Williams v. City of Brockton

Decision Date13 November 2014
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 12–10430–JGD.
Citation59 F.Supp.3d 228
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
PartiesKen WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF BROCKTON, et al., Defendants.

John J. Hightower, Randolph, MA, for Plaintiff.

Stephen C. Pfaff, Louison, Costello, Condon & Pfaff, LLP, Boston, MA, Gregory F. Galvin, Weymouth, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE

DEIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Ken Williams (Williams), is a former officer in the Brockton, Massachusetts Police Department (“BPD”). He has brought this civil rights action against the City of Brockton (“City or “Brockton”), four present and/or former officers of the BPD,1 the Brockton Retirement Board, and five individual members of the Retirement Board2 (collectively, the “Retirement Board Defendants). Williams alleges, in essence, that the defendants engaged in a pattern of retaliation against him after he advised an African–American businessman to file a complaint with the Internal Affairs Division of the BPD accusing one of Williams' fellow police officers, defendant Lon Elliott, with false arrest and racially offensive conduct. Williams also alleges that the City and the four defendant police officers (collectively, the “Police Defendants) discriminated against him after he became disabled with post-traumatic stress disorder

(“PTSD”). By his Complaint, Williams has asserted claims against all of the defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, for violations of his constitutional rights and for payment of attorney's fees incurred by Williams as a result of those violations. (Counts I, III and IV). He has also asserted claims against the four individual police officers for depriving him of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) (Count II). Each of the individual defendants has been named in both his official and individual capacities.

The matter is before the court on the Defendants City of Brockton, William Conlon, Emmanuel Gomes and Brian Leary's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 119) and on the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendants, Brockton Retirement Board, William R. Farmer, William E. Parlow, Matthew J. McLaughlin, Edward P. Mack & Heidi A. Chuckran (Docket No. 123). By their motions, the defendants contend that there are no material facts in dispute, and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Williams' claims against them. The matter is also before the court on the plaintiff's Motion to Strike Celotex Argument from the City's Summary Judgment Motion (Docket No. 133), by which Williams requests that the court: (1) limit the City's argument regarding the First Amendment and ADA claims to the issue of statute of limitations; (2) ... limit the City's 1983 argument to whether the City violated clearly established law; and (3) ... limit the City's argument regarding municipal [liability] to whether Williams' custom, practice, or policy claims are time barred.” For all the reasons described below, the plaintiff's motion to strike is DENIED, the Retirement Board Defendants' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED, and the Police Defendants' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The matter shall proceed to trial on the plaintiff's claims against the Police Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983 ”), to the extent they are premised upon the denial of Williams' 2010 request for injured on duty leave and the events surrounding his retirement from the BPD.3

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS4

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir.2008). Accordingly, the following facts are relevant to the defendants' motions for summary judgment.5

The plaintiff, Williams, was employed as a police officer in the BPD from approximately October 1995 until his retirement on November 12, 2010. (Compl. (Docket No. 1) ¶ 16; PD SOF ¶ 6; PRPD ¶ 6). He initially performed work as a patrolman, but was later promoted to the position of Generalist Detective. (PD Ex. B at 8). Williams, who is African–American, claims that during his tenure as a police officer, he was one of only a handful of minority officers who were employed by the BPD. (Compl. ¶ 17). The record indicates that the plaintiff performed well in his job, even earning an award as a “Top Cop” in the spring of 2009. (See Pl. Supp. SOF ¶ 44, 58; Pl. Ex. 35).

The Arrest of Jose Semedo

As indicated above, Williams' claims in this action arise out of events that occurred following the arrest of an African American businessman named Jose Semedo (“Semedo”). Semedo was arrested on a warrant by officers from the BPD on November 20, 2007. (PD SOF ¶ 3(b); Pl. Ex. H ¶ III(1)). One of those officers was defendant Elliott, who was then a Sergeant with the BPD. (Pl. Ex. H ¶ III(1)). During the arrest, Semedo attempted to convince Elliott that the warrant had been recalled, but his efforts were unavailing. (Pl. Ex. C at 4). Elliott not only refused to confirm that the warrant remained outstanding, but he also made racially offensive remarks to Semedo, and mocked Semedo using racially offensive gestures. (Pl. Ex. H ¶ III(11) & (15)).

Following an appearance in and subsequent release from court on November 20, 2007, Semedo went to the bus station where Williams happened to be working a police detail. (Pl. Ex. 15 at 36–38; PD SOF ¶ 3(c); PRPD ¶ 3(c)). Semedo approached Williams and entered into a discussion with the plaintiff in which Semedo recounted details of his arrest, including Elliott's racist comments. (Pl. Ex. 15 at 37–38). Williams advised Semedo to file a complaint with the BPD. (Id.; see also PRPD ¶ 3(e)). Accordingly, Semedo submitted a letter to the Internal Affairs Division of the BPD in which he described the circumstances of his arrest, including the manner in which Elliott had treated him during the course of the incident. (Pl. Ex. C at 4–5).

In January 2008, the Internal Affairs Division launched an investigation into Semedo's complaint against Elliott. (Pl. Supp. SOF ¶ 12; Pl. Ex. C at 8–13). The investigation included, but was not limited to, interviews with Elliott and witnesses to the incident, the submission of written reports by officers who took part in Semedo's arrest, and a search for documentation regarding the status of any warrants relating to Semedo. (See Pl. Ex. C). The plaintiff claims that by July 2008, Elliott and other members of the BPD had learned about Williams' role in advising Semedo to report the offending conduct. (See Compl. ¶¶ 32–33). It is Williams' contention that the BPD originally tried to cover up the facts relating to Semedo's arrest. (See Pl. Opp. Mem. (Docket No. 140) at 6–7). Eventually, however, Elliott's employment with the BPD was terminated.

Denial of Williams' 2008 Injured on Duty Claim

Williams contends that the Police Defendants harassed him and took adverse actions against him in retaliation for his involvement in the Semedo matter. (See Compl. ¶¶ 35–41). The first such alleged incident occurred in the summer of 2008, after Williams was injured on duty. Specifically, the record demonstrates that on July 12, 2008, Williams suffered a blood exposure injury in the course of performing his duties as a police officer, and had to remain out of work for a number of weeks. (Pl. Ex. U at 12; Pl. Ex. 14 at 90–91; PD Ex. B at 9). According to Williams, Elliott was responsible for submitting the plaintiff's claim for injured on duty (“IOD”) leave to City Hall so that Williams could receive workers' compensation. (Pl. Ex. 14 at 90–92; PRPD ¶ 3(h)). However, when Williams returned to work in August 2008, he discovered that Elliott had failed to submit the necessary paperwork. (Pl. Ex. 14 at 92; PD Ex. B at 9). As a result of Elliott's conduct, Williams was not credited for sick time while he was away from work, and was reprimanded by his Operations Bureau Commander for abusing his sick leave. (PD Ex. B at 9; Pl. Ex. U at 2, 13). Although the plaintiff's 2008 claim for IOD leave was ultimately submitted by another officer, Williams claims that Elliot's failure to file the paperwork in a timely manner was due to the plaintiff's communications with Semedo, including his effort to encourage Semedo to file a complaint with the BPD, and that Elliott's conduct thereby constituted unlawful retaliation for Williams' exercise of his right to free speech. (See Pl. Ex. 14 at 92–95; Compl. ¶¶ 36, 41 & Count I).

In about October 2008, Williams received a summons to appear and testify at a disciplinary hearing regarding Elliott's conduct toward Semedo. (PD Ex. B at 9–10). Prior to the hearing, Williams encountered one of the Police Defendants, Emmanuel Gomes, in the hallway outside the hearing room. (Pl. Ex. 14 at 99–100). According to Williams, Gomes attempted to discourage him from testifying adversely against Elliott. (Id.; Pl. Supp. SOF ¶ 21). However, Williams declined to follow Gomes' advice, and provided testimony and information that was damaging to Elliott. (PD SOF ¶ 3(i); PRPD ¶ 3(i)). Both Elliott and the Chief of the BPD, defendant William K. Conlon, were among the individuals who were present at the hearing. (PRPD ¶ 3(i)). Consequently, they were able to hear Williams' testimony against Elliott. (See id. ).

On December 18, 2008, Williams received notice that the City had denied his IOD claim relating to the blood exposure injury because Williams' attending physician had indicated that Williams could return to work. (Pl. Ex. U at 2, 6). The plaintiff disputed the denial, which was upheld by the City on February 25, 2009. (Id. at 11). Notwithstanding the stated reason for the denial, Williams asserts that the City's decision was based on his testimony at Elliott's disciplinary hearing, and that the City...

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