Williams v. City of Kansas City, Mo.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2000
• Docket Number: Nos. 99-3172,99-3273,s. 99-3172
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) TRACY WILLIAMS, APPELLEE, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MO, APPELLANT. TRACY WILLIAMS, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MO, APPELLEE. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 749

223 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2000)

TRACY WILLIAMS, APPELLEE, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MO, APPELLANT.

TRACY WILLIAMS, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MO, APPELLEE.

Nos. 99-3172, 99-3273

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: May 8, 2000

Filed: August 16, 2000

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Richard S. Arnold and Heaney, Circuit Judges, and Magnuson ¹, District Judge.

Heaney, Circuit Judge.

Tracy Williams sued the City of Kansas City (the City) for creating and maintaining a hostile work environment and for retaliation. Following trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Williams on both claims, and the district court entered judgment accordingly. The City appeals the judgment, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support either claim. The City also argues that the admission of certain evidence was error and mandates a new trial. Williams cross-appeals the district court's remittitur of her back pay award and denial of punitive damages on her retaliation claim.

We conclude that the evidence presented by Williams was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on her hostile work environment claim, but was insufficient to sustain the verdict on her retaliation claim. We further conclude that the district court's evidentiary errors do not warrant a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the district court in part and reverse in part.²

FACTS

Tracy Williams was employed as a stock clerk for several years in the City's Public Works Department. On April 18, 1996, William Arthur Horn began working with the City as Supervisor of Stores and Security. He was Williams' superior, and they worked in the same area.

Evidence of Hostile Work Environment

For his first few weeks on the job, Horn spent his time observing the workings of the department, and had very little contact with his subordinates. On May 8, 1996, Horn had his first substantive contact with Williams. He sent her an e-mail message commending her on her efforts and joking that he wished he could clone her. Shortly thereafter, Horn called Williams into his office. He informed her that he had received a complaint about her telephone etiquette, but that he would take no disciplinary action. Near this same time, Williams was advised by a fellow employee to be wary of Horn because he often had affairs with co-workers.

For the next several weeks, Horn routinely called Williams into his office to talk. The topics of their conversations varied. Horn would often probe Williams about the private lives of fellow employees. He told Williams that he felt she was the only one he could talk to, and that she could have all the power she wanted through him. He also asked her to coordinate a picnic and canoe trip for the office, which they both could attend.

Although other employees were more skilled with the City's computer system, Horn asked Williams to assist him. He would call her into his office and have her perform tasks on his computer while standing behind her. At one point, when Williams told Horn that she was too busy to help him with the computer, he suggested she come in on the weekend to train him. She declined the offer.

During this same period, Horn was involved in a conversation with another male employee about men exaggerating the size of their penises. He then pointed his finger at Williams and said, "Now, don't you laugh." On another occasion, Horn approached Williams and told her, "It's not the size of the lead in your pencil, it's how you sign your name." Williams did not provoke either comment or participate further in either conversation.

Williams' desk was in front of a window where the City's mechanics would place orders. The mechanics often would ask Williams for her assistance, apparently keeping her from her other work. To remedy the situation, Williams asked that her desk be moved away from the window and closer to the facsimile machine, which she often used. Instead, Horn moved her desk slightly away from the window to a position where Williams was in Horn's line of vision as he sat as his desk. Horn explained to his supervisor that he moved Williams to this location so that he could observe her closely.

At trial, Williams and other employees testified that Horn would often stare at Williams' body during the months they worked together.

Evidence of Retaliation

In the early part of June, Horn asked Williams to come into his office for another of their frequent meetings. Williams replied that she did not have time to visit in his office, and asked Horn to leave her alone and let her do her job. Horn slammed his office door, and stopped talking to Williams for several weeks.

Williams had long been planning a family trip in July. She had asked for vacation time to take the trip, which was approved. On or about June 20, Horn spoke to Williams for the first time since Williams asked Horn to leave her alone. He advised her that, according to his calculations, she did not have enough paid leave to take her vacation. Williams was in fact two hours short. Williams knew that she had not accrued enough paid leave, but planned to take two hours of unpaid leave, commonly referred to as "dock time." Although dock time generally had been granted to vacationing employees in the past, it was not an entitlement. Rather, it was a discouraged method of taking time off of work. Nevertheless, Williams testified that she knew that she would be allowed to use dock time to take her vacation and that, despite Horn's observations, he could not deny her previously-approved vacation. Almost immediately after Horn advised Williams of the discrepancy between her scheduled vacation and her accrued vacation hours, she tendered her resignation.

DISCUSSION

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A. Standard of Review

The City contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both of Williams' claims because her evidence at trial was insufficient to support the verdicts. However, the City did not move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, and generally "a litigant who fails to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence cannot later argue--either in a post-trial Rule 50 motion or on appeal--that the verdict was supported by insufficient evidence." Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 655 (8th Cir. 1995). We have recognized an exception to this rule where a Rule 50 motion was made shortly before the close of the evidence and the district court indicated that another Rule 50 motion at the close of all evidence would be unnecessary. See BE & K Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 90 F.3d 1318, 1325 (8th Cir. 1996). If a party does not comply with Rule 50's requirements or fall within our recognized exception, we review only for plain error, and reverse only if the jury's verdict would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice if permitted to stand. See Pulla, 72 F.3d at 655.

The City moved for judgment as a matter of law following Williams' case-in-chief. The district court denied the motion and urged the City to proceed. The City would have us view the district court's curt denial of its original motion for judgment as a matter of law as a signal that another motion would be futile and unnecessary. However, the record reveals no indication from the district court that the City was relieved of its responsibility to renew the motion. The City's own perception that renewing its motion would be pointless does not excuse its noncompliance with the rules of procedure.

Because the City failed to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence without justification, our review of the City's sufficiency of evidence arguments is limited to the plain error standard. See id.

B. Hostile Work Environment

The jury found that Williams was sexually harassed in that Horn subjected her to a hostile work environment. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, "[t]he plaintiff must show both that the offending conduct created an objectively hostile work environment and that she subjectively perceived her working conditions as abusive." Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997). Not all unpleasant conduct creates a hostile work environment. See id. Rather, the plaintiff must show that she was singled out because of her gender, and that the conduct was severe and pervasive. See id. "There is no bright line between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct so a jury's decision must generally stand unless there is trial error." Id.; see Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Once there is evidence of improper conduct and subjective offense, the determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury.")

The district court did not plainly err by permitting the five-thousand-dollar jury verdict to stand. Williams presented evidence that Horn stared at her body, made inappropriate sexual comments to her, and told her that she could have all the power she wanted through him. She further presented evidence that Horn held private meetings with her, invited her to join him at City functions, suggested that they meet at work on the weekend, and moved her desk into his line of sight. While much of this evidence is generally innocuous, when considered in its totality it supports Williams' interpretation.

C. Retaliation

The jury further found that Horn retaliated against Williams, resulting in her constructive discharge. To establish a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove that she was engaged in a protected activity, such as complaining about the harasser's conduct or confronting the harasser, and that as a result she suffered adverse employment action. See Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997). Adverse employment action is exhibited by...