Williams v. County of Fresno, 1:21-cv-00648-AWI-SAB
| Decision Date | 19 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00648-AWI-SAB |
| Parties | PRINCE PAUL RAYMOND WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF FRESNO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND THIS MATTER BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MAY 27, 2021 COURT ORDER AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (ECF Nos 1, 4)
Prince Paul Raymond Williams (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
Plaintiff's complaint was screened and on May 27, 2021, a screening order issued finding that Plaintiff had failed to state any cognizable claims in this action and granting him thirty days in which to file an amended complaint. More than thirty days have passed and Plaintiff has neither filed an amended complaint nor otherwise responded to the May 27, 2021 order. For the reasons discussed herein, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim and this action be dismissed for failure to comply with a court order and failure to prosecute.
Notwithstanding any filing fee, the court shall dismiss a case if at any time the Court determines that the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (). The Court exercises its discretion to screen the plaintiff's complaint in this action to determine if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore, the complaint must contain sufficient factual content for the court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff brings this action against the County of Fresno and Judge Amy Guerra on the basis of federal question and diversity of citizenship. (Compl. 2, 3, [1] ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff contends that the defendants falsely accused him of kidnapping his minor child and relocated the child out of the state . (Id. at 4.) The child's mother provided the court with false address information. (Id.) Defendant Guerra and Ms. Browns, court appointed counsel for the child, do not know the child's address. (Id.) The child's mother made verbal threats of harm against Plaintiff in the presence of the child. (Id.) Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages. (Id.)
On February 4, 2019, Judge Tharpe granted Plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of his minor child, Khiren Williams. (Id. at ¶ 8.) On September 17, 2020, Defendant Guerra granted the child's mother sole legal and physical custody. (Id. at ¶ 9.) The custody ordered provided that “the child shall reside with the father as mutually agreed upon between the parties” and “Neither parent shall remove the child from the State of California, County of Fresno for the purpose of changing the child's residence.” (Id.) Defendant Guerra knew that the residency of Khiren's mother was Las Vegas, Nevada. (Id.)
On October 2, 2020, Defendant Guerra ordered that Plaintiff could have supervised visits in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The order provided that Plaintiff would be responsible for 100% of the cost of visitation. (Id.)
On October 26, 2020, Plaintiff and the mother were ordered to report to the family court on November 16, 2020, at 8:25 a.m. (Id. at ¶ 11.) On November 16, 2020, Defendant Guerra appointed Cheryl Browns as counsel for Khiren. (Id. at ¶ 13.) The court ordered that the parents would have joint legal custody with the father having sole physical custody and the mother's contact with Khiren was limited to participating in supervised visits unless otherwise agreed upon by the parents. (Id. at ¶ 12.) In November 2020, Plaintiff informed Browns that he did not want her to represent Khiren. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
On December 4, 2020, the court ordered sole and physical custody to the mother with no visitation to Plaintiff claiming a risk of abduction pursuant to FCS 3048(b)(1). (Id. at ¶ 15.) Defendant Guerra ordered that Plaintiff could not remove Khiren from the county, state, or country. (Id.)
In February 2021, Ms. Browns coordinated Zoom meetings between Plaintiff and Khiren. (Id. at ¶ 16.) In March of 2021, Ms. Browns coordinated a spring break visit between Plaintiff and Khiren. (Id. at ¶ 17.) On March 30, 2021, Plaintiff and Khiren met with Ms. Browns at her office for the purpose of Ms. Browns personally meeting Khiren and to discuss custody and visitation, including spring break and summer break child exchanges between the parents. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Ms. Browns spoke with Khiren, acknowledging Khiren's desire to return to Plaintiff's home permanently. (Id.) Ms. Browns emphasized to Plaintiff the need to respect the court's authority. (Id.)
Ms. Browns made the following recommendations. At the conclusion of spring break, Plaintiff would travel to Las Vegas to return Khiren to his mother. (Id. at ¶ 19.) At the start of summer, Khiren would return to Plaintiff for a period of three to four weeks, return to the mother for three to four weeks, and then return to Plaintiff for the remainder of summer break. (Id.) Ms. Browns explained to Plaintiff that the exchanges were a test of the parties ability to exchange Khiren in a manner in the child's best interest. (Id.) Ms. Browns informed Plaintiff that she would recommend giving custody to Plaintiff as it was Khiren's wish. (Id.) Plaintiff agreed with the recommendations. (Id. at ¶ 20.)
On April 4, 2021, Plaintiff traveled to Las Vegas to return Khiren to his mother. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff notified the mother by email of the estimated arrival time but she did not respond. (Id. at ¶ 22.) When they arrived in Las Vegas, Plaintiff intended to return Khiren to the address on file with the court, but Khiren informed him that they actually lived at a different location. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff took Khiren to the address he provided. (Id. at ¶ 24.)
When they went to the door of the apartment, Khiren's mother expressed anger and frustration and grabbed Khiren by the arm telling him to come inside. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 26.) Plaintiff attempted to give Khiren his belongings and say his goodbyes, but the mother grabbed Khiren telling him to come inside and called out for the cohabitant of the apartment to get up. (Id. at ¶¶ 27, 28.) As Plaintiff was walking away, in the presence of Khiren, the mother stated, “You're lucky my brother isn't here because he'd. . . .” (Id. at ¶ 29.) The mother recorded Plaintiff walking to his car and driving away. (Id. at ¶ 30.)
A short time later, Plaintiff received a reply to the email that stated, “Location.” (Id. at ¶ 31.) Plaintiff called Ms. Browns leaving multiple voice mail messages regarding the exchange. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff emailed Khiren's mother that he was going to file for emergency custody of the child. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Plaintiff subsequently called Ms. Browns to inform her of the events that had occurred during the exchange and that he did not want to proceed with the proposed terms of visitation. (Id.) Ms. Browns told Plaintiff that they had an agreement and he questioned her on why she did not know Khiren's address. (Id.) Ms. Browns told him she was not aware of Khiren's address and Plaintiff stated that he was going to file an ex parte motion with the court. (Id.) Ms. Browns told Plaintiff to file his motion and they would see what the judge says. (Id.)
On this same date, Khiren's mother emailed Plaintiff asking him to help pay for extra activity, dental care, therapy, a tutor, or to plan a summer trip with Khiren so he could benefit and help develop their son. (Id. at...
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