Williams v. Commissioner of Social Sec.

• Decision Date: 05 May 2008
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 07-0810(DRD).
• Citation: 549 F.Supp.2d 613
• Parties: Debra WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

549 F.Supp.2d 613

Debra WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Civ. No. 07-0810(DRD).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

May 5, 2008.

Langton & Alter, by Abraham S. Alter, Esq., Rahway, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Christopher J. Christie, United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, by Sixtina Fernandez, Esq., Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION

DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff, Debra Williams, has filed an application for attorney's fees, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, following the remand of her case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further consideration. Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), does not contest the amount of Williams's EAJA request; rather, the Commissioner merely objects to the fee being paid to Williams's attorney. The Commissioner asserts that any fees should be paid directly to Williams as the applicant for the attorney's fees.

In order to advance the purpose of the EAJA, Williams's EAJA fee application will be granted and the fees will be paid directly to her attorney.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 18,1999, Williams filed an application for Supplemental Security Income payments, alleging disability since December 30, 1998, due to carpal tunnel syndrome and degenerative disc disease. The claim was initially denied. A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Richard L. De Steno on November 20, 2000. Following the hearing, on January 23, 2001, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Williams was not disabled. The ALJ's decision was appealed to Appeals Council, which found no grounds for review, and the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision.

On November 21, 2001, Williams filed a Complaint in the District of New Jersey seeking review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision. Briefs were filed by both parties and on February 23, 2004, District Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh issued an opinion remanding the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.

On January 13, 2005, a second hearing was held before ALJ De Steno. During the second set of hearings, Williams's attorney informed the ALJ that Williams had filed a second application for Supplemental Security Income in July, 2001. On the basis of this second application, the Social Security Administration found that Williams was disabled as of February 1, 2001, due in part to her obesity.

On January 21, 2005, the ALJ again issued an unfavorable decision finding that Williams was not disabled from May, 1999, the date of her original application, until February 1, 2001. The Appeals Council again found no grounds for review and the ALJ's decision became the final determination of the Commissioner. On February 16, 2007, Williams filed a second Complaint in the District of New Jersey seeking review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision because the ALJ did not consider her obesity and its effect on her ability to perform work-related activities.

On February 25, 2008, 2008 WL 539056, this Court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further consideration of whether Williams's obesity rendered her disabled from May 18, 1999, through January, 2001, the month before the Social Security Administration found Williams to be disabled on the basis of her second application. Williams's EAJA application for $5,014.75 in attorney's fees followed the Court's remand order.

II. DISCUSSION

The EAJA provides that a court shall award attorney's fees and expenses to a prevailing party in a civil action against the United States, unless "the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Williams is the prevailing party in this civil action against the United States because she obtained a favorable judgment when her case was remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 301-02, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993). In addition, her application for fees was timely because it was filed within thirty days of the Court's order. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Therefore, under the EAJA, Williams is entitled to $5,014.75 as reasonable attorney's fees.

The issue here, however, is not whether Williams is entitled to fees under the EAJA; but rather, who is the appropriate recipient of the funds: Williams, as the applicant, or her attorney. The Commissioner argues that any fees and expenses should be paid directly to Williams because, as the prevailing party, the fees belong to her, and not to her attorney. In support of this argument, the Commissioner points to the text of the EAJA, which confers the right to fees and expenses to the "prevailing party," and argues that the unambiguous language of § 2412(d)(1)(A) mandates that any funds be paid directly to Williams as the prevailing party.

The Commissioner's efforts to adopt this new practice of routing through the claimant the legal fees payable under the EAJA after a successful appeal of the denial of Social Security benefits, instead of continuing with the common practice of paying the fee award directly to the attorney, has sparked a raft of opinions addressing the discreet issue of who is the appropriate recipient of EAJA funds following the successful appeal of the denial of Social Security benefits. Although some decisions,¹ including two from the District of New Jersey,² have agreed with the Commissioner's position, that the language of the EAJA directs an award of attorney's fees to be paid to the applicant, and not her attorney, other decisions have rejected this position and ordered that EAJA fees be paid directly to the applicant's attorney.³

The decisions siding with the Commissioner have primarily relied on the principle of statutory construction which holds that courts should apply the plain meaning of a statute when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., Chonko v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2008 WL 1809188, at *4, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32867, at **12-13 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2008); Vongphakdy v. Astrue, 2008 WL 650017, at *1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18752, at *3, (E.D.Pa. Mar. 11, 2008). However, these courts, for the most part, have ignored a less often cited, but equally important, principle of statutory construction which holds that when the literal application of statutory language would either produce an outcome demonstrably at odds with the statute's purpose or would result in an absurd outcome, courts are entitled to look beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language. Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F.Supp.2d 802, 807 (D.Md.2008); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mack Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527,109 S.Ct. 1981,104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006) ("A basic tenet of statutory construction is that courts should interpret a law to avoid absurd or bizarre results."); United States v. Zats, 298 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 2002) (refusing to "read a text to produce absurd results [that are] plainly inconsistent with the drafters' intentions").

The literal application of § 2412(d)(1)(A) in this case undeniably leads to bizarre and absurd results. Therefore, the Court will look beyond the language of the statute⁴ in order to give effect to the purpose of the EAJA. The Court will then consider the Commissioner's argument that the EAJA must be interpreted consistently with 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On the basis of these considerations, the Court concludes that EAJA fees, once sought by a Social Security claimant, should be paid directly to the attorney.

A. The Purpose of the EAJA

"[T]he clear purpose of the EAJA is to prevent unreasonable government action by providing attorneys to parties who could not otherwise afford one." Smith v. Astrue, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96826, at *7 (N.D.Ala. Oct. 11, 2007). In enacting the EAJA, Congress found that "certain individuals ... may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights in civil actions and in administrative proceedings." Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(a), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). Thus, Congress presented the EAJA, with its costs and fees provision, in order to "diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action by providing in specified situations an award of attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other costs against the United States." Id. at § 202(c)(1). "The theory underlying EAJA is that individuals with claims against the federal government will have a greater ability to actually assert those claims if their attorneys can recover attorney's fees in a successful suit." Chonko, 2008 WL 1809188, at *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32867, at *23. In practice, the EAJA diminishes a powerful disincentive faced by litigants wishing to challenge governmental action because it allows them to recover attorney's fees.

Paying fees directly to the applicant necessarily frustrates the obvious purpose of the EAJA. Vargas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 2008 WL 699581, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18964 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2008); Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F.Supp.2d 802, 805 (D.Md. 2008) ("An interpretation of the statute that would entitle the prevailing party to the receipt of the fee award (as opposed to counsel) would frustrate this statute's remedial purpose."); Smith v. Astrue, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96826, at *7 (N.D.Ala. Oct. 11, 2007) (The purpose of the EAJA "will not be served if the EAJA fees are paid directly to the plaintiff.").

Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir.2007), the case most often cited to in support of the Commissioner's position, admits that "it seems counter intuitive to hold that an award of attorney's fees does not go to the attorney,...