Williams v. Calderon
| Decision Date | 01 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-99009,96-99009 |
| Citation | 83 F.3d 281 |
| Parties | 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3267, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5166 Keith Daniel WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Arthur CALDERON, Warden, San Quentin State Prison, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Richard B. Mazer, San Francisco, California, and David A. Nickerson, Sausalito, California, for petitioner-appellant.
J. Robert Jibson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Robert E. Coyle, District Judge, Presiding.
Before: POOLE, THOMPSON and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
OVERVIEW
Keith Daniel Williams is a California state prisoner who has been sentenced to death. His execution is scheduled for May 3, 1996, at 12:01 a.m. Williams has filed a second federal habeas petition in the district court. 1 The district court relied upon the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 142 Cong. Rec. H3305-01 (1996) () (Act), and ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear the second petition without this court granting an order authorizing the filing of the second petition as required by section 2244(b)(3)(A) of the Act. The district court also concluded the Act required dismissal of Williams's claims.
Alternatively, the district court ruled that if the Act did not apply retroactively to Williams's case, Williams failed to show cause and prejudice for bringing his successive and abusive claims, and denied his habeas petition.
We hold that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain Williams's second petition without first obtaining an authorization order from this court under section 2244(b)(3)(A) of the Act, because we treat the entirety of Williams's second petition filed in the district court as having been filed before the Act was signed into law.
We do not decide whether the remainder of the Act governs Williams's second petition. Even if the remainder of the Act applies to Williams's case, it does not enhance his ability to obtain federal habeas relief.
We conclude Williams's second petition raises both successive and abusive claims, and Williams has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for raising these claims at this late date, nor has he shown that a miscarriage of justice would result from our refusal to review these claims. We, therefore, affirm the district court's denial of Williams's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and we deny his application for a stay of execution. We also deny Williams's motion to recall our mandate in Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir.1995).
In September 1978, Williams and Robert Tyson robbed a couple, stealing their camper and its contents, including a checkbook. In October 1978, Williams, Tyson, and others held a garage sale to sell, among other things, the contents of the camper. Miguel Vargas and Lourdes Meza attended the garage sale and Miguel expressed an interest in selling his car to Williams and buying a gun from Williams which Williams had previously stolen from his employer.
The next day, Miguel and Meza returned to Williams's home to complete the sale of the car. A check that had been stolen from the camper was used to buy the car. After Miguel and Meza left, Williams formed a plan to go to Miguel and Meza's home to rob them, to retrieve the check, and to kill them.
The following day, Williams and Tyson, armed with fully loaded weapons, arrived at Miguel's and Meza's home. Miguel, Meza, and Salvador Vargas were at their home. Williams shot and killed Miguel and Salvador and then left the home with Tyson and Meza. After having intercourse with Meza in the car, Williams drove to an abandoned field and killed her, leaving her body in the field. During this time, Williams was under the influence of alcohol, morphine, codeine, heroin, and marijuana.
Williams was charged with three counts of murder, with special circumstances under California's 1977 death penalty statute. Williams pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. After Williams was examined by two psychiatrists and found sane, his defense proceeded on a theory of diminished capacity. In 1979, a jury found him to be sane, convicted him on the three counts of murder, found nine of ten special circumstances true, and returned a sentence of death.
The California Supreme Court affirmed Williams's direct appeal and denied his first habeas corpus petition which had been consolidated with his automatic appeal. People v. Williams, 44 Cal.3d 883, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395 (1988). The United States Supreme Court denied Williams's petition for certiorari. Williams v. California, 488 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 249, 102 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988).
Williams then filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief with the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied this second petition in an unpublished decision.
In 1989, Williams filed his first federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied this petition on the merits. Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F.Supp. 1443 (E.D.Cal.1993). We affirmed. Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir.1995). We also denied Williams's request for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc.
On February 20, 1996, the Supreme Court denied Williams's petition for certiorari. --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 937, 133 L.Ed.2d 863 After Williams's execution date was set, Williams filed a another habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court on April 22, 1996, and requested a stay of execution. In this petition, Williams raised four new claims. On April 26, 1996, the California Supreme Court denied this petition and denied Williams's request for a stay of execution. The California Supreme Court denied the first three claims as untimely and denied all the claims on the merits.
(1996). Williams's execution date was then scheduled for May 3, 1996, at 12:01 a.m
Contemporaneous with Williams's filing of his petition before the California Supreme Court on April 22, 1996, Williams filed a second federal petition with the district court. In this petition, Williams asserted two claims which we and the district court had previously rejected. He argued the discovery of new evidence justified bringing the successive claims. He also sought leave to amend his petition after exhausting the four new claims which were then pending before the California Supreme Court.
After Williams filed his second petition with the district court, President Clinton, on April 24, 1996, signed the Act. When the California Supreme Court dismissed Williams's four claims which previously had been unexhausted, he filed an amended petition in the district court on April 26, 1996. In this amended petition, Williams realleged the two claims he filed in his second petition before enactment of the Act, as well as the four previously unexhausted claims. The district court determined that the Act governed Williams's second petition, both as to the two claims filed before enactment of the Act and as to the four previously unexhausted claims which were filed after enactment of the Act as part of the amended petition.
With regard to the two claims Williams filed before enactment of the Act, the district court concluded the Act required dismissal of those claims. Alternatively, the district court dismissed the claims under the prior law because Williams had not shown cause or prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to justify again raising these claims.
With regard to the four new claims, the district court also concluded the Act required their dismissal. Alternatively, the district court determined that under the prior law an independent and adequate state procedural ground barred review of three of the claims, the fourth claim was abusive and Williams had not shown cause or prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to justify raising the claims at this late date. As a result, the district court dismissed Williams's latest petition in its entirety. The district court also denied Williams's request for a stay of execution and declined to issue a certificate of probable cause.
On April 30, 1996, Williams appealed to this court. Williams requests a certificate of probable cause. He also appeals the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition and requests a stay of execution. Finally, he moves for an order recalling our mandate that issued following the filing of our opinion in Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 937, 133 L.Ed.2d 863 (1996).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was signed into law by President Clinton on April 24, 1996. Section 2244(b)(3)(A) of the Act provides:
Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.
The two claims Williams filed in the district court on April 22, 1996 were filed before the Act was signed into law. As to these claims, therefore, section 2244(b)(3)(A) would not apply to Williams's case, and no advance approval of this court would be required to authorize the filing of that petition. The four claims which Williams added by his amended petition filed after enactment of the Act pose more of a problem. We need not, however, adopt a holding in this case that habeas claims added by amendment to a petition There is one final matter which affects our review of the district court's order denying Williams's habeas petition. The Act contains new standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability of an order denying a second habeas petition. Prior law required a...
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