Williams v. Cow Gulch Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 12 January 1921
• Docket Number: 5508.
• Citation: 270 F. 9
• Parties: WILLIAMS et al. v. COW GULCH OIL CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

270 F. 9

WILLIAMS et al. v. COW GULCH OIL CO.

No. 5508.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

January 12, 1921

William A. Riner and Frederick A. Williams, both of Cheyenne, Wyo for appellants.

John D Clark, of Cheyenne, Wyo., for appellee.

Before SANBORN and CARLAND, Circuit Judges, and MUNGER, District Judge.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of dismissal of the suit of Louis D McCall to enforce the specific performance of a contract of the Cow Gulch Oil Company, a corporation, to assign to him an oil and gas lease or leases of 640 acres of land in the Buck Creek oil field in the state of Wyoming. The dismissal was made on the motion of the Oil Company, on the ground that the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain his suit in equity, because the land the oil and gas leases upon which the Oil Company agreed to convey, was not described with sufficient certainty in the contract to justify a court of equity in enforcing specific performance thereof.

The contract is set out in the complaint. The parties to it were Louis D. McCall and the Oil Company. It was in writing, and was made, signed by the Oil Company, by its president, J. W. McKim, and delivered to the plaintiff on May 13, 1917. It recited that the Oil Company had received from McCall an oil and gas lease of four oil placer mining claims, each consisting of 160 acres, in Natrona county, state of Wyoming; that it then held titles and possessory rights by gas and oil leases from locators in and to various tracts of land in the Buck Creek oil field in Natrona county, Wyo., and was conducting negotiations for the necessary clearance of its titles covering these premises; that in consideration of the oil and gas lease to the four placer claims, consisting of 640 acres, which it had received from McCall, it would immediately upon completion of its negotiations and the clearance of its titles to the oil and gas leases it had acquired to lands in the Buck Creek field, assign to him all its right, title, and interest and leasehold estate in its oil and gas leases and claims upon 640 acres of the land it should then hold, of an average probable value per acre of the remaining lands it should then hold, which 640 acres should be selected by J. W. McKim as its agent, or in case of his inability to make such selection by some other competent geologist. In addition to setting forth this contract, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the Oil Company was and still is the owner of certain oil and gas placer mining locations or oil and gas leases of lands in the Buck Creek oil fields, which are clearly described and identified in the complaint, and which amount in the aggregate to about 6,320 acres; that he demanded that the defendant make assignments to him of oil and gas leases of 640 acres of these lands, of the probable average value per acre of that portion of these lands that should be retained by the Oil Company; and that it has refused so to do.

There are no other allegations in the complaint pertinent to the answer to the objection that the contract fails to describe the leases of the lands to be assigned with sufficient certainty to justify a court of equity in enforcing its specific performance. 'The jurisdiction of courts of equity to decree the specific performance of agreements,' says the Supreme Court, 'is of a very ancient date, and rests on the ground of the inadequacy and incompleteness of the remedy at law. Its exercise prevents the intolerable travesty of justice involved in permitting parties to refuse performance of their contracts at pleasure by electing to pay damages for the breach. ' Union Pacific R.R. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 163 U.S. 564, 600, 16 Sup.Ct. 1173, 1187 (41 L.Ed. 265).

An action at law for damages for the breach of a contract to convey land does not afford as adequate a remedy as a suit in equity for specific performance, and it is no answer to such a suit because, in the case of a contract for real estate, the action at law does not place the parties in the same situation in which they were before the agreement was made, and it is not as prompt, complete, and efficient as is the suit in equity. Castle Creek Water Co. v. City of Aspen, 146 F. 8, 11, 76 C.C.A. 516, 519, 8 Ann.Cas. 660; Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215, 7 L.Ed. 655; Williams v. Neely, 134 F. 1, 10, 67 C.C.A. 171, 181, 69 L.R.A. 232; Wilhite v. Skelton, 149 F. 67, 72, 78 C.C.A. 635, 640.

In equity, the vendee of land, or of a right or interest therein under a contract of the vendor to convey it to him, is treated as the owner thereof, and the vendor is deemed to stand seized of it in trust for the vendee, and when, as in the case at bar, the entire purchase price has been paid and is in the hands of the vendor, who refuses to perform his part of the agreement, the equity of the vendee is of the highest character, and specific performance of the contract may not be denied, unless it is forbidden by some insuperable principle or rule of law or equity. Gunton v Carroll, 101 U.S. 426, 430, 431, 25 L.Ed. 985. Why, then, may not a court of equity compel the performance of this contract? Counsel answer, because it does not point out and specify by section, town, and range the particular 640 acres in the Oil Company's 6,320 acres, the oil and gas leases upon which the Oil Company agreed to convey. But the Oil Company's contract is more than a mere agreement to convey oil and gas leases on 640 acres of land that cannot be identified. It is an agreement that the oil company will convey oil or gas leases of 640 acres of its 6,320 acres, of the probable average value per acre of the 5,680 acres thereof which will remain after such conveyance, and that the 640 acres to...