v. Williams, No. 305917, 2014 WL 354628 at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014), leave to appeal denied, 496 Mich. 865, 849 N.W.2d 354 (2014) (Mem).

Limited court records are available from the petitioner's 1977 trial, as the transcripts have been destroyed and the judge and defense attorney are now deceased. Among the available records are the original charges and the investigator's report of the incident and the preliminary examination transcript. The complainant reported the petitioner forced her into a vehicle at gun point and took her to another location where he sexually assaulted her. The petitioner was charged with kidnapping and four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. On November 18, 1977, he was convicted at a bench trial of a single count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.

After absconding from Michigan, the petitioner served twenty-seven years in a Georgia prison for armed robbery and other offenses. He was then was paroled to Michigan in 2008. Williams, 2014 WL 354628 at *2. The petitioner asserts that while he was incarcerated in Georgia, he wrote to numerous authorities to resolve the Michigan conviction. Ibid. He provides as an example a 1982 letter from the U.S. Marshal addressed to him stating that a Michigan detainer against him had been lifted. Id.; ECF No. 12-8, PageID.499. The petitioner also argued that he attempted to contact the State of Michigan while serving his Georgia prison term to resolve the conviction, but he has provided the Court no evidence that he had done so, nor that he attempted to contact the state or Wayne County courts between his 2008 return to Michigan and his 2011 arrest for failure to appear. Williams, 2014 WL 354628 at *2-3.

The petitioner raised two issues in his direct appeal through appointed appellate counsel. Both issues were raised initially by the attorney in a motion before the trial court, which denied it following a hearing. The petitioner's first issue was that his rights to a speedy trial were violated by the 33-year delay before sentencing. The court of appeals disagreed, because of the lack of documentation of his diligence and his failure to resolve the outstanding conviction between his return to Michigan on parole in 2008 and his arrest in 2011. Id. at *3. In deciding that his speedy trial rights were not violated, the court found the petitioner largely responsible for the delay between his conviction and sentence. Ibid. On the same reasoning, the court rejected a challenge to the sentencing court's jurisdiction, ruling that a Michigan statute governing delayed sentencing on which the argument relied was inapplicable. Id. at * 4 (citing Mich. Comp. Law § 771.1).

The petitioner's second issue on direct appeal addressed the trial court's denial of his motion to settle the record or for a new trial. He argued that the lack of a trial record prejudiced his appellate rights. The court of appeals held that under such circumstances, a "presumption of regularity" applies, where "'[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of the integrity, competence and proper performance of their official duties by the judge and the State's attorney.'" Id. at *5 (quoting People v. Iacopelli, 141 Mich. App 566, 568; 367 N.W.2d 837, 837 (1985)). Again, because the petitioner was responsible for the delay between conviction and sentencing, and because he "identified no indisputable specific errors relative to the conviction," it affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. Ibid.

The petitioner subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court under Michigan Court Rule 6.500 et seq., in which he raised twenty-seven claims of error. In his motion (as well as his application for habeas relief), the petitioner stated generally that his blindness and hearing issues contributed to his difficulty in resolving his Michigan conviction while in prison in Georgia. The petitioner also argued in support of his sentencing challenges that his pre-sentence investigation report (PSIR) contained numerous inaccuracies or omissions, including the failure to note his successful compliance during his parole period, his participation in a program for the blind, and his college degree and enrollment in more college classes.

The trial court denied the petitioner's motion, finding that the petitioner did not establish good cause or prejudice for his failure to raise claims he could have brought in his direct appeal, as required by Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D). Without further analysis, the court held that the petitioner's claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective were without merit. The absence of ineffective performance by counsel prevented the petitioner from being able to establish good cause under the court rule.

The petitioner appealed the trial court's ruling. Both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in standard form orders. People v. Williams, Docket No. 331938 (Mich. Ct. App. July 14, 2016), leave denied, 500 Mich. 926, 888 N.W.2d 93 (2017) (Mem).

The present habeas corpus petition states twenty-seven claims for relief, which consist of the two issues raised on direct appeal and twenty-five raised in his motion for relief from judgment in the state trial court:

I. The trial court denied Petitioner his Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial/sentencing, and Fifth Amendment rights to due process when it denied Petitioner-Appellant's motion to set aside judgment of sentence and dismiss case for lack of jurisdiction to sentence Defendant-Appellant.

II. The trial court erred when it denied Defendant-Appellant's motion for a new trial, or in the alternative to settle the record.

III. Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when his appellate attorney failed to introduce favorable evidence in the form of a special motion.

IV. Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when Defendant's trial counsel failed to challenge the false information contained in the PSI report that was used during sentencing, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal.

V. Petitioner did not appear before the proper judge where the original judge to convict Petitioner was deceased and the appropriate successor judge was not used in violation of the U.S. Const., amends. V, VI, XIV.

VI. Petitioner was denied a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment when the trial judge refused to honor the agreement to sentence Petitioner to time served.

VII. Defendant was denied a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment when the sentencing judge made a mistake of law by stating that a prison term was mandatory under the conviction.

VIII. The sentencing judge abused his discretion when he sentenced Petitioner to prison when a diversion program was available as an alternative which resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.

IX. The sentencing judge committed error when he failed to make registration under the SORA part of the judgment of sentence, leaving it up to the MDOC to make the determination which resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.

X. Defendant was deprived of a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment when the trial judge did not ask Defendant or his attorney if they had an opportunity to review the PSI report prior to sentencing.

XI. Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when Defendant's trial counsel failed to review the PSI Report with Defendant prior to sentencing.

XII. Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when Defendant's trial counsel failed to suggest that Defendant be sentenced to the available diversion program.

XIII. Defendant was harmed during a post-sentencing hearing when the prosecutor misrepresented a letter from the U.S.

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