Williams v. Chater

• Decision Date: 31 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 4:95cv0046 AS.,4:95cv0046 AS.
• Citation: 915 F. Supp. 954
• Parties: Martha S. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

915 F. Supp. 954

Martha S. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. 4:95cv0046 AS.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

January 31, 1996.

Ralph Robinson, Lafayette, IN, for plaintiff.

Clifford D. Johnson, Office of the United States Attorney, South Bend, IN, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Martha S. Williams (the "claimant") appeals from a final judgment of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d). The claimant contends that she has been denied due process of law as a result of the administrative law judge ("ALJ") prejudging the outcome of her case. Alternatively, the claimant challenges the Commissioner's decision on remand that she has no impairment or combination of impairments listed in or medically equal to an impairment listed in the Social Security regulations, and that she has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. This court has jurisdiction over Ms. Williams' petition for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

The present case has traced a long and circuitous route through the administrative and judicial branches of the federal government. The claimant applied for DIB on January 16, 1990, alleging that she became disabled as of January 15, 1980.¹ Her application for benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration. Ms. Williams subsequently requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge, and on November 29, 1990, ALJ Dale McLaughlin rendered his decision that, although the claimant had a severe physical impairment, she had no impairment or combination of impairments listed in or medically equal to an impairment listed in the Social Security regulations. Furthermore, ALJ McLaughlin found that while Ms. Williams was unable to return to her past relevant work, she had the RFC to perform sedentary work activities. The claimant filed a request for review with the Appeals Council, and on June 24, 1991, the Council vacated the decision and remanded the case to ALJ McLaughlin to further evaluate the claimant's subjective symptoms of pain pursuant to the criteria set forth in Social Security Ruling 88-13.

A second hearing was held before ALJ McLaughlin on August 19, 1991. In a decision dated October 25, 1991, the ALJ again determined that Ms. Williams was able to perform sedentary work and thus was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Following the claimant's request for review, the Appeals Council vacated ALJ McLaughlin's second decision and remanded the claim for further proceedings. This time, the Appeals Council remanded the case to a different administrative law judge, directing the ALJ to evaluate, inter alia, the severity of any mental impairment, and to include in his decision a Psychiatric Review Technique Form ("PRTF").² Following Ms. Williams' third administrative hearing, ALJ Marshall Williams determined on November 24, 1992, that the claimant had severe arthritis as well as chronic anxiety and depression, but concluded that she had no impairment or combination of impairments listed in or medically equal to an impairment listed in the Social Security regulations. Additionally, ALJ Williams found that the claimant in fact had the RFC to perform her past relevant work and therefore was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Appeals Council denied the claimant's request for review on March 5, 1993, rendering the ALJ's decision the final administrative decision pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

The claimant then filed a petition for judicial review of the administrative decision in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In a decision dated December 8, 1993, this court concluded that although substantial evidence existed to support the ALJ's finding that Ms. Williams was not disabled under Listing 1.03, (Arthritis of a major weight-bearing joint), 20 C.F.R. Ch. III, Pt. 404, App. 1, the Secretary's determination that Ms. Williams could perform her past relevant work was not supported by substantial evidence. More important, because the record did not contain the kind of specific expert medical evidence envisioned by Listing 12.04 (Affective Disorders), id., the court reversed the administrative decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, ordering the Secretary of Health and Human Services³ to obtain the requisite expert input for a proper evaluation of the nature and severity of Ms. Williams' mental impairment in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. See Williams v. Shalala, 842 F.Supp. 362, 366-67 (N.D.Ind.1993).

The Appeals Council vacated the final decision of the Secretary and, in accordance with this court's order, remanded the case for additional proceedings. A fourth hearing was held in Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 17, 1994. In a decision issued December 13, 1994, ALJ Daniel Shell found that, prior to the date the claimant was last insured, she had no physical or mental impairment that imposed significant nonexertional limitations which would have reduced her ability to perform a full range of sedentary work. The Appeals Council denied review on May 3, 1995, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

Ms. Williams filed her present petition for judicial review in this court on June 12, 1995. The claimant, by counsel, filed her brief in support of summary judgment on October 31, 1995, and the Commissioner filed her response on December 15, 1995. As no reply brief has been filed, the court now rules on the claimant's motion for summary judgment.

II. Facts

The claimant, Ms. Williams, is a fifty-eight-year-old woman who has a high school education. She was forty-seven years of age when last insured under the special earnings requirements of the Social Security Act and, thus, was a "younger person" for purposes of the present claim for Disability Insurance Benefits. Ms. Williams' work record indicates that she has held positions as a factory worker, waitress, maid, cashier, and dispatcher. Immediately prior to the alleged onset date of disability, she performed food production-type work in a factory at Lafayette, Indiana. Ms. Williams' physical problems apparently began in February 1979,⁴ when she fell into a broken conveyer belt at work and tore the cartilage in her right knee. After initially being placed in traction at the hospital, and then on crutches at home, the claimant had surgery in May 1979 to remove the damaged cartilage. When Ms. Williams returned to work in July (or August) of 1979, the treating physician restricted her to sedentary work with no lifting. The company provided the claimant with a sedentary position until January 1980, when she was informed that she would no longer be allowed to sit on that particular job. Apparently, Ms. Williams was laid off because no other sedentary positions were available in the plant.⁵

In January 1981, Ms. Williams was admitted to the hospital for evaluation of abdominal pain and diarrhea, at which time she was also diagnosed as suffering from chronic anxiety and depression.⁶ When Ms. Williams was released a few days later, the discharging physician prescribed the psychotropic medication Ativan for the claimant's anxiety, but did not recommend psychiatric or psychological treatment. During the next two years, Ms. Williams allegedly attempted suicide twice—the first time by jumping from a moving car, and the second by threatening to swallow a large number of sleeping pills. She was not hospitalized after either suicide attempt, nor did she seek treatment from a mental health professional after either incident. In September 1983, Ms. Williams' family physician prescribed the psychotropic medication Tranxene for the management of her anxiety disorder. Ms. Williams now claims to be addicted to Tranxene. Tr. 116-17; see Tr. 425.

Despite functional limitations which significantly affected her ability to work—e.g., degenerative abnormalities of both knees which caused her to have difficulty standing and to fall frequently—Ms. Williams attempted to return to work on two occasions, first in 1986 and again in 1989. From May through November of 1986, the claimant worked as a cashier at the Tippecanoe Battlefield museum and gift shop, where she sat at a table and collected proceeds from the sale of souvenirs. Apparently, Ms. Williams was forced to leave her job at the gift shop when her employer insisted that she perform nonsedentary janitorial work as well. Tr. 108. Then, in the spring of 1989, the claimant worked for six weeks as a dispatcher at a local plumbing shop. Ms. Williams testified that she was laid off from this position because she was unable to write dispatch reports legibly, due to arthritis in her right hand. Tr. 109. Based on the record, it appears that the claimant has not worked since 1989. She filed the present claim for DIB on January 16, 1990, when she was fifty-two years of age.

DISCUSSION

In its order of December 8, 1993, this court overruled the Secretary's decision and remanded the case to the Secretary for further consideration of the claimant's medical condition. Since the court entered a substantive ruling reversing the Secretary's decision and remanded the case to the Secretary for disposition (rather than retaining jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings), the order was a "sentence four" remand under § 405(g) rather than a "sentence six" remand.⁷ See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990); see also Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991). Thus, the present...