Williams v. Coursey
| Decision Date | 24 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | 2:11-cv-00927-KI |
| Parties | LARRY BENJAMIN WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. RICK COURSEY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
C. Renee Manes
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Attorney for Petitioner
Oregon Attorney General
SAMUEL A. KUBERNICK
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
Petitioner, an inmate at the Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution, brings this habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the amended petition is DENIED.
On October 6, 2003, petitioner shot and killed his long-time friend and business associate Michele Hawkins. Petitioner immediately confessed to his brother, and drove to the police station to turn himself in. On October 14, 2003, petitioner was indicted on charges of Aggravated Murder (murder in the course of a burglary) and Murder in the First Degree. Resp. Exh. 103. At trial, petitioner raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. In support of this defense, petitioner presented multiple witnesses who testified to his "peaceful nature." Additionally, petitioner testified that he did not recall the actual act of shooting the victim, and explained that he was heartbroken over the fact that his personal and business relationship with Ms. Hawkins appeared to be ending.
On December 13, 2004, petitioner was convicted by a jury of Murder in the First Degree, and acquitted of Aggravated Murder. Resp. Exhs. 101 & 125. As part of the verdict, the jury rejected petitioner's defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Resp. Exh. 125. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after 25 years. Resp. Exh. 101.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal, assigning as error the trial court's denial of his demurrer to the Aggravated Murder charge onthe basis that the indictment failed to allege with sufficient particularity the underlying burglary offense.1 The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Williams, 213 Or. App. 588, 162 P.3d 1095, rev. denied, 343 Or. 224 (2007).
Petitioner subsequently sought state post-conviction relief raising multiple grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner raised a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel--that trial counsel was "inadequate and ineffective for failing to advance fully his defense of extreme emotional distress." Resp. Exh. 131 at 4. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Williams v. Coursey, 236 Or. App. 268, 236 P.3d 851, rev. denied, 349 Or. 57 (2010).
Generally, a state prisoner must exhaust all available state court remedies either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings before a federal court may consider granting habeascorpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by "fairly presenting" his claim to the appropriate state courts at all appellate stages afforded under state law, including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845-47 (1999); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2004). A prisoner fairly presents his claims by describing in the state court proceeding both the operative facts, and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011); Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008).
When a state prisoner fails to exhaust his federal claims in state court, and the state court would now find the claims barred under applicable state rules, the federal claims are procedurally defaulted. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991); Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327; Casey, 386 F.3d at 920. Similarly, if a federal constitutional claim is expressly rejected by a state court on the basis of a state procedural rule that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30; Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims is barred unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the procedural defaultand actual prejudice, or that the failure to consider the claims will result in a miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
Respondent moves the court to deny habeas relief on petitioner's first ground for relief on the basis that his challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment was premised upon state law only. Additionally, respondent argues that if petitioner raised a federal challenge in his brief to the Oregon Court of Appeals, he nevertheless omitted any reference to federal law in his petition for review to the Oregon Supreme Court. I agree.
In petitioner's appellate brief to the Oregon Court of Appeals challenging the particularity of the indictment, petitioner footnoted that "[t]he right to have a jury determine all facts essential to a conviction and sentence is also found in Amendments 6 and 14 to the United States Constitution. Resp. Exh. 104 at 11 n.3 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) & Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)). Additionally, petitioner made note of the federal standard for harmless error, and mentioned due process in his factual summary. Resp. Exh. 104 at 7 & 14-15. Assuming that any of the foregoing references fairly presented a Sixth Amendment and/or Due Process challenge to the particularity of the indictment to the court of appeals, it is undisputed that no federal challenge was included in his subsequent petition forreview to the Oregon Supreme Court. See Resp. Exh. 106. Consequently, the claim is procedurally defaulted.
In so holding, I reject petitioner's assertion that "[g]iven that the Oregon Supreme Court could have considered the Claim based on the presentation to the Oregon Court of Appeals, it is incumbent on the State to prove that Claim was actually rejected for a procedural reason." Brief in Support at 11 (citing Farmer v. Baldwin, 346 Or. 67, 205 P.3d 871 (2009)). As noted above, it is well settled that in order to exhaust state remedies, a state prisoner must raise his federal claims at every appellate level. Petitioner failed to do so. Petitioner's assertion that respondent must prove that the federal claim was rejected based upon an independent and adequate state procedural rule, confuses a procedural default caused by the failure to fairly present a claim, with a procedural default caused by the state court's invocation of an independent and adequate state court rule. In the instant proceeding, petitioner's procedural default was caused by his failure to fairly present the claim to the Oregon Supreme Court, coupled with the fact that the claim would now be untimely under an independent and adequate state procedural rule. See Cooper, 641 F.3d at 328; Casey 386 F.3d at 918-19 & n.23; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1; O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848; see also O.R.S. 2.520 ().
In sum, petitioner procedurally defaulted his first ground for relief by failing to fairly present the claim to the Oregon Supreme Court. Petitioner has not demonstrate cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse his default, or that a miscarriage of justice will result if this court fails to address the defaulted claim. Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted.
Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as follows:
I agree with Respondent's argument that petitioner procedurally defaulted all but ground 2(E) due to the fact that he raised only ground 2(E) in his appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. See Resp. Exhs. 131 & 133. In so holding, Inote that petitioner's appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief consistently identified trial counsel's inadequacy as the failure to adequately argue to the jury petitioner's defense of extreme emotional disturbance. See Resp. Exh. 131 at 1, 5, 8-9. For example, petitioner's "Summary of Argument" provided as follows:
Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on his conviction for murder. During his trial, petitioner advanced a defense of extreme emotional disturbance. His claims on post-conviction relief concern trial counsel's failure to argue that defense fully. In particular, petitioner wanted counsel to argue to the jury that he was an ordinary person who typically engaged in normal day-to-day activities. The point was to underscore how unusual petitioner's actions were when he snapped and killed the victim. Had counsel argued this issue, the jury would likely have found that petitioner was acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. For that reason, petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief.
Resp. Exh. 131 at 1-2 (emphasis added).
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