Williams v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 16 January 1930
• Citation: 153 Va. 987
• Parties: V. S. WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 987

153 Va. 987

V. S. WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

January 16, 1930.

Absent, Chichester and Epes, JJ.

1. ASSAULT AND BATTERY — Maiming — Indictment — Crimes Charged in the Indictment — Case at Bar. — In the instant case accused was indicted under the maiming act, Code of 1919, section 4402, the indictment charging that he "in and upon one M. R. Young unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously did make an assault and him the said M. R. Young unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously did wound with intent him, the said M. R. Young) then and there to maim, disable, disfigure and kill * * *." Under this indictment the accused could be found guilty of any felony or misdemeanor substantially charged therein — that is, he could be convicted of (a) malicious wounding with intent to maim, disable, disfigure and kill, (b) of unlawful wounding with the same intent, or (c) of simple assault and battery. Each of these crimes was charged in the indictment.

2. VERDICT — Reformation of Verdict — When Action of Trial Court Supported by Supreme Court of Appeals. — The Supreme Court of Appeals will go far in sustaining the trial court judges when they undertake to reform defective verdicts in the presence of the jury and before they are discharged.

3. VERDICT — Reformation of Verdict — Duty of Trial Court. — It is the duty of the trial court in the presence of the jury and before they are discharged to reform defective verdicts as to matters of form.

4. VERDICT — Illegal Verdict — Discharge of Jury — Duty of Trial Court. — It is clearly the duty of the trial court to see that the jury is not discharged upon the return of an illegal verdict. In such event they should be properly instructed and not discharged (except for some other good reason) until they have found and returned a legal verdict upon which the appropriate judgment can be based.

5. VERDICT — Defective Verdict Accepted by Trial Court — Supreme Court of Appeals Disregarding Defects. — The Supreme Court of Appeals will also go far in the disregard of defects in verdicts which have been accepted by the trial courts, but from which, notwithstanding such defects, the real finding of the jury may be determined, though it may not be accurately couched in the technical language of the law.

6. VERDICT — Defective Verdict — Verdict must Show what Jury Found or Intended to Find. — It is always necessary, however, before a judgment can be entered upon a verdict, that it appear just what the jury found or intended to find.

7. VERDICT — Defective Verdict — Fatally Defective where there is Uncertainty as to Whether the Verdict was of Guilty of a Misdemeanor or of a Felony — Case at Bar. — The instant case was a prosecution under the maiming act, Code of 1919, section 4402. The verdict of the jury was as follows: "We, the jurie, find the accused guilty of unjestiful assault, and fix his punishment at two years in the penitentiary. W. E. Wood." The court amended the verdict to read as follows: "We, the jurie, find the accused guilty of unlawful assault as charged in the indictment, and fix his punishment at two years in the penitentiary. W. E. Wood, Foreman," which amendment the jury accepted.

Held: That the verdict was fatally defective.

8. VERDICT — Defective Verdict — Fatally Defective where there is Uncertainty as to Whether the Verdict was of Guilty of a Misdemeanor or of a Felony — Case at Bar. — A judgment of conviction cannot be sustained where it was not possible under the verdict of the jury in a prosecution under the maiming act, Code of 1919, section 4402, to determine the crime of which the jury intended to find the accused guilty, as so much of the verdict as found accused guilty of "unjestiful assault" might be fairly construed as finding him guilty of unlawful assault; that is, simple assault and battery; but the concluding clause of the verdict in which the punishment was fixed at two years in the penitentiary contradicts this finding of simple assault. The punishment as for a felony is inconsistent with the finding that accused was guilty of a misdemeanor.

9. APPEAL AND ERROR — Harmless Error — Examination of the Evidence. — The Supreme Court of Appeals before it adjudges an apparent error to be either harmful or harmless examines the evidence in the case.

10. APPEAL AND ERROR — Harmless Error — Examination of the Evidence — Case at Bar. — In the instant case it was doubtful whether the verdict found the accused guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony. An examination of the evidence showeed little to support a conviction of felony, and therefore the sentence of the accused, as though he had been found guilty of a felony, based upon the faulty verdict, was held to be harmful error.

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Princess Anne county.

The opinion states the case.

W. R. Ashburn, for the plaintiff in error.

John R. Saunders, Attorney-General, and Leon M. Bazile and Edwin H. Gibson, Assistant Attorneys-General, for the Commonwealth.

PRENTIS, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The accused, V. S. Williams, has been sentenced to two years confinement in the penitentiary as though found guilty, under the maiming statute (Code, section 4402), of unlawfully wounding M. R. Young, with intent to maim, disfigure, disable and kill. Whether the verdict justifies the sentence is the fundamental question raised.

These are among the facts shown by the evidence: The accused, Williams, was a special police officer in Princess Anne county. Two automobiles had been in collision on the highway, and in response to a summons he was there, by virtue of his office, in charge of the wrecks. M. R. Young, operating an automobile repair shop, went to the scene of the wreck. There had been some bad feeling between the two men for several years. When Young (with his mechanic, Swindell) came there with the hope of taking the wrecked automobiles, presumably for repair, he was told by Williams that he as an officer was in charge, and that he could not get them. During the interview Young asked the owner of one of the cars whether he could take it, and was told that he could not. Young then drove up the road, which was narrow, to turn his vehicle, saying to his mechanic, Swindell, that there was nothing for them to do except to go home, but when he came back he stopped and renewed his verbal controversy with Williams. His own statement of his reason for doing so, showing that he was at fault and looking for trouble, is thus stated by him: "I told you I wanted to tell him how dirty he had been doing and that I was getting tired of it, and that I knew a few things myself." There was much coarse, profane and insulting language — not all of such language as is unfit to print, but certainly a great deal of it.

In the second interview he substantially accused Williams of violating the laws against trafficking in intoxicating liquors, of being "crooked," and threatened to expose him to the next grand jury.

According to the testimony for the defense, given by five of the six disinterested bystanders, the accused shot while Young was advancing upon him, having just threatened to beat his brains out. Williams, the accused, testified that he directed his pistol downward so as not to inflict a mortal wound. The location of the wound and its slightly downward course from the crotch in front to the back of the leg, a few inches below the hip joint, confirms this. At the time of the shot Young was advancing upon him and violently threatening to attack him.

The substantial conflict in the testimony comes from Young and Swindell, and is as to the precise location of the shooting, they saying that it occurred about seventy-five or 100 yards away from where all the other bystanders said that the affray occurred, and that Williams, the accused, shot without justification or excuse. There is, however much in Swindell's testimony confirming the testimony of the other bystanders,...