Williams v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd.

• Decision Date: 07 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 149,149
• Citation: 307 Md. 606,516 A.2d 573
• Parties: Maser WILLIAMS v. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD. Sept. Term 1985.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 606

307 Md. 606

516 A.2d 573

Maser WILLIAMS v. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD.

No. 149 Sept. Term 1985.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 7, 1986.

Mark E. Herman, Baltimore, for appellant.

C.J. Messerschmidt, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Ralph S. Tyler, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ^* ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

Maryland Code (1981 Repl.Vol.), Article 26A, entitled "Criminal Injuries Compensation Act," provides for monetary awards in certain circumstances to innocent victims of crime. This case involves a claim for benefits under the Act, sought by an individual who was criminally assaulted and as a result was blinded in one eye. The question presented is whether, under the Act's provisions, the victim is entitled to a monetary award for permanent partial disability for loss of an eye, even though he returned to work without diminution in earnings.

(1)

The "Declaration of policy and legislative intent" underlying the 1968 passage of the Act, as set forth in § 1, states:

"The legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer personal physical injury or death as a result of criminal acts or in their efforts to prevent crime or apprehend persons committing or attempting to commit crimes. Such persons or their dependents may thereby suffer disability, incur financial hardships or become dependent upon public assistance. The legislature finds and determines that there is a need for government financial assistance for such victims of crime. Accordingly, it is the legislature's intent that aid, care and support be provided by the State, as a matter of moral responsibility, for such victims of crime."

Section 3 of the Act creates the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board which is empowered by § 4, among other things, to hear and determine all claims for awards. Section 7 provides:

"An award may not be made on a claim unless the claimant has incurred a minimum out-of-pocket loss of one hundred dollars or has lost at least two continuous weeks' earnings or support. Out-of-pocket loss means reimbursed and unreimbursable expenses or indebtedness reasonably incurred for medical care, mental health counseling, funeral expenses, or other services necessary as a result of the injury upon which such claim is based."

Section 12(b) provides, with certain exceptions not here pertinent, that

"[a]ny award made pursuant to this article shall be made in accordance with the schedule of benefits and degree of disability as specified in Article 101 [the Workmen's Compensation Act], § 36 (as it existed on July 1, 1974), § 37, and other applicable sections of the Code.... However, the term 'average weekly wages' as applied to determine the award in accordance with § 36 of Article 101, does not include tips, gratuities and wages that are undeclared on the claimant's State or federal income tax returns in the applicable years. If a claimant does not have 'average weekly wages' so as to qualify under the formula in § 36 of Article 101, the award shall be in an amount equal to the arithmetic average between the maximum and minimum awards listed in the applicable portion of that section." ¹

Section 12(f)(1) and (2) provide:

"(f)(1) If the Board ... finds that the claimant will not suffer serious financial hardship, as a result of the loss of earnings or support and the out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of the injury, if not granted financial assistance pursuant to this article to meet the loss of earnings, support, or out-of-pocket expenses, the Board ... shall deny an award. In determining the serious financial hardship, the Board ... shall consider all of the financial resources of the claimant....

(2) The conditions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply in determining an award under paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of § 5(a) of this article." ²

(2)

Maser Williams was criminally assaulted on January 22, 1982 and thereafter filed his claim for benefits under the Act. Following a hearing, the Board, on June 30, 1984, awarded Williams $2,139.23 for unreimbursed medical expenses and $398.97 for 2 weeks and 3 days' temporary total disability, representing lost time from work. The Board declined to make an award for permanent partial disability for the loss of Williams' eye, concluding that because he "returned to work with no diminution in earnings, ... [he] does not have a serious financial hardship as is required by Section 12(f) of the Statute for an award for his alleged permanent partial disability."

On appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Williams maintained that § 12(b) required a monetary award for permanent partial disability in accordance with the schedule of benefits set forth in § 36(3) of Article 101--for the loss of an eye, 250 weeks of compensation based on Williams' average weekly wage computed under the payment formula contained in § 36(3)(c). While conceding that § 12(f)(1) requires a showing of serious financial hardship as a prerequisite to an award, Williams argued that he made such a showing, as indicated by his award for medical expenses and lost earnings. Having once been made, Williams maintained that serious financial hardship need not again be separately demonstrated as to his permanent impairment and claim for permanent partial disability.

The circuit court affirmed the Board's order and on further appeal the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Williams v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., 65 Md.App. 486, 501 A.2d 105 (1985). In concluding that Williams was not entitled to an award for permanent partial disability in the absence of present economic loss, the intermediate appellate court read § 1 of the Act, setting forth the legislative declaration of policy and intent, in conjunction with § 12(f)(1), deeming it apparent therefrom "that the legislature's intent was not to make the victim whole, but to ameliorate serious financial losses sustained as a result of the victim's injuries." 65 Md.App. at 491, 501 A.2d 105. Writing for the court, Chief Judge Gilbert held that § 12(f)(1) mandates a denial of an award where the victim does not suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the criminal activity. Nothing in the Act, the court said, "was intended as a panacea for damages or injuries arising from crime," but rather the Act's purpose was "to provide recompense to crime victims who otherwise will suffer serious financial hardship." Id. at 492, 501 A.2d 105. Upon Williams' petition, we granted certiorari to consider the important issue raised in the case.

(3)

We first reviewed the history of the Act and its various provisions in Criminal Inj. Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 331 A.2d 55 (1975). At that time, we observed that Maryland was but the fifth state "to establish a program permitting the unreimbursed victims of crime to be compensated by funds appropriated by the state for their personal injuries and loss of earnings, if the victim would otherwise suffer serious financial hardship." ³ 273 Md. at 495-96, 331 A.2d 55. Prerequisite to any award, we said, was "the incurring of 'serious financial hardship,' " the payment of benefits under the Act being "predicated upon the schedule of benefits and degree of disability reflected in the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. at 496, 331 A.2d 55. In commenting upon the Act's passage, we said:

"The General Assembly, conceding an inability to ameliorate to any degree the threat of violent crime, and undertaking to assume the consequences of such crime as a public burden, on the ground of 'moral responsibility,' in enacting Art. 26A was embarking on uncharted waters in a noble social experiment without any real background data of experience. The recent nature of this type of legislation, the uncertain estimate of the volume of claims to be made under the Act, and the incalculable amount of the funds required to be appropriated for its administration confronted our lawmakers when they adopted this 'welfare-theory' of compensation. See Comment, Criminal Victim Compensation in Maryland, [30 Md.L.Rev. 266]. The statutory scheme for eligibility, the prerequisites for awards and the computation of benefits were all novel. Since the funds to be disbursed were public there can be sensed a legislative hesitancy on disbursement without some restraint." Id. at 498, 331 A.2d 55.

In Holmes v. Crim. Injuries Comp. Bd., 278 Md. 60, 359 A.2d 84 (1976), we again emphasized that § 12(f)(1) "requires a mandatory denial of an award to claimants who do not suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the criminal activity." 278 Md. at 65, 359 A.2d 84. We noted that § 12(f)(1) "specifies that serious financial hardship must result from the loss of earnings, support or out-of-pocket expenses." Id. The statute requires a denial of an award, we said,

"if, and only if, the Board determines that the claimant will not suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the loss of earnings or support and that he will not suffer such hardship as a result of out-of-pocket expenditures. If either finding cannot be made, or, in other words, if serious financial hardship does result from either the loss of earnings or support or from out-of-pocket expenses, then § 12(f)(1) does not require that the Board deny benefits. Only where no hardship results from the loss of earnings or support, or from expenditures, does § 12(f)(1) mandate the denial of an award.

"This conclusion is also supported by other language contained in § 12(f)(1) which provides that an award shall be denied where no serious financial hardship would result if the claimant is 'not granted financial assistance pursuant to this article to meet the loss of earnings, support, or out-of-pocket expenses.' (Emphasis supplied.) As is indicated by this provision, the types of losses necessary to sustain a finding of...