Williams v. Cnty. of Alameda
| Decision Date | 10 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: C 12–02511 SBA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | Curtis D. Williams, an individual, Plaintiff, v. County of Alameda; Lieutenant Thomas F. Madigan, Sergeant Mario M. Felix, Deputies, Kevin H. Estep, Brian R. Fernandez, Michael J. Giammalvo, and Justin Miguel, members of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office; and Does 1–5 inclusive, Defendants. |
Darryl Parker, Premier Law Group, PLLC, Bellevue, WA, for Plaintiff.
Robert Dean Reiter, Samantha Nicole Stonework, Oakland, CA, for Defendants.
Docket 46, 47
Curtis D. Williams (“Plaintiff”) brings the instant civil rights action against the County of Alameda (the “County”) and six law enforcement officers1 alleging various claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of a warrantless entry into his residence. See Dkt. 44. The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to strike. Dkt. 46, 47. Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss, but does not oppose the motion to strike. Dkt. 48. 49. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with these matters and being fully informed, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss, and DENIES Defendants' motion to strike. For the reasons stated below, the Court converts Defendants' unopposed motion to strike into a motion to dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages against Sergeant Felix and Lieutenant Madigan. The Court, in its discretion, finds these matters suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) ; N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7–1(b).
The following facts, which are taken from the SAC, are accepted as true for purposes of resolving the motions presently before the Court. On May 8, 2011, Plaintiff and his fiancé, Rickea Butler (“Butler”), were arguing about their daughter's behavior. SAC ¶ 14. During their argument, the Alameda County Sheriff's Office was notified by the California Highway Patrol dispatch of a 911 call from a person they thought was a “young boy” who stated that his parents were “about to fight.” Id. ¶ 15. The Sherriff's Office attempted to return the phone call from the young boy, but there was no response. Id.
Alameda County Sherriff Deputies were dispatched to the origin of the call, 22322 Center Street in Castro Valley, i.e., Plaintiff's residence. SAC ¶ 15. Lieutenant Madigan directed Sergeant Felix and Deputy Estep to head an “Immediate Action Team” composed of themselves and Deputy Fernandez, Deputy Giammalvo, and Deputy Miguel. Id. ¶ 19.
Approximately 30 minutes after the 911 call, Plaintiff and Butler heard pounding on the front door. SAC ¶ 16. As the two of them approached the door, Deputy Estep “smashed in the door and forced it open.” Id. The officers then entered the residence with handguns and rifles aimed at both Plaintiff and Butler. Id. Butler, holding her baby, was forced backwards into the kitchen by Deputy Giammalvo, who was holding an M–4 rifle. Id. ¶ 20.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff was directed to get on his knees. SAC ¶ 17. He complied with this command by putting his hands up and kneeling on the floor. Id. Plaintiff was then directed to get on the ground. Id. As he was doing so, several deputies slammed him down, using their body weight to pin his right side and arm against a couch and the floor. Id. One of the officers yelled at Plaintiff while pressing his firearm against his face, causing Plaintiff to bleed. Id. In response to his question: “what did I do?” Plaintiff was told to “shut the Fuck up.” Id. Plaintiff was then ordered to place his right arm behind his back, but was unable to do so because of the weight of the officers on top of him. Id. ¶ 17. As a consequence, Plaintiff's arm was “wrenched” behind his back, causing injury to his shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
Deputy Miguel handcuffed Plaintiff while he was on the ground. SAC ¶ 18. After Plaintiff was escorted to a patrol car, id. , the officers interrogated his family members, who confirmed that there had only been an argument, not a fight, id. ¶ 21. Butler displayed no physical signs of an altercation, and the home showed no indication of a disturbance outside of the conduct of the officers.Id.
Plaintiff was taken to Valley Care Hospital in Pleasanton, but declined treatment. SAC ¶ 22. He was then taken to Santa Rita County jail and booked. Id. Plaintiff remained in custody overnight and was released in the morning. Id. Upon his release, Plaintiff returned to the hospital. Id. He was subsequently charged with a violation of California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) —resisting arrest, and California Penal Code § 273a(b) —child endangerment. Id. ¶ 23. However, after several months and multiple court appearances, the charges against Plaintiff were dropped in the interests of justice. Id. ¶¶ 23–24.
On May 16, 2012, Plaintiff commenced the instant action. See Compl., Dkt. 1. On May 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed a SAC alleging six claims for relief under § 1983 : (1) unlawful entry and damage to property; (2) unnecessary force; (3) violation of equal protection; (4) unlawful arrest; (5) malicious prosecution; and (6) municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Dkt. 44. The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to strike. Dkt. 46, 47.
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir.2013). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899–900 (9th Cir.2007). However, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Those facts must be sufficient to push the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 683, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Ultimately, the allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Where a complaint or claim is dismissed, “[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the district court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir.2009). Leave to amend is not required where permitting further amendment to the pleadings would be futile. See Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1049–1050 (9th Cir.2006).
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Defendants have submitted portions of Plaintiff's deposition testimony in support of their motion to dismiss. “As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”2 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 if either party to the motion to dismiss submits materials outside the pleadings in support of, or opposition to, the motion, and if the court relies on those materials. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir.1996). However, the Court has discretion either to consider or reject such evidence. See Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d 1139, 1143–1146 (9th Cir.2003) (). If a court converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, the court must give the parties notice and a reasonable opportunity to supplement the record.
Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir.1995).
Here, the evidence submitted by Defendants is not subject to judicial notice or otherwise appropriate for the Court to consider without converting Defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Given the relatively early stage of this litigation, the Court exercises its discretion and declines to convert Defend...
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Williams v. Cnty. of Alameda
...26 F.Supp.3d 925Curtis D. Williams, an individual, Plaintiff,v.County of Alameda; Lieutenant Thomas F. Madigan, Sergeant Mario M. Felix, Deputies, Kevin H. Estep, Brian R. Fernandez, Michael J. Giammalvo, and Justin Miguel, members of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office; and Does 1–5 inclus......