Williams v. Cofer

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CLARKE
• Citation: Williams v. Cofer, 271 S.E.2d 486, 246 Ga. 344 (Ga. 1980)
• Decision Date: 17 September 1980
• Docket Number: No. 36255,36255
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. COFER.

Page 486

271 S.E.2d 486

246 Ga. 344

WILLIAMS v. COFER.

No. 36255.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Submitted May 23, 1980.

Decided Sept. 17, 1980.

F. Glenn Moffett, Jr., L. Prentice Eager, III, Atlanta, for appellant.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Daryl A. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

CLARKE, Justice.

Appellant's driver's license was suspended by the Department of Public Safety as a result of his having accumulated fifteen or more points for traffic violations as provided in Code Ann. § 68B-307. The suspension was upheld by the Fulton Superior Court, and appellant appeals.

1. Appellant complains that the final violation for which points were assigned to him was beyond the 24-month period because the judgment of the traffic court forfeiting his cash bond was dated December 5, 1978, instead of December 5, 1977, which was the actual date upon which it was entered. The trial court found that the incorrect date could be corrected, and we approve this finding. An obviously incorrect entry of a date on a court document does not change the date an event occurred.

2. Appellant also contends that out-of-state traffic violations cannot be included in the calculation of points for revocation. This contention is erroneous since it is implied in § 68B-303(c) and specifically provided in § 68B-307(b) that points will be assessed for out-of-state violations which would subject the violator to points if committed within the State of Georgia.

3. Appellant next argues that the points assessed against him have been erroneously calculated. He points out that by the time of suspension the points assigned for one of the violations had been reduced by the General Assembly to two instead of four as was provided at the time the violation occurred. This issue was specifically addressed in Cofer v. Gurley, 146 Ga.App. 420, 246 S.E.2d 436 (1978). In that case, the Court of Appeals construed the language of § 68B-307(b) and held that points were accrued at the time of conviction. However, we have since held in Southern Discount Co. v. Ector, 246 Ga. 30, 268 S.E.2d 621 (1980), as follows: "Forfeitures and penalties are not favored. Courts should construe statutes relieving against forfeitures and penalties liberally so as to afford maximum relief." As in Ector, we are here construing a statute relieving against a forfeiture. In light of Ector, it must be construed liberally. We therefore overrule Cofer v. Gurley, supra, to the extent that it would impose a forfeiture in spite of a subsequent relieving statute. In the instant case, however, retrospective application of the point reduction will not affect the results because even after the reduction, appellant is charged with a sufficient number of points to cause his license to be suspended.

4. Appellant makes a constitutional attack upon the point system statute on the ground that no time limit is prescribed within which the Department of Public...