Williams v. Deasel
| Decision Date | 08 May 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 11915,11915 |
| Citation | 311 N.E.2d 414,19 Ill.App.3d 353 |
| Parties | Danny WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joyce DEASEL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Costigan, Wollrab, Fraker & Wochner, Bloomington, for defendant-appellant.
Jerome Mirza, Bloomington, for plaintiff-appellee.
This court granted leave to appeal from an order of the McLean County circuit court granting a new trial in a personal injury suit. The jury returned a verdict of $7,000 in favor of the plaintiff. The posture of the parties in this court is unusual. The defendant asks that the order of the trial court granting a new trial be reversed and the judgment originally entered in that court be reinstated. The plaintiff is insisting on a new trial. In event that we affirm the trial court in granting a new trial, the defendant requests that this court in its opinion correct certain alleged errors which occurred during the first trial and that we provide a road map for the trial judge on the second trial on such issues.
At the outset we find ourselves in a procedural vacuum as to just what authority we may have. The jury's verdict in this case was returned about 9 P.M. one evening. Judgment was entered on the verdict, execution authorized and the jury discharged from further service. Thereafter, plaintiff's attorney asked the court to rule on his motion for a mistrial based upon defense counsel's argument concerning excluded medical evidence. On the following day, the trial court entered an order allowing the mistrial, vacated the judgment entered on the verdict, and ordered a new trial.
It is quite clear from the record that no written motion of any kind was filed before the trial judge after verdict and judgment. Instead plaintiff orally renewed his motion to declare a mistrial. Indeed it is candidly stated in his brief that 'plaintiff's renewal of his motion for mistrial made during the course of the trial appears to be the only motion made after trial that could be called a 'post-trial motion' within the meaning of Rule 306 and will be treated as such for the purpose of this brief.' There is however an actual and a functional difference between a motion for a new trial and a motion for mistrial. In 66 C.J.S. New Trial § 1c, this difference is clearly delineated in the following language:
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Smith v. Andreini
...pre-verdict motion and not a post-verdict or post-trial motion.'" 181 W.Va. at 300, 382 S.E.2d at 353 (quoting Williams v. Deasel, 19 Ill.App.3d 353, 311 N.E.2d 414, 415 (1974)). In Vilar, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant, challenging the validity of the will and power of executed by......
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City of DeKalb v. Anderson
...defendants' motion to vacate filed after 30 days of the July 10th judgment, it acted without authority. Cf. Williams v. Deasel (1974), 19 Ill.App.3d 353, 355, 311 N.E.2d 414. Since defendants' October 18, 1972 motion to vacate was not filed in apt time, the appeal is not premature. I agree ......
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...rendered. It is not properly made either after a verdict is rendered or a judgment is entered on the verdict. (Williams v. Deasel (1974), 19 Ill.App.3d 353, 355, 311 N.E.2d 414.) However, we believe that motion, Pomper's motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence and the m......
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Vilar v. Fenton
... ... 3 The Illinois court has aptly summarized this point in Williams v. Deasel, 19 Ill.App.3d 353, 311 N.E.2d 414 at 415 (1974): ... A motion for a mistrial is a procedural tool whetted and honed for use during the ... ...