Williams v. Brunswick County Bd. Of Educ.

• Decision Date: 02 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 7:08-CV-140-D.,7:08-CV-140-D.
• Citation: 725 F.Supp.2d 538
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Lorene WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. BRUNSWICK COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

725 F.Supp.2d 538

Lorene WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,

v.BRUNSWICK COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 7:08-CV-140-D.

United States District Court,E.D. North Carolina, Southern Division.

July 2, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Romallus O. Murphy, Greensboro, NC, for Plaintiff.

Christine Scheef, Kathleen P. Tanner Kennedy, Tharrington Smith, LLP, Raleigh, NC, for Defendant.

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, District Judge.

Lorene Williams (“Williams” or “plaintiff”) filed suit against the Brunswick County Board of Education (“Board” or “defendant”). Williams alleges that the Board violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, when it transferred her from Director of Pre-K and Student Services to Dean of Students at Shallotte Middle School. The transfer resulted in no loss of pay, benefits, or seniority. The Board seeks summary judgment and contends that Williams is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, that the transfer did not constitute adverse employment action, and that there is no evidence of unlawful discrimination (including unlawful retaliation). As explained below, the court grants summary judgment to the Board.

I.

Williams has worked for the Board since 1975. See Williams Dep. 32-33. From 1975 to 1985, Williams served in various classroom roles. See id. at 33. From 1985 to 1996, Williams served as Director of Exceptional Children's Program. Id. From 1996 to June 2005, Williams served as Director of Federal Programs. Id. In June 2005, Williams again became Director of Exceptional Children's Program. Id.; McGee Aff. ¶¶ 12-19. In December 2005, due to performance concerns, Superintendent Katie McGee transferred Williams to Director of Pre-K and Student Services. See McGee Aff. ¶¶ 21-37; see also Babson Aff. ¶ 5.

In early June 2007, Superintendent McGee decided to recommend Williams' transfer to a position as Dean of Students at Shallotte Middle School. McGee Aff. ¶¶ 46-54. Superintendent McGee believed that Williams would be able to work with the at-risk students at Shallotte Middle School in light of Williams' skills and ties to the Shallotte community. See id. ¶¶ 7, 52. Superintendent McGee decided to make the recommendation to the Board as part of a reorganization plan involving fifteen employees. See id. ¶¶ 46, 54, 56.

On June 4, 2007, Williams submitted a letter to her immediate supervisor, Dr. Zelphia Grissett, requesting a six-month medical leave of absence from June 8, 2007, through December 8, 2007. Williams Dep. 100; Id., Ex. 5. In her letter, Williams explained her plan to use her accumulated sick leave due to her “diabetic levels” and “accompanying gynecological problems.” Id. Ex. 5.

On June 5, 2007, before the Board meeting, Superintendent McGee advised the employees subject to her transfer recommendations about the recommendations. See McGee Aff. ¶¶ 46, 56. As for Williams, Superintendent McGee met with Williams in person to tell her of the recommended transfer. Id. ¶ 57. Williams was upset and told Superintendent McGee that she wanted to remain as Director of Pre-K and Student Services. Id. ¶¶ 57, 64. When Superintendent McGee met with Williams, she knew that Williams had requested a six-month medical leave of absence, but did not know about the request when she decided to recommend the transfer. Id. ¶ 59.

On June 5, 2007, the Board approved Superintendent McGee's reorganization plan, including Williams' transfer to Dean of Students at Shallotte Middle School. See id. ¶ 46. The transfer did not impact Williams' salary, benefits, or seniority. See Williams Dep. 111-12; Baily Aff. ¶ 5. Williams was upset about the transfer and asked the Board to meet with her to permit her to contest the transfer. See Williams Dep. 51, 59-60; McGee Aff. ¶ 66. Although the Board was not required to meet with Williams, the Board granted her request for a meeting. See Babson Aff. ¶ 9; Miller Aff. ¶ 6.

On June 12, 2007, Williams visited her physician, Dr. James Wormian, and told him that she was taking a six-month medical leave of absence. Wormian Dep. 32-33. Williams told Dr. Wormian that her leave “means nothing” and that she was due the sick leave. See id. at 38-39. Dr. Wormian never advised Williams that she needed a six-month medical leave of absence. Id. at 40. In fact, no medical professional ever advised Williams that she needed a six-month medical leave of absence. See Williams Dep. 104-05.

In June 2007, Williams' gynecologist, Dr. Susan Wilson, told Williams that she might need surgery if the polyps in her uterus were cancerous. See id. at 104-05, 184, 187-88, 224-25. The polyps, however, were not cancerous, and Williams received outpatient treatment in late June 2007 to remove the polyps. See id. at 207-08, 225.

On July 2, 2007, Williams met with the Board to contest her transfer to Dean of Students at Shallotte Middle School. See Milligan Aff. ¶¶ 7-9; Babson Aff. ¶ 10; Miller Aff. ¶ 7; Hobbs Aff. ¶ 5. At the meeting, Williams asked the Board to permit her to remain as Director of Pre-K and Student Services until she retired and claimed that Superintendent McGee did not value her skills and abilities and personally disliked her. See Milligan Aff. ¶¶ 8-9; Hobbs Aff. ¶ ¶ 5-6; see also Babson Aff. ¶ 10; Miller Aff. ¶ 7.

On August 7, 2007, Superintendent McGee submitted a written response to the Board explaining her rationale for recommending Williams' transfer. See McGee Aff., Ex. 8. Again, Dr. McGee noted Williams' ability to work with at-risk students at Shallotte Middle School and her ties to the Shallotte community. See id. On August 27, 2007, the Board voted to uphold Williams' transfer. See Milligan Aff. ¶ 11. The Board members testified that Williams' health did not affect the decision to transfer Williams and they had no knowledge that Williams was diabetic when the decision was made. See id. ¶ 12; Babson Aff. ¶ 13; Miller Aff. ¶ 9; Hobbs Aff. ¶ 8.

Williams would have returned to work in August 2007 if the Board had permitted her to return as Director of Pre-K and Student Services. See Williams Dep. 211-12. Instead, Williams remained on sick leave until January 2008. Id. at 210-11. During her sick leave, Williams visited with relatives, relaxed, and took a vacation to the Caribbean. See id. at 212. Williams returned to work in January 2008, and has served as the Dean of Students at Shallotte Middle School since that time. See id. at 33, 211; McGee Aff. ¶ 68.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record taken as a whole, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, but “must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quotation omitted) (emphasis removed). A trial court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

A.

Williams has no direct evidence of disability discrimination concerning her June 2007 transfer and proceeds under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n. 11, 391-92 (4th Cir.2001) (applying McDonnell-Douglas framework to ADA claim); Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 267-71 (4th Cir.2001) (applying McDonnell-Douglas framework to Rehabilitation Act claim). Under that framework, Williams initially must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that: (1) she is within the ADA's protected class; (2) she suffered adverse employment action; (3) at the time of the adverse employment action, she was performing her job at a level that met her employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. See Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 387 n. 11; Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Business & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir.1995); cf. Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 266-67. If Williams establishes a prima facie case, the Board then must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49-50, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the Board meets this burden of production, Williams must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board's stated reason for the adverse employment action was a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). “[T]he plaintiff can prove pretext by showing that the [employer's] explanation is unworthy of credence or by offering other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of [disability discrimination].” Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir.2004) (quotations omitted); see ...