Williams v. Cravens

Citation210 F.2d 874,93 US App. DC 380
Decision Date25 February 1954
Docket NumberNo. 11777.,11777.
PartiesWILLIAMS v. CRAVENS.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

Mr. Keith L. Seegmiller, Washington, D. C., Messrs. Ray R. Murdock and Irving Wilner, Washington, D. C., on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. John D. Lane, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., Messrs. Leo. A. Rover, U. S. Atty., and William J. Peck, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at time brief was filed, on the brief for appellee. Messrs. Lewis A. Carroll, Asst. U. S. Atty., and William R. Glendon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at time record was filed, for appellee.

Before EDGERTON, PRETTYMAN and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This is one more in the series of cases1 where the employment of one in the classified Civil Service has been terminated "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of such service", as the statute puts it.2 In his complaint in the District Court the appellant alleged: "The action of the said Administrator, W. Stuart Symington, in terminating plaintiff's services was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of procedural provisions of law. (Act of August 24, 1921, as amended by Act of June 10, 1948, 5 U.S.Code § 562 (sic), and section 9.102 of the Regulations of the Civil Service Commission.)"3

Appellant was a loan examiner in the Office of Loans in the Business Loans Division of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation when, under date of October 26, 1951, he was notified in writing that he had "interfered or attempted to interfere with officials of the Corporation by endeavoring to influence their judgment and recommendation with respect to loan applications under consideration." Much had gone on within the Corporation before the letter was written, appellant had been interviewed, specific cases had been called to his attention, conferences had been had with respect to his memoranda of explanation and otherwise. Appellant himself interpreted this particular "reason" to mean that he had "endeavored to improperly influence" action on loans, as he wrote. Whether this first "reason" be sufficiently specific or otherwise, our decision may properly rest upon a second reason cited by the Administrator, and since both reasons were independent, proper action under either would be adequate. This second reason, quite sufficient by itself, in our view meets procedural requirements, and if there be adequate ground to sustain the Corporation's action on this latter aspect, appellant's appeal from the denial of his motion for summary judgment must fall.

The Corporation's letter specified as the second reason: "In passing on particular loans, you have failed to consider all important and relevant data. This has led to actions on the part of the Corporation which have been severely criticized and has made it impossible to rely upon your judgment, findings and recommendations." Appellant demanded that he be given "a specific and detailed list of the loans and instances in which I am alleged to have failed to consider all important and relevant data," and the Administrator promptly replied specifying several such. Appellant by affidavit furnished to the District Court a job description outlining the duties of his position as a loan examiner stating that "The position required the handling of complex loan applications from various business enterprises. The work involved an analysis of problems of more than average difficulty, and the servicing and administrating (sic) of loans already granted. The duties entailed the preparation of memoranda and detailed reports on proposals or requests relating to changes or modification in details and conditions of loans, including recommendations of courses of action to be followed, due regard being given to defending the interests of the Corporation."

In view of the exacting and important...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Harmon v. Brucker, 13230.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • January 31, 1957
    ...a general discharge." Hearings on S. 3096, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 75. 20 219 U.S. at page 306, 31 S.Ct. at page 234. 21 93 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 210 F.2d 874 (D.C.Cir.1954), certiorari denied Williams v. Robbins, 348 U.S. 819, 75 S.Ct. 30, 99 L.Ed. 646 (1954). 22 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.......
  • Hills v. Eisenhart, Civ. 7637.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • November 15, 1957
    ...employee's dismissal (Angilly v. United States, D.C., 105 F.Supp. 257, 259, affirmed, 2 Cir., 199 F.2d 642, and Williams v. Cravens, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 210 F.2d 874, 876). Under the above regulations, and, in particular § 9.102(1) (i), the employee, in order to avail himself of the proced......
  • Vitarelli v. Seaton, 13702.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • February 13, 1958
    ...is beyond dispute, even under the here inapplicable Lloyd-LaFollette and Veterans' Preference Acts. See Williams v. Cravens, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 381, 210 F. 2d 874, 875, certiorari denied sub nom. Williams v. Robbins, 1954, 348 U.S. 819, 75 S.Ct. 30, 99 L.Ed. 646; Kohlberg v. Gray, 1953, 9......
  • Dew v. Halaby
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • March 28, 1963
    ...review is available to determine if discharges subject to this limitation are arbitrary and capricious. See Williams v. Cravens, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 382, 210 F.2d 874, 876 (1954), cert. denied, sub nom. Williams v. Robbins, 348 U.S. 819, 75 S.Ct. 30, 99 L.Ed. 646 (1954); Norden v. Royall, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT