Williams v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 19 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10 C 6234 |
| Parties | HERBERT WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS O'BRIEN #10634 AND BYRNE #5304, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Hon. Charles R. Norgle
Before the Court is Defendants City of Chicago and Chicago Police Officers Joseph O'Brien ("O'Brien") and Mathew Byrne's ("Byrne") (collectively, "Defendants") motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
On November 18, 2009, Officers O'Brien and Byrne (collectively, the "Officers")— partners assigned to the Chicago Police Department's Fifth District—were driving northbound on Michigan Avenue when they saw a large smoke cloud. The Officers drove toward the smoke and discovered that the residence of 11144 South Edbrooke was on fire. The Officers recall that, as they arrived at the scene, they saw the Plaintiff, Herbert Williams ("Williams"), exiting the burning residence. Williams stronglydisputes that he went inside 11144 South Edbrooke. However, there is no dispute that Williams was on the porch of 11144 South Edbrooke when the Officers arrived.
Upon their arrival, the Officers exited their car and approached Williams on the porch. Williams told them that there was a fire in the back of the residence on the upper floors, that he believed people were in the residence, and that he was banging on the door to warn people to get out. Williams then watched as O'Brien kicked open the front door to gain entry to the residence. After the Officers entered, Williams crossed the street and entered his home, where he called 911 to report the fire.
During their sweep of 11144 South Edbrooke, the Officers saw what they believed to be evidence of arson: burning wood that was neatly packed in a pile, a burning mattress, and burning newspaper that had been twisted up and shoved into the exposed insulation. They did not find anyone inside the residence. After completing the sweep and exiting the building, O'Brien saw Williams at the entrance to his residence across the street, at 11145 South Edbrooke. O'Brien entered Williams's home and examined his hands with a flashlight. The two men then exited the residence, at which time O'Brien asked Williams for his identification. Williams produced his postal service, veterans, and state identification cards. O'Brien then handcuffed Williams, placed him into the squad car, and drove him to the Fifth District police station, where he was held in an interrogation room, handcuffed to a wall.
Chicago Police Bomb and Arson Detective Janice Govern ("Detective Govern") was assigned to investigate the fire. Detective Govern viewed and photographed the scene of the fire, spoke with the owner of 11144 S. Edbrooke, Carl Branigan ("Branigan"), and ultimately determined that no chemical agent or accelerant was used in the fire.Detective Govern did not ask Branigan if he wanted to sign a criminal complaint against Williams, and Branigan did not tell Detective Govern that he wanted to prosecute Williams for criminal trespass to his residence.
Following her investigation, Detective Govern met with Williams, who remained in custody, and advised him of his Miranda rights. Williams, choosing to voluntarily speak with Detective Govern, told her that he saw the house was on fire and knocked on the door hoping to warn the people living there. Williams denied ever being inside of 11144 South Edbrooke. Detective Govern subsequently consulted Jennifer Sexton of the Cook County State's Attorney Felony Review Unit ("ASA Sexton"). ASA Sexton declined to approve the filing of felony arson charges. Neither Detective Govern nor the Officers asked ASA Sexton if Williams should be charged with criminal trespass to residence.
After Detective Govern told the Officers that Williams could not be charged with arson, the Officers had a conversation and decided, with Detective Govern's approval, to charge Williams with criminal trespass to residence, a Class A misdemeanor. Neither Officer spoke with Branigan, the owner of 11144 S. Edbrooke, before O'Brien signed the criminal trespass complaint. After informing Williams of the criminal trespass charge, Williams recalls that Byrne told him that Pl's L.R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 35. The case against Williams was dismissed in the Circuit Court of Cook County on December 18, 2009.
Williams filed this civil rights action on September 29, 2010, alleging unlawful arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and malicious prosecution under Illinois law. Defendants moved for summary judgment on November 17, 2011. The motion is fully briefed and before the Court.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court does not "make credibility determinations [or] weigh the evidence." Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must identify "with reasonable particularity" the evidence in the record that shows a genuine triable dispute of material fact. Hemsworth, II v. Quotesmith.com. Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007). The movant will prevail where the record as a whole demonstrates that "a rational trier of fact could not find for the non-moving party." Williams v. OSI Educ. Servs., Inc., 505 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Where the material facts specifically averred by one party contradict the facts averred by a party moving for summary judgment, the motion must be denied." Payne. 337 F.3d at 773 (citation omitted). However, "[a] genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, or by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 933 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "In a § 1983 case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and must present sufficient evidence to create genuine issues ofmaterial fact to avoid summary judgment." Sow v. Fortville Police Dep't, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010)).
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
1, False Arrest
"Section 1983 allows citizens whose constitutional rights have been violated by public officials to sue those officials in their individual capacities." Fleming v. Livingston Cnty., Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2012). Williams alleges that the Officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by arresting him without probable cause. Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the Officers had probable cause to arrest Williams or, at a minimum, that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
"The constitutionality of a warrantless arrest for a criminal offense turns on the existence of probable cause for the arrest." Sow. 636 F.3d at 301 (citing Woods v. City of Chi., 234 F.3d 979, 992 (7th Cir. 2000)). "[I]f [the officer] actually did have probable cause to arrest [the plaintiff], then a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest is foreclosed." Fleming, 674 F.3d at 878 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A police officer has probable cause to arrest when, at the moment the decision is made, the facts and circumstances within her knowledge and of which she has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." Id. at 878-79 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). "This standard 'does not require that the officer's belief be correct or even more likely true than false, so long as it is reasonable.'" Fleming, 674 F.3d at 879 (quoting Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953(7th Cir. 1999)). Indeed, the "rule of probable cause is a 'practical, nontechnical conception' that affords the 'best compromise' between the interests of individual liberty and effective law enforcement." Woods, 234 F.3d at 996 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). "Arresting officers may draw reasonable inferences based on their training and experiences in determining whether suspicious circumstances rise to the level of probable cause." Thompson v. Wagner, 319 F.3d 931, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2003). The existence of probable cause "turns on the information known to the officers at the moment the arrest [was] made, not on subsequently received information." Id, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendants sole argument is that summary judgment should be denied in light of the factual dispute over whether the Officers saw Williams exit 11144 South Edbrooke. The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute," however, "will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Hannemann v. S. Door Cnty. Sch. Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the determination of probable cause does not rest upon whether the Officers saw Williams exit the burning residence. To the contrary, there are multiple other facts upon which the Officers' determination of probable cause was reasonably based. Williams admits that he was on the porch of 11144 South Edbrooke when the officers arrived to the scene. Indeed, Williams was the only individual that the Officers...
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