Williams v. Dalton
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-3058-SAC |
| Parties | DESTNEY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. HARTPENCE DALTON, MEGHAN DAVIS, ERICA MARSHAL, HOLLY CHAVEZ, DONA HOOK, and GLORIA GEITHER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
The plaintiff Destney Williams (“Williams”) has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 using the required court-provided forms. ECF# 1. Williams currently resides at Topeka Correctional Facility (“TCF”). As set out in the complaint's nature of case, Williams alleges that in retaliation for filing a grievance she was removed from private industry jobs transferred to another dorm where she contracted COVID and was exposed to an inmate who attacked her, and denied shift changes in a second private industry job that resulted in another inmate attacking her. Williams seeks as relief only to be compensated for the lost wages from the date she lost job her private industry at Koch Inc. on October 20, 2020 through her release from TCF or her receipt of a job with equal wages or more.
The plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. ECF# 2. There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil matter. Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613, 616 (10th Cir. 1995). The decision whether to appoint counsel in a civil action remains in the district court's discretion. Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991).
The party asking for counsel to be appointed must persuade the court that the claims presented have sufficient merit to warrant the appointment of counsel. Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2016). It is not enough “that having counsel appointed would have assisted [the movant] in presenting his strongest possible case, [as] the same could be said in any case.” Steffey, 461 F.3d at 1223 (citation omitted). Thus, the district court should consider “the merits of the prisoner's claims, the nature and complexity of the factual and legal issues, and the prisoner's ability to investigate the facts and present his claims.” Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995). After reviewing the record, the court finds the appointment of counsel here is not warranted, as the plaintiff's claims lack sufficient merit and are not unusually complicated. The motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
When the plaintiff filed her complaint on April 1, 2022, she neither paid the filing fee nor submitted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). On the same day, the Court issued a notice of deficiency informing Plaintiff that she was required to correct this deficiency by May 2, 2022. ECF# 3. The notice advised Plaintiff that if she failed to do so, this action may be dismissed without further notice. On April 11, 2022, the plaintiff filed a response saying she had emailed the TCF's business office requesting that it process her payment of the filing fee and provide copies of her account summary for the last six months. ECF# 4. As of her filing, the plaintiff said she has not received any responses from the business office. Id. The plaintiff next filed on April 17, 2022, her motion to proceed ifp. ECF# 5. Her motion is deficient for not answering all matters under question one and for not attaching a transactional ledger sheet of her institutional account. She does attach her inmate request to staff dated April 1, 2022, in which she asked for processing of her “$402.00 for my civil case” and a printout of her account. ECF# 5-1. Staff answered her request indicating the business office was “short staffed” but should complete her request “soon.” Id. If the plaintiff does not respond by May 2, 2022, with either the filing fee or inmate account statements, the court shall communicate with the facility and extend the plaintiff's deadline.
A court must screen prisoners' complaints which seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The screening court must dismiss the entire complaint or any part of it that, “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
The same standard used for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motions is used for § 1915 dismissals, and this includes the newer language and meaning taken from Twombly and its “plausibility” determination. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148 (2010). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has made clear, “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The plaintiff has filled out a form civil rights complaint for an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleges three counts for relief. Count one refers to her dorm transfers on October 22nd and November 20th of 2020 and mentions TCF classifications administrator, Meghan Davis, as the only named defendant. She alleges having contracted COVID after her November transfer. Count one also lists “negligence, deliberate indifference, general orders 14-103 offender rights, 15-101A Private Industry Non prison, [and] Deprivation of character slander” as her apparent legal theories for relief ECF# 1, p. 4.
For count two, she alleges filing a grievance on October 21, 2020, and then being removed from the G-Dorm and being told on 23, 2020, by Deputy Warden Kevin Keith that he had removed her from the Koch Inc. job “for hearsay.” Id. Deputy Warden Keith is not named as a defendant in this lawsuit. She further alleges that on the evening of October 22, 2020, Lt. Thompson told the plaintiff that she was going to be placed in maximum custody, but Officer Stinsocker explained to Thompson that the plaintiff had never left her room. Neither Thompson nor Stinsocker are named as defendants in her complaint. There is no allegation that the plaintiff was ever moved to maximum custody as had been threatened. For this count, the plaintiff lists these legal theories, “Harassment (violation of the 14th Amendment), General Orders 14-103 offender rights, 1st Amendment.” Id.
For count three, the plaintiff alleges that on June 11 and 22, 2021, she wrote her counselor and warden asking that her private industry job shift be changed. Warden Gloria Geither wrote back that she did not switch shifts for inmates. On August 5, 2021, the plaintiff was attacked by an inmate. The warden switched shifts for others on September 1, 2021. Count three lists the following, “Discrimination (violation of the 14th Amendment), General Orders (14-103) offender rights, (15-101A) Work release and non Prison Based private Industry.”
Along with the completed § 1983 complaint form summarized above, the plaintiff submits 121 pages of her handwritten notes and copies of various grievances. Her complaint does not refer to these additional pages. More importantly, these additional pages are not organized according to her three pleaded claims for relief. Consequently, the court finds that these additional pages do not meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), as they do not offer a short and plain statement of the plaintiff's claims showing her entitlement to relief. “[P]ro se parties [must] follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks). These additional pages, however, do address each named defendant with theories of recovery and some factual allegations. As part of its screening responsibility, the court has reviewed and here summarizes the contents. In doing so, the court is not assuming any duty to supply factual allegations otherwise lacking or to state new or different legal theories. Nor is the court taking “on the responsibility of serving as the litigant's attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id.
Against Unit Team Manager (“UTM”) Hartpence Dalton, the plaintiff's notes summarily refer to First Amendment retaliation in response to her filing of grievances and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and discrimination violations. She alleges that UTM Dalton moved her from G-Dorm on October 22, 2020, in retaliation for filing a grievance. She alleges her G-Dorm counselor...
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