Williams v. Casino Reinvestment Development Authority
| Decision Date | 13 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | A-5368-18 |
| Parties | ROBERT WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CASINO REINVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, a/k/a CRDA, DANIEL MACK, and ROSILAND KINCADE, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Submitted March 24, 2021
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Atlantic County, Docket No. L-1500-16.
Timothy J. McIlwain, attorney for appellant.
Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland &Perretti, LLP, attorneys for respondents (Adam J. McInerney, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges Ostrer, Vernoia, and Enright.
Plaintiff Robert Williams appeals from an order granting defendant Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA or defendant) summary judgment on plaintiff's claims defendant terminated his employment in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50. More particularly, plaintiff contends the motion court erred by granting summary judgment on his claims defendant unlawfully terminated his employment because of his race-Caucasian-and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under the LAD. We find no merit to plaintiff's arguments and affirm.
Following approximately four years of employment with defendant plaintiff filed a complaint alleging defendant violated the LAD by terminating his employment because he was Caucasian and in retaliation for engaging in a "protected activity"-filing a complaint with defendant concerning a coemployee, defendant Daniel Mack.[1] Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment following Mack's report of plaintiff's workplace misconduct and an outside law firm's investigation into the allegations. Plaintiff also claimed Mack and another co-worker, Rosalind Kincade, aided and abetted in defendant's retaliation against him.[2] In the complaint, plaintiff asserted LAD claims against defendant for reverse race discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation, and against Mack and Kincade for aiding and abetting retaliation.[3]
The trial court set an initial discovery end date of December 28 2017. The court later granted the parties' joint request for a sixty-day discovery extension. Plaintiff moved for a second sixty-day-extension, which the court granted, setting a new end date of May 30, 2018. On May 3, 2018, plaintiff moved for another sixty-day extension, asserting defendant had not provided documents requested orally during depositions; "[p]laintiff ha[d] very recently served a formal [r]equest" for documents on defendant; and defendant had not yet conducted its court-ordered redeposition of plaintiff.
Defendant completed the redeposition of plaintiff on May 8, 2018. On May 17, defendant served its response to plaintiff's formal demand for documents and filed opposition to plaintiff's motion to extend discovery. One week later, defendant moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff thereafter cross-moved for summary judgment.
Prior to addressing the facts relied on by the parties in support of their motions, we note that "[w]e review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard as the trial court." Abboud v Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 450 N.J.Super. 400, 406 (App. Div. 2017). This standard mandates the grant of summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories[, ] and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).
In our review of a summary judgment record, we limit our determination of the undisputed facts to those properly presented in accordance with Rule 4:46 2. Under the Rule:
"[A] party opposing a motion for summary judgment [must] 'file a responding statement either admitting or disputing each of the facts in the movant's statement.'" Ibid. (quoting R. 4:46-2(b)). "[A]ll material facts in the movant's statement which are sufficiently supported will be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion only, unless specifically disputed by citation conforming to the requirements of paragraph (a) demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact." R. 4:46-2(b).
Rule 4:46-2's requirements are "critical" and "entail[] a relatively undemanding burden." Housel v. Theodoridis, 314 N.J.Super. 597, 604 (App. Div. 1998). They were "designed to 'focus [a court's] . . . attention on the areas of actual dispute' and [to] 'facilitate the court's review' of the motion." Claypotch, 360 N.J.Super. at 488 () (quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.1 on R. 4:46-2 (2003)). As such, a trial court must decide a motion for summary judgment based only upon the "factual assertions . . . that were . . . properly included in the motion [for] and [in opposition to] . . . summary judgment" pursuant to Rule 4:46-2. Kenney v. Meadowview Nursing &Convalescent Ctr., 308 N.J.Super. 565, 573 (App. Div. 1998); see also Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 549 (2011) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (). Thus, we will only consider "those [properly included] factual assertions" on appeal. Kenney, 308 N.J.Super. at 573; see also Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 549 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) ("That limitation- that a summary judgment determination is defined and limited by the summary judgment record-also applies on appeal."). Therefore, in our review of the court's summary judgment order, we rely solely on the undisputed facts established by the parties' Rule 4:46-2 statements.[4] See Kenney, 308 N.J.Super. at 573.
We have carefully considered the Rule 4:46-2 statements of the parties and glean the following undisputed facts. [5] Defendant, located in Atlantic City, "is an independent authority in, but not of, the New Jersey State Department of Treasury." Plaintiff, a Caucasian male, began working for defendant in April 2011.[6] He was first employed as a construction manager and, in that position, "he supervised eleven employees and was responsible for building parks and performing building maintenance and landscaping services within Atlantic City's tourism district. "Defendant had an anti-harassment and antidiscrimination policy, which plaintiff received in approximately October 2014.
In December 2014, defendant promoted plaintiff to the position of Operations Manager. As a result of the promotion, plaintiff became responsible for the supervision "of approximately [sixty] employees, including [eight] supervisors in the General Maintenance department of [defendant]'s Special Improvement District Division [(SIDD)]." Mack, an African American male, was a supervisor in the SIDD. He reported to Maurice Cherry and Angel Torres-two SIDD assistant managers who reported to plaintiff. Plaintiff reported to the director of the SIDD, Rick Santoro, another Caucasian male.
Kincade, an African American woman, was defendant's Human Resources (HR) Director. Kincade's duties included "investigat[ing] complaints of discrimination and harassment, . . . interviewing witnesses, making findings, reporting her findings to upper management[, ] and making recommendations for discipline."
Prior to or on about March 3, 2015, Mack told Cherry plaintiff had directed certain offensive conduct to him. Cherry advised Mack to contact HR. On or about March 3, Mack called Kincade "and asked for a meeting with [her], . . . Santoro[, ] and [plaintiff] regarding [plaintiff's] inappropriate conduct toward him." Mack met with Kincade and Santoro, and informed them plaintiff "made comments to him questioning his sexuality, accusing him of raping his foster children[, ] and making a racial comment related to white being pure like clouds and black being like crows, death and grungy." Mack later testified he did not say plaintiff "insulted African Americans, "but he considered plaintiff's statement concerning white and black to be "racist." HR had not received any prior complaints concerning plaintiff.
Santoro and Kincade met with plaintiff and Mack on March 9, 2015. At this meeting, plaintiff "admitted making comments [to Mack] about race and sexuality . . . but denied making a comment about Mack abusing his foster children." Santoro informed plaintiff "his comments and behavior were unacceptable in the workplace." Plaintiff did not make any complaints to Santoro or Kincade concerning Mack prior to or during the meeting. Following the meeting, Kincade questioned Lance Hamilton-a General Maintenance supervisor-and Cherry "about Mack's allegations. "
Hamilton told Kincade "he witnessed [plaintiff] make a disparaging comment to Mack in the [company] lunchroom" to the effect of, "[Y]ou can tell you're the type of person who rapes his kids when he goes home." "Hamilton [also] told [Kincade] that [plaintiff] constantly [made] biased statements about race and religion in the lunchroom." Hamilton further stated plaintiff "questioned 'how come black people do most of the crime and white people do less[, ]' and that [plaintiff] made jokes...
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