Williams v. City of Allentown
| Decision Date | 03 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:17-cv-04910,5:17-cv-04910 |
| Parties | BILL WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ALLENTOWN; KEITH MORRIS; ED PAWLOWSKI; GLEN DORNEY; GAIL STRUSS; and FIVE JOHN & FIVE JANE DOES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6 - Granted
Plaintiff Bill Williams, a police officer with the City of Allentown, initiated this civil rights action against the City and several of its employees after he was reassigned from his position in the Youth Division to a position in patrol allegedly for informing a subordinate officer that he could run for political office and for approving this officer's military leave. Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, but Williams is given leave to file an amended complaint as explained herein.
On November 2, 2017, Williams initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Allentown, Keith Morris, who was then Chief of Police of the City of Allentown Police Department, Ed Pawlowski, who was then Mayor of Allentown, Glen Dorney1 and Gail Struss, Assistant Chiefs of Police for the City of Allentown Police Department, and five unnamed individuals believed to be officials, agents, employees, or representatives of the City. Williams asserts the following claims: (1) First Amendment retaliation, (2) a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation,2 (3) Monell3 liability, (4) Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA") retaliation, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335, and (5) and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
The Complaint alleges as follows. In April 2006, Williams began working for the City of Allentown Police Department as a police officer. Compl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 1. In February 2014, he advanced to a detective in the Youth Division, which consisted of fifteen officers and detectives. Id. ¶ 22. In May 2016, through a promotion in the civil service, Williams advanced in rank to the sole Detective Sergeant in the Youth Division. Id. ¶ 24. In this new position, Williams supervised all officers and detectives within the Division. Id. Williams was supervised by Captain Lake. Id. ¶ 36.
Accompanying this advancement, Williams experienced newfound perks consisting of "unique duties and benefits that do not exist in other City of Allentown Police Department sergeant positions, such as patrol," including a "steady day shift," no weekend or holiday assignments, avoidance of midnight shifts, and "use of [a] car from home to work with fuel andmaintenance benefits." Id. ¶ 25. Additionally, his new position in the Youth Division offered greater prestige, more time with family, and increased income opportunities through overtime and other shifts. Id. ¶ 26.
In January 2017, Williams was approached by a subordinate police officer in the Youth Division, inquiring of the possibility of retaining employment in the City of Allentown Police Department while running for mayor as an opponent of then-mayor Pawlowski. Compl. ¶¶ 27-28, 34. Williams "investigated all policies and regulations known to him" to conclude that there was no prohibition from maintaining employment as a police officer while running for mayor. Id. ¶ 28. After conveying this information to the subordinate officer, Williams suggested that the subordinate officer "seek approval from the Chief of Police, Defendant Morris, to confirm his findings." Id. ¶ 30. The subordinate officer began his campaign for the mayoral position on February 23, 2017. Id. ¶ 32. Shortly thereafter, Williams granted the subordinate officer's request for USERRA leave "to travel and report for active military duty." Id. ¶ 33.
Upon granting the subordinate officer's USERRA leave, Williams received an order from Captain Lake requesting "documentation of the subordinate's military orders," to which Williams acquiesced. Id. ¶ 36. On March 2, 2017, Williams received an order from Captain Lake to appear before Chief of Police Morris. Id. ¶ 37. Upon entering the Chief's office, Williams observed that Assistant Chief Dorney and Assistant Chief Struss were also present. Id. ¶ 38. In the meeting, Morris informed Williams that March 2, 2017, would be his last day in the Youth Division and reassigned him to patrol, beginning with a night shift on March 8, 2017. Id. ¶ 41. When reporting for his first night shift on March 8, 2017, Williams was informed that an internal disciplinary investigation had commenced concerning his grant of USERRA leave to the subordinate officer. Id. ¶ 43.
Soon after, Williams "filed a grievance for the position change." Compl. ¶ 44. In his new position on patrol, Williams works weekends and nights and no longer has the use of the city-owned car and gas card with maintenance benefits "for use ... between home and work." Id. ¶ 41. Williams believed Defendants were retaliating against him for his association with the subordinate officer, who was challenging Pawlowski in the mayoral election. Id. ¶ 46. In July, August, and September 2017, Williams met with the new4 Chief of Police Dorney and the Director of Human Resources to discuss the matter. Id. ¶ 47. In mid-September, the City of Allentown made an offer to Williams to settle the grievance and avoid arbitration. Id. ¶ 48. Williams, already skeptical of the offer, did not accept before the City of Allentown revoked the offer upon instruction from Pawlowski. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. Arbitration on the grievance was not scheduled. Id. ¶ 49.
In response to Williams's Complaint, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim. They also argue that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.5
In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, this Court must "accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if"the '[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'" has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. (). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Defendants assert that Williams has not established a valid First Amendment retaliation claim because the information he provided the subordinate officer was given as part of Williams's official role, not as a private citizen, and is therefore not protected by the First Amendment. See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Br. 7-8, ECF No. 6. Williams responds that his speech is protected because his job did not require him to give advice to the subordinate officer and, additionally, that he spoke out against, and grieved, the perceived First Amendment violation. See Pl.'s Opp. 9-11. Williams contends that his First Amendment claim is further based onfreedom of association, and that Defendants have not challenged this component of his claim.6 See id.
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting a violation of free speech, "a plaintiff must establish: (1) he engaged in First Amendment protected activity, (2) the defendant took adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights, and (3) the adverse action was prompted by the plaintiff's protected activity." Rossiter v. City of Phila., 674 F. App'x 192, 196 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)). For a public employee, such as a police officer, to fall under First Amendment protected activity, the individual must also show: (1) he "spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the government employer did not have 'an adequate justification for treating the employee differently'" than other persons of the general public. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Garcetti v.Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-18 (2006)).
When acting in an official capacity, a public employee does not speak as a citizen and therefore does not have a First Amendment right. See Hill, 455 F.3d at 241-42; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415-17 (). Accordingly, public employees are not shielded from employer discipline when their speech is made while performing job duties. See Hill, 455 F.3d at 423.
In Garcetti, a supervising deputy district attorney authored a memorandum discussing the misrepresentations and inaccuracies in a search warrant affidavit used in an ongoing case, andrecommended dismissal of the prosecution. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413-14. Despite the recommendation, the...
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