Williams v. Castleman
| Decision Date | 13 December 1922 |
| Docket Number | (No. 3593.) |
| Citation | 247 S.W. 263 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. CASTLEMAN. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Suit by J. W. Castleman against C. T. Williams. From order granting plaintiff temporary injunction, defendant appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals certifies questions. Questions answered.
T. B. Ridgell, of Breckenridge, Goree, Odell & Allen and Ernest May, all of Fort Worth, and Chas. L. Black, of Austin, for appellant.
E. W. Bounds, of Fort Worth, for appellee.
This case is before us on certified questions from the honorable Court of Civil Appeals of the Second District. The facts of the case are taken from the certificate.
On March 5, 1921, the commissioners' court of Stephens county, by an order duly entered, declared that the city of Breckenridge, located in justice precinct No. 1, was a city of over 8,000 population; adjudged that another justice court was necessary in the precinct, and created another justice court for precinct No. 1, designating it as place No. 2. They then appointed appellant, C. T. Williams, justice of the peace of precinct No. 1, place No. 2. In pursuance of this order and appointment, appellant gave bond, took the oath of office, and entered upon the active discharge of the duties of the office. The court in the order erecting the office declared, after considering the matter, and being fully advised, and from all the facts and evidence before them, that the city of Breckenridge had a population of over 8,000, that there was a necessity for the office, and that the administration of the law in the county and the service of the people of the precinct demanded and required the creation of said justice court. Appellee, J. W. Castleman, was the duly elected and qualified justice of the peace of precinct No. 1, Stephens county, for the term ending in 1922, and was at the time these proceedings were begun in the active discharge of the duties of his office. Shortly after appellant assumed the duties of the place to which he was appointed, appellee brought this suit in the district court against him for injunction, alleging that appellee was entitled to all the fees of office in justice precinct No. 1, and that no such office existed as that to which appellant had been appointed, for the reason that under the 1920 United States census Breckenridge had only 1,846 inhabitants, and that appellant was ineligible to hold the office of justice of the peace because at the time of his appointment he had not resided in the county or precinct for six months. Appellee prayed judgment for the fees which had been previously collected by appellant, amounting to $300, and for an injunction restraining appellant from further acting in the capacity of justice of the peace. No allegations of fraud were made against the commissioners' court in ascertaining any of the facts relative to or entering the order erecting the office in controversy. The trial court considered the petition, answer, and evidence introduced, upon hearing for temporary injunction, and granted the temporary injunction, because, as found by him, appellant had not resided in the precinct six months, and was therefore ineligible to hold the office. Appeal is from this order of the trial court. The evidence showed that the allegations of plaintiff's petition were true, with the following modifications: The commissioners' court never at any time prior to the erection of the office in controversy made any official canvass or enumeration of the population of Breckenridge, and made no estimate thereof, other than to talk individually with the postmaster of Breckenridge and the secretary of the Chamber of Commerce concerning the probable population, and considering newspaper editorials, etc., that came under their individual notice. The court assumed and took judicial knowledge that the city of Breckenridge was a city of over 8,000 inhabitants, and based the order creating the office here in controversy upon said assumption and judicial notice and what the individual members of the court knew about the population of Breckenridge. The commissioners' court were satisfied that it was a fact that Breckenridge at the time they created the office was a city of more than 8,000 population. Other facts are stated in the certificate, but the foregoing is sufficient for the purposes of this opinion. Upon this state of facts the Court of Civil Appeals certifies the questions which follow:
The questions will be discussed and the answers made in the order presented in the certificate. This involves a construction and interpretation of sections 18 and 28 of article 5 of the state Constitution. Section 18 reads as follows:
The fundamental proposition relied on by the appellee is stated in his argument filed in the Court of Civil Appeals as follows:
"Whenever the taking effect of any law is made to depend upon the number of population of any locality, and the law itself makes no provision for the method of determination and ascertainment of the number of population of said locality, then such population is determined solely and only by the most recent United States census."
From this it is apparent that the first question presented is one merely of the construction and interpretation of section 18, art. 5, of the Constitution, for the purpose of determining whether or not this section confers upon commissioners' courts the power to ascertain the population of any city in any of the justice precincts into which counties may be divided.
The primary rule of interpreting and construing the Constitution is to ascertain the intention of the people in adopting it, and give effect to that intention. 2 Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) §§ 369, 370; Ellis County v. Thompson, 95 Tex. 22, 31, 64 S. W. 927, 66 S. W. 48; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) 69.
In determining the intention we may, of course, examine previous Constitutions, as well as the journals of the convention which framed the Constitution. 6 Ruling Case Law, p. 50, § 45; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) 80.
The history of section 18, art. 5, of our present Constitution begins with the Constitution of the Republic of Texas. Section 2, art. 4, of the Constitution provided that the Republic should be divided into "convenient judicial districts, not less than three, nor more than eight." Section 11 of the same article authorized the Congress to divide the Republic into "convenient counties"; while section 12 related to justices of the peace, declaring:
"There shall be appointed for each county, a convenient number of justices of the peace."
By these sections the number of judicial districts, counties, and justices of the peace were left to the discretion of the legislative department of the government, subject to certain limitations specified in sections 2 and 11 of said article. 1 Gammel's Laws, pp. 1073, 1074.
By an act approved December 20, 1836, the Congress of the Republic provided for the election of two justices of the peace in each district; the districts being defined to be "each militia captain's district." 1 Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1201. It is evident from the legislative enactment that the Legislature considered itself as having power, under the Constitution, to determine the appropriate division of each county into precincts, and the number of justices necessary for each precinct. It is plain, however, that all actions by either the legislative or executive authorities in dividing the Republic into judicial districts, counties, and justice precincts, and fixing the number of justices necessary therefor, were to be governed by the primary purpose declared in the Constitution of the Republic, to wit, the "convenience of the people." The governing phrases, "shall be divided into convenient judicial districts," "the Republic shall be divided into convenient counties," and "there shall be...
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...though supervisory appeal has been extended to the district court in such cases by the Constitution. In the case of Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263, 269, speaking with reference to an order issued by the commissioners court, this Court said: "The judgment and discretion of......
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