Williams v. Dark, Civ. A. No. 93-2232.
Decision Date | 07 September 1993 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 93-2232. |
Citation | 844 F. Supp. 210 |
Parties | Terrance WILLIAMS v. Leon O. DARK, Lynne Abraham, District Attorney of Philadelphia, William P. James. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Terrance Williams, pro se.
Maryellen Gallagher, Adm., Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Philadelphia, PA, for Leon O. Dark.
Brian J. Preski, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, PA, for Lynne Abraham.
AND NOW, this 7th day of September, 1993, upon consideration of Defendant William P. James' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted Or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, and the response, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant James' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED for the following reasons:
I. Facts
Plaintiff, Terrance Williams ("Plaintiff" or "Williams"), filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Leon O. Dark, Manager of Court Reporting Services for the Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County, and Lynne Abraham, District Attorney of Philadelphia. Plaintiff later amended his complaint on May 12, 1993, to include William P. James, Esquire. On July 23, 1993, Plaintiff amended his complaint a second time. See Second Amended Complaint.1 In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendant James in his capacity as an Assistant District Attorney. On July 30, 1993, this court granted Defendants Dark's and Abraham's respective motions for summary judgment and dismissed them from this matter.
Plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of his constitutional rights by the defendants because they have not turned over to him "the records, documents, transcripts necessary and pertinent for me to bring meritorious claims of litigation and effectively pursue my appeal rights in my criminal action." See Complaint at p. 3.
Against Defendant James in particular, Plaintiff further alleges that:
See Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 15-18.
In the underlying criminal prosecution, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, 1984 September Term, Nos. 0979-0801, Plaintiff was tried, convicted by a jury and sentenced to a substantial period of incarceration for a 1984 homicide. Plaintiff was represented in the state criminal proceeding by Stephen Gallagher, Esquire. Plaintiff was represented in his appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania by Defendant James. On June 5, 1991, Defendant James filed a petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on Plaintiff's behalf. See Defendant's Exhibit C. On June 12, 1991, following notice from the Superior Court that Plaintiff's criminal appeal had been denied, Defendant James notified Plaintiff that he was withdrawing from further representation of the Plaintiff. See Defendant's Exhibit A. Defendant James was permitted to withdraw as appellate counsel for Plaintiff on June 28, 1991 by a per curiam order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. See Defendant's Exhibit B. On or about July 1, 1991, Defendant James was appointed as Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia County.
Plaintiff seeks relief in that this court enter an order requiring Defendant James to turn over all of the requested documents and award the sum of $100,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. See Complaint at p. 6; Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 29, 30, and 31.
II. Requirements to Grant Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which states:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Material" facts are those facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the substantive law governing the claims made. An issue of fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party" in light of the burdens of proof required by substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
A motion to dismiss which is premised on Rule 12(b)(6), the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, may be treated as a motion for summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. See Fed. R.Civ.Pro. 12(b). Since Defendant James' motion to dismiss utilizes various exhibits, which are beyond the pleadings, this court shall treat his entire motion as one for summary judgment. As his motion is both one for dismissal and for summary judgment, however, this court finds that all sides had a reasonable opportunity to present all material allowed under Rule 56 governing summary judgment motions. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b).
As will be discussed below, Williams has failed to establish the existence of any genuine issues of material fact against Defendant James.
III. Discussion
In reading Plaintiff's Complaint, Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint broadly, Plaintiff appears to be claiming a § 1983 civil rights violation based upon (1) the Defendants' failure to give him certain requested documents, (2) a denial of access to the courts, and (3) a denial of his right to appeal, in addition to a § 1985(3) claim of conspiracy to violate his civil rights. Each claim will be discussed separately.
A plaintiff must prove two essential allegations in order to state a claim under § 1983: (1) "the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right" and (2) the plaintiff "must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). Plaintiff has failed to establish either of these two requirements to have a viable § 1983 claim against Defendant James.
Defendant James, while now an Assistant District Attorney, was not acting under the color of state law when he allegedly did not provide Plaintiff with his own copy of discoverable documents. Private attorneys acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors. See Polk County v. Dobson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 453, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) ( ); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien and Frankel, 787 F.Supp. 471, 475 (E.D.Pa.1992) ( ); Borsello v. Leach, 737 F.Supp. 25, 26 (E.D.Pa.1990) ( ). To the extent Plaintiff's claims can be read to assert a § 1983 action against Defendant James while James was a private attorney, Plaintiff cannot establish a viable claim as James cannot be considered a state actor.
Even if Plaintiff's claims are read to include conduct when James was an Assistant District Attorney such that James satisfies the state actor requirement, Plaintiff cannot establish that the Defendant James has deprived Plaintiff of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws by not providing him with his own copy of discoverable documents.
State law establishes what information the Commonwealth must disclose to a criminal defendant. See Pa.R.Crim.Pro. 305.2 A criminal defendant has no independent right to his own copy of discoverable documents in a state court criminal proceeding when represented by counsel and when these documents have been provided to defense counsel. If the criminal defendant's attorney have had unrestricted access to the relevant documents throughout the litigation then "plaintiff the criminal defendant has suffered no deprivation to his constitutional rights." Gay v. Watkins, 573 F.Supp. 706, 707 (E.D.Pa.1983). In addition, a criminal defendant, now a civil plaintiff, Gay v. Watkins, 579 F.Supp. 1019,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Brown v. Tucci
...merely because he or she acts as an “officer of the court.” Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1119 (3d Cir.1980); Williams v. Dark, 844 F.Supp. 210, 213 (E.D.Pa.1993). The question of whether actions taken by an attorney employed by a governmental entity constitute “state action” turns on......
-
Thomason v. Lehrer, Civil Action No. 98-2336 (D. N.J. 8/21/1998)
...involve either state officials or significant assistance from state officials to accomplish the desired result"); Williams v. Dark, 844 F. Supp. 210, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (private attorney acting on behalf of client is not state actor for purposes of section 1983), aff'd mem., 19 F.3d 645 (3......
-
Massaquoi v. McConaughey
...under the Federal Constitution. Id., at 822, 97 S.Ct. at 1495; Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir.1981); Williams v. Dark, 844 F.Supp. 210, 214 (E.D.Pa.1993),aff'd 19 F.3d 645 (1994); Agresta, 801 F.Supp. at 1472. The right of access to court is not unlimited; all that is requir......
-
Taylor v. Cox
...under the Federal Constitution. Id., at 822, 97 S.Ct. at 1495; Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir.1981); Williams v. Dark, 844 F.Supp. 210, 214 (E.D.Pa.1993), aff'd., 19 F.3d 645 (3d Cir.1994); Agresta v. City of Philadelphia, 801 F.Supp. 1464, 1472 (E.D.Pa.1992), aff'd., 993 F.......