Williams v. City of Dover

• Decision Date: 06 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-040,87-040
• Citation: 543 A.2d 919,130 N.H. 527
• Parties: R. Craig WILLIAMS v. CITY OF DOVER.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 919

543 A.2d 919

130 N.H. 527

R. Craig WILLIAMS v. CITY OF DOVER.

No. 87-040.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

June 6, 1988.

Nighswander, Martin & Mitchell P.A., Laconia (Willard G. Martin, Jr., on brief and orally, and Linda G. Peck, on the brief), for plaintiff.

Fisher, Moran, Willoughby & Clancy, Dover (Scott E. Woodman, on the brief and orally), for defendant.

BROCK, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, R. Craig Williams, appeals from a decision of the Superior Court (Gray, J.), upholding his removal from the Dover Planning Board by the Dover City Council for acts alleged to constitute malfeasance in office. The plaintiff argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in upholding his removal because neither of the two acts relied upon by the city council relates to the performance of his official duties as a planning board member. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the plaintiff and therefore reverse.

On December 12, 1984, the city council appointed Williams to the planning board for a term to expire on December 31, 1987. However, on July 23, 1986, the city council removed him by a resolution alleging that he had committed certain acts constituting malfeasance in office. First, the city council charged that Williams' participation in the development of a plan for the installation of a driveway for his full-time employer, the Elliott Rose Company of Dover, Inc., in violation of certain ordinances requiring a permit from the Dover Director of Public Works, amounted to malfeasance in office. Second, the city council charged that Williams' activities, also in the fall of 1985, in support of the Elliott Rose Company's decision to construct an additional greenhouse on its property, without obtaining either a permit or site review in accordance with city ordinances, amounted to malfeasance in office. In both instances, the planning board has jurisdiction over such matters.

Williams filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the superior court, challenging his removal. See Ehrenberg v. City of Concord, 120 N.H. 656, 659, 421 A.2d 128, 130 (1980). A hearing was held and the trial court found that Williams had contacted the appropriate city officials regarding the construction of the driveway and that Williams had been informed that a number of permits would be required. Notwithstanding this, Williams' employer, the Elliott Rose Company, proceeded to construct the driveway without permits. City officials all testified that Williams never suggested or otherwise implied that he was acting in his capacity as a planning board member in his dealings on behalf of the Elliott Rose Company.

The trial court also found that Williams had contacted the appropriate city officials with reference to the greenhouse construction permit. Williams had argued to these officials on behalf of the Elliott Rose Company that the greenhouse project did not require site review before a permit could be issued. Ultimately, a permit issued, but it was later withdrawn. The official with whom Williams dealt testified that, although he knew Williams was a planning board member, Williams always represented himself to be the agent of the Elliott Rose Company and never referred to his position on the planning board.

In ruling against Williams, the trial court defined "malfeasance" to include the general misuse of public office. The court relied in part on the definition of "malfeasance" found in Black's Law Dictionary, which states that malfeasance can mean "wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts or interferes with the performance of official duties." Black's Law Dictionary 862 (5th ed. 1979). The court then defined malfeasance more generally as "the doing of an act which ought not to be done," citing Quinn v. Concord, 108 N.H. 242, 247, 233 A.2d 106, 109-10 (1967), and concluded that the city council could reasonably have found "that something was done which the official [Williams] ought not to have done."

At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling that Williams' acts constituted malfeasance in office, justifying his removal. The trial court's jurisdiction on a petition for a writ of certiorari is limited to granting relief "only if the administrative agency has exceeded its jurisdiction or authority, has otherwise acted illegally, has abused its discretion, or has acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously." Runde v. City of Concord, 128 N.H. 175, 177, 512 A.2d 408, 410 (1986). While the plaintiff claims that the court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and against the weight of the evidence, we dispose of the case on the ground that the court committed an error of law in upholding Williams' dismissal, and therefore need not address these other claims.

We note that Williams' appointment would have expired on December 31, 1987, even if he had not been removed earlier. This would normally render moot the issue of the propriety of his removal. However, as we have stated before, the...