Williams v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 22 November 1948 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 3423. |
| Citation | 188 Va. 583 |
| Parties | RAYMOND WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
1. CRIMINAL LAW — Presence of Accused at Trial for Felony. — The right of one charged with felony to be personally present throughout his trial was a basic principle of our common law. The first sentence of section 4894 of the Code of 1942 (Michie) is but a legislative declaration of that principle.
2. CRIMINAL LAW — Presence of Accused at Trial for Felony — Conference in Judge's Chamber as to Admissibility of Evidence — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for housebreaking with intent to commit larceny, the attorney for the Commonwealth asked a question during the trial to which counsel for accused objected as improper, and the trial judge and counsel retired to consider the admissibility of the question and expected answer in evidence. The accused and jury were left in the courtroom. After hearing argument the judge concluded the question was proper and announced that he would admit it, allowing counsel for accused his objection. Upon their return to the courtroom, and in the presence of the jury and accused, the judge announced his ruling. The question and further examination was permitted, to which counsel for accused duly objected. The accused contended that his constitutional and statutory right to be present during the trial was violated because he was not present when the court ruled upon the admissibility of the evidence objected to.
Held: That though the trial court heard argument out of the presence of accused upon whether the question and testimony sought to be elicited were proper, nothing was done in his absence that could affect his interest. The questions were asked, the ultimate official ruling made, and the objections and exceptions thereto taken by counsel in his presence. What happened was a temporary suspension of the trial for the judge to be advised upon a purely legal question that had arisen to the end that a correct ruling could be made. The conference in the judge's chambers was not a part of the actual trial and there was no denial of any right of accused or error in the procedure adopted.
3. CRIMINAL LAW — Presence of Accused at Trial for Felony — Does Not Include Inquiry into Purely Legal Matters by Trial Judge. — The prisoner's right of personal presence in a felony case throughout the trial from arraignment to sentence, when anything is done that can affect his interest, is an inalienable one. It is to be rigidly and jealously guarded. Yet, in its protection and enforcement, it must not be so enlarged as to exceed its true scope and thereby made to include all inquiry into and consideration of purely legal matters by the trial judge which are in fact and reality merely careful and prudent preparation for the resumption and conduct of the trial.
4. BURGLARY AND HOUSEBREAKING — Evidence Sufficient to Establish Presence of Accused Where Crime Was Committed — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for housebreaking with intent to commit larceny, the crime charged in the indictment was committed in a jurisdiction other than that in which accused was found and apprehended in possession of part of the stolen goods. The forcible entry and theft of the stolen goods were parts of the same transaction committed at the same time. That a car owned by accused was used in removing the stolen goods was clearly established. By his admission the car was in his possession during the entire day on which the felony was perpetrated. Accused contended that the only substantial evidence connecting him with the offense charged was his possession of the stolen goods in the jurisdiction where he was found and that venue was not proven.
Held: The contention was really a claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish the presence of accused in the jurisdiction where and when the crime was committed and was without merit, since the incriminating circumstances established his presence at the scene of the crime.
5. LARCENY — Unexplained Exclusive Possession of Recently Stolen Goods Raises Presumption of Guilt. — Unexplained or insufficient explanation of exclusive possession of recently stolen goods, either within or without the jurisdiction of the actual theft, is sufficient to raise the factual presumption or inference of guilt of the larceny at the place where the crime was actually committed. The presumption against one that may be thus raised is not limited to the territorial jurisdiction where he is found in possession of the stolen goods. Venue, or presence where the crime was committed, may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
6. BURGLARY AND HOUSEBREAKING — Evidence Sufficient to Establish Guilt — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for housebreaking with intent to commit larceny, the forcible entry and theft were parts of the same transaction committed at the same time. That a car owned by accused was used in removing the stolen goods was clearly established. By his own admission, the automobile was in his possession during the entire day on which the felony was perpetrated. Sixteen days after the crime was committed he was found in possession of a part of the stolen goods. His statement that he had bought the goods in explanation of his possession was of such character as to warrant its rejection by the jury. Accused contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt.
Held: That every material fact or circumstance necessary to prove the guilt or innocence of accused was definitely established by competent evidence beyond all reasonable doubt. In unbroken sequence, the chain of circumstances pointed with certainty to him as the guilty party. All facts and circumstances were consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. No more was necessary.
7. LARCENY — Instruction as to Exclusive Possession of Recently Stolen Goods Held Proper — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for housebreaking with intent to commit larceny, the goods stolen consisted of fifty-two pieces of cured hog meat which had been stored in a barn. Tire tracks disclosed that an automobile or similar vehicle had been used in carrying out the theft. It was evident from marks on the ground that objects had been dragged from the barn to the side and rear of where the car had stood. Sixteen days after the felony was committed the accused was found in possession of part of the stolen goods. The trial court instructed the jury that "possession of recently stolen property creates a presumption of guilt of the larceny of the property, and places upon the accused the burden of explaining such possession". Accused contended the instruction should have stated to the jury that they could only find him guilty of larceny of such of the stolen property as actually came into his possession.
Held: The court did not instruct the jury that possession of a part of recently stolen property created a presumption of guilt of stealing other property taken at the same time. A fair interpretation of the language used limited the presumption of guilt so created by such possession to the actual property found in the possession of accused. It unmistakably appeared that the one who broke and entered the barn perpretated the theft of all of the parcels of meat and under the circumstances proved, even if the language was susceptible of the construction contended for by accused, there would be no error in the instruction.
8. LARCENY — Possession of Part of Stolen Goods Infers Theft of All. — The possession of a part of recently stolen property warrants the inference that accused stole all of it. Such inference is warranted, however, only as to the property taken at about the same time as that found in accused's possession.
9. APPEAL AND ERROR — Objections to Instructions Not Made in Trial Court Will Not Be Considered — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for housebreaking with intent to commit larceny, accused assigned as error in the Supreme Court of Appeals the omission of a statement in an instruction. The petition for a writ of error admitted that this objection was not made at the trial when the instruction was tendered by the attorney for the Commonwealth and given by the trial judge.
Held: Under Rule 22 of the Supreme Court of Appeals such objection would not be entertained on appeal.
10. BURGLARY AND HOUSEBREAKING — Evidence Sufficient to Justify Instruction and Sustain Verdict — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for housebreaking with intent to commit larceny, the forcible entry and theft were parts of the same transaction committed at the same time. That a car owned by accused was used in removing the stolen goods was clearly established. By his own admission, the automobile was in his possession during the entire day on which the felony was perpetrated. Sixteen days after the crime was committed he was found in possession of a part of the stolen goods. His statement that he had bought the goods in explanation of his possession was of such character as to warrant its rejection by the jury. The court instructed the jury that though they did not believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that accused, alone, broke and entered as alleged in the indictment, or that he was present, aiding and abetting in the breaking and entering, yet if they did believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he took and carried away any of the goods they should find him guilty. Accused contended that there was no evidence on which the instruction could be based.
Held: There was ample proof presented to the jury to justify the giving of the instruction.
11. ARGUMENTS AND CONDUCT OF COUNSEL — Comments Held Not Prejudicial to Accused — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for housebreaking with intent to commit larceny, the attorney...
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