Williams v. Brown
| Docket Number | CIVIL 4:20-cv-4079 |
| Decision Date | 04 April 2022 |
| Parties | HARMON WILLIAMS PLAINTIFF v. DETECTIVE REYN BROWN; OFFICER DANIEL OLLER; and STEPHEN GULICK DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation issued by the Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. (ECF No. 42). Judge Bryant recommends that the Court grant in part and deny in part Separate Defendant Stephen Gulick's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 29). Judge Bryant also recommends that the Court deny Separate Defendant Daniel Oller's Motion to Join in the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 36). Defendant Gulick objects. Defendant Oller has not objected, and the time to do so has passed. The matter is ripe for consideration.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 5, 2020, asserting two claims against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's first claim concerned an alleged unlawful arrest for possession of controlled substances on October 15 2019. His second claim concerned an alleged violation of his constitutional rights when his parole was revoked without sufficient due process.
After preservice screening, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's second claim and determined that the first claim challenged the validity of pending state criminal proceedings. The Court stayed this case pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, with instructions that Plaintiff could file a motion to reopen the case along with proof of the final resolution of the criminal charges stemming from his October 5, 2019 arrest. On August 13, 2021, Plaintiff moved to reopen the case, providing proof that his drug-possession charge had been nolle prossed on May 3, 2021.[1] The Court then reopened the case and directed service on Defendants.
In his remaining claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights on October 15, 2019. His employer allegedly contacted his parole officer, Defendant Gulick, who in turn allegedly asked Defendants Brown and Oller to harass Plaintiff at his job. They allegedly went to his workplace, searched him without a warrant, claimed to have found methamphetamine in his pocket, and arrested him for possession of a controlled substance. Plaintiff contends the arrest was unconstitutional because he did not have methamphetamine on him and the officers lacked any other probable cause for an arrest.
Plaintiff's drug charges were eventually nolle prossed. However, Plaintiff's drug arrest- among other things-led to his parole being revoked on July 17, 2020, following a revocation hearing where the parole board found by a preponderance of the evidence that he unlawfully possessed and used controlled substances on October 15, 2019, failed to reside at his approved residence, committed domestic-abuse criminal offenses, and had not paid his required parole-supervision fees. Plaintiff was placed in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Corrections to serve a six-month sentence. He appears to allege that he lost his job because of the incarceration.
On October 29, 2021, Defendant Gulick filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff's claim against him is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 447 (1994), and that he is alternatively entitled to absolute and/or qualified immunity. (ECF No. 29). Plaintiff responded. (ECF No. 34). Defendant Gulick replied. (ECF No. 35).
On December 13, 2021, Defendant Oller filed a motion to adopt and join in the motion to dismiss, contending that Plaintiff's claim against him is likewise barred by Heck v. Humphrey. (ECF No. 36). Plaintiff responded. (ECF No. 40).
On March 1, 2022, Judge Bryant issued the instant Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 42). Judge Bryant recommends that the Court deny Defendant Oller's motion to join and grant in part and deny in part Defendant Gulick's motion to dismiss. Defendant Gulick objects.
The Court may designate a magistrate judge to hear pre- and post-trial matters and to submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of receipt of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, “a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); accord W.D. Ark. Local Rule 72.2(VII)(C). After conducting an appropriate review, the Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge . . . or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
“[T]he specific standard of review depends, in the first instance, upon whether or not a party has objected to portions of the report and recommendation.” Anderson v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 308 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1015 (N.D. Iowa 2018). Generally, “objections must be timely and specific” to trigger de novo review. Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1990). In the absence of objections, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note, subd. (b); see also Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996).
Judge Bryant's Report and Recommendation has three central recommendations. First, he recommends that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Oller and Gulick is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because a judgment for Plaintiff in this case would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's parole revocation, which was based on multiple violations that are not all at issue in this case. Second, Judge Bryant recommends that Defendant Gulick, a state employee, is entitled to sovereign immunity on Plaintiff's official-capacity claim. Third, Judge Bryant recommends that Defendant Gulick is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity on the individual-capacity claim against him.
Thus, Judge Bryant recommends that the Court deny Defendant Oller's motion and grant Defendant Gulick's motion to dismiss only to the extent that it seeks dismissal of the official-capacity claim against him. Defendant Oller has not objected. Defendant Gulick objects, but only to Judge Bryant's analysis on qualified immunity. The Court will begin with the findings and recommendations that were not objected to. Then the Court will conduct a de novo review of Defendant Gulick's specific objections.
Most of Judge Bryant's findings and recommendations have not been objected to. No. one objects to Judge Bryant's Heck analysis, his recommendation that Defendant Gulick is entitled to sovereign immunity on Plaintiff's official-capacity claim, his recommendation that Defendant Gulick is not entitled to absolute immunity, or his recommendation that Defendant Oller's motion should be denied. The Court reviewed the parties' filings and, in the absence of any specific objections, finds no clear error on the face of the record as to those findings and recommendations. See Grinder, 73 F.3d at 795.
Accordingly, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation insofar as it recommends: (1) that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Oller and Gulick should not be dismissed pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, (2) that Plaintiff's official-capacity claim against Defendant Gulick should be dismissed based on sovereign immunity, (3) that Defendant Gulick is not entitled to absolute immunity, and (4) that Defendant Oller's motion should be denied.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by searching him without a warrant and by arresting him without probable cause. Defendant Gulick argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has not stated a constitutional deprivation and, even assuming that he did, the implicated right was not clearly established. He argues that Arkansas law requires parolees like Plaintiff to submit to warrantless searches as a condition of their parole. Thus, he argues that Plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches while on parole, such as the search by Defendants Oller and Brown on October 15, 2019.
Judge Bryant agrees with Defendant Gulick that parolees like Plaintiff do not have a constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches. However, Judge Bryant reasons that Plaintiff's claim in this case does not as much concern the warrantless search on October 15, 2019, as it does the detention and arrest that followed that search. Judge Bryant concludes that Plaintiff has alleged enough to state a cognizable claim for unlawful arrest and that the law at the time was clearly established, protecting Plaintiff from being unlawfully arrested. Thus, Judge Bryant recommends the Court find that Plaintiff is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendant Gulick objects, arguing that this case is properly framed as stemming from the warrantless search because Defendants Oller and Brown immediately arrested Plaintiff after they searched him and found methamphetamine in his pocket. Although Plaintiff alleges that he did not have methamphetamine and the officers lied about finding meth in order to unlawfully arrest him, Defendant Gulick points to the July 17, 2020 parole revocation judgment, which states that Plaintiff admitted in his revocation hearing that the officers found methamphetamine in his pocket on October 15, 2019. Defendant Gulick reiterates that, as a parolee, Plaintiff could be searched without a warrant at any time. Because Plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial