Williams v. Butler, s. 83-2534

• Decision Date: 05 December 1984
• Docket Number: Nos. 83-2534,83-2641,s. 83-2534
• Citation: 746 F.2d 431
• Parties: , 17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 767 Debbie WILLIAMS and Linda Stanley, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. William R. BUTLER, Defendant, v. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, Third-Party Defendant Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 431

746 F.2d 431

53 USLW 2210, 17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 767

Debbie WILLIAMS and Linda Stanley, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. William R. BUTLER, Defendant, v. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, Third-Party Defendant

Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 83-2534, 83-2641.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 11, 1984.

Decided Oct. 15, 1984.

Rehearing En Banc Granted Dec. 5, 1984.

Hugh Brown, Little Rock, Ark., for third-party defendant appellant/cross-appellee.

Philip E. Kaplan, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiffs/appellees/cross-appellants.

Before BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

The defendant, the City of Little Rock (City), appeals from a jury verdict in favor of the prevailing plaintiff, Debbie Williams, awarding her compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982), for a violation of her First Amendment rights by defendant Butler, a municipal judge. We affirm, but remand for a consideration by the district court of the supplemental motion for costs and attorneys' fees submitted by the plaintiffs.

I. Facts

Butler was a duly elected municipal judge for the traffic court of the City of Little Rock. The plaintiffs in this action, Debbie Williams and Linda Stanley, were hired by Butler as clerks for his court. All three parties were employees of the City. Both of the plaintiffs, at different times, saw Butler deliberately destroy traffic tickets. Williams disclosed this event to the police. After Butler became aware that Williams had made a statement to the police, he fired her. Stanley was subpoenaed before a grand jury which was investigating possible corruption in the municipal traffic court, and she disclosed that she had seen Butler destroy traffic tickets. Stanley made two other appearances before the grand jury. Allegedly, after these appearances, Stanley was harassed by her co-workers to such an extent that she felt compelled to resign.

Both plaintiffs filed Sec. 1983 ¹ actions against Butler in his official capacity. ² Butler brought a third party complaint against the city, seeking judgment against the City for any sums adjudged against him. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Williams, awarding her $40,000.00 in compensatory damages and $60,000.00 in punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Butler on Stanley's Sec. 1983 claim, and the court found in favor of Butler on his third party complaint against the City. The district court awarded Williams attorney fees, but did so only after reducing the award by 25% to account for Stanley's complete failure to prevail on her claim. On the basis of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), the district court set aside the punitive damage award the jury had returned for Williams. The City is appealing the district court's finding in favor of Butler on his third party complaint, and Williams is appealing the dismissal of the punitive damage award and the reduction in the requested amount of attorney fees.

II. Discussion

A. The City's liability.

The City argues that it is not liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employee, Butler. It is not disputed that, by firing Williams, Butler violated Williams' First Amendment rights. Rather, the City argues that Butler's action was not taken pursuant to City policy, nor was Butler a city "official" for purposes of Sec. 1983. We hold that, under our reading of Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the City is liable for Butler's unconstitutional act.

In Monell, the Supreme Court reversed, in part, its earlier decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), and held that local governments are not "wholly immune from suit under Sec. 1983." Monell, 436 U.S. at 663, 98 S.Ct. at 2021. The Court held as follows:

Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and local government units to be included among those persons to whom Sec. 1983 applies. Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under Sec. 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover, although the touchstone of the Sec. 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like every other Sec. 1983 "person" by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.

Id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. However, the Court upheld the part of Monroe which held that a municipality will not be liable "solely because it employs a tortfeasor--or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under Sec. 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. "Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under Sec. 1983." Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037.

Thus, under Monell, we need to address two questions in order to determine the City's liability in this case. First, we need to determine whether Butler's act of firing Williams implemented or executed a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision adopted and promulgated by the City's governing body. If not, we need to decide whether his unconstitutional act was taken "pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom" had not received formal approval through the City's official decisionmaking channels. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (emphasis added). In other words, we need to determine whether, in executing a City custom, Butler inflicted an injury of constitutional dimensions. See id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037.

As a threshold matter, we note that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, the party for whom the jury returned its verdict. Trace X Chem. Inc. v. Canadian Indus. Ltd., 738 F.2d 261 at 265 (8th Cir.1984). At trial, Williams did not introduce any evidence of a formal policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision adopted and promulgated by the City's governing body. Thus, it is clear that Butler did not act pursuant to any of those modes of authority when he fired Williams.

Williams was the only party who introduced evidence regarding whether Butler acted pursuant to governmental custom when he fired Williams. Butler had been elected as a municipal court judge in 1969. He has served in that capacity for fifteen years. In 1969, according to his own testimony, Butler went to see the City's personnel director regarding how he was to go about getting a staff. The personnel director told him that traditionally the courts had been responsible for hiring and firing their own employees.

The district court found specifically that even though Butler's employees were processed through the City personnel office when they were hired, paid by the City, given City parking places, and worked in City buildings--Butler hired his own employees, and controlled and supervised their work. In other words, Butler was making employment decisions for the City. The district court also found that the City personnel office had given Butler authority to make employment decisions when he had assumed his office. There was no evidence to the contrary. Thus, we think it is clear that the City, by custom and practice for at least fifteen years, had established a policy of giving municipal judges carte blanche authority to make their own personnel decisions. It equally is clear that Butler acted pursuant to this policy when he fired Williams.

The determinative issue in this case is whether Butler's unconstitutional decision and act were sufficient to render the City liable under Sec. 1983. In other words, we must determine whether Butler's unconstitutional act was within the meaning of the language used by the Supreme Court when it wrote: "... it is when execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under Sec. 1983." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037 (emphasis added). This precise issue is a difficult one, and appears to be a novel question in this circuit. The Fifth Circuit appears to have been the first circuit to address this question squarely and, indeed, it paved a path which several other circuits have chosen to follow.

In Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.1980), the Fifth Circuit considered the liability of a state and a school board for a county judge's enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute. Because the county judge drew his authority from the state, only the school board could be held liable for the judge's actions. Id. at 404. In the process of reaching this conclusion, the court considered under what circumstances a county official's actions could be said to represent "official policy" for purposes of liability under Sec. 1983. The court concluded that, at least in the areas in which a local governmental official, alone, is the "final authority or ultimate repository of ... power," that official's "conduct and decisions must necessarily be considered those of one 'whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy' " for purposes of Sec. 1983. ³ Id. The Second, ⁴ Third, ⁵ Fourth, ⁶ Ninth, ⁷ and Eleventh ⁸ Circuits have followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit...