Williams v. DeKalb County
| Decision Date | 13 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | S19A1163 |
| Citation | 308 Ga. 265,840 S.E.2d 423 |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. DEKALB COUNTY, et al. |
Thomas Vernon Burch, Addison Smith, John Lex Kenerly, UGA School of Law, 313A Rusk Hall, 225 Herty Drive, Athens, Georgia 30602, for Appellant.
Viviane H. Ernstes, Bennett Davis Bryan, Shaheem Malik Williams, Assistant County Attorneys, Laura Karen Johnson, Terry Gerard Phillips, DeKalb County Law Department, 1300 Commerce Drive, 5th Floor, Decatur, Georgia 30030, Kenneth Edward Jarrard, Jarrard & Davis, LLP, 222 Webb Street, Cumming, Georgia 30040, Brent William Herrin, Gus H. Small, Benjamin S. Klehr, Small Herrin, LLP, Two Paces West, Suite 200, 2727 Paces Ferry Road, Atlanta, Georgia 30339, for Appellee.
Larry Wayne Ramsey, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Kelly Jean Long Pridgen, Assistant General Counsel, Association County Commissioners of Georgia, 191 Peachtree St. N.E., Suite 700, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Amicus Appellee.
Edward Williams appeals from an order of the Superior Court of DeKalb County, which dismissed his second amended complaint with prejudice. Acting pro se, Williams sued DeKalb County and members of its governing authority, the Chief Executive Officer and the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, in their official and individual capacities (collectively, "Appellees").1 In his complaint, Williams challenged in a variety of ways the legality of a DeKalb County ordinance, which increased the salaries of the members of the county governing authority, setting forth claims for mandamus, declaratory and injunctive relief, criminal and civil penalties for violating the Open Meetings Act, and attorney fees and costs of litigation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Williams’ petition for mandamus and granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss Williams’ remaining claims, ruling that his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, that he had failed to state a claim for a declaratory judgment or for injunctive relief against the Chief Executive Officer and the commissioners in their individual capacities, and that he failed to state a claim under the Open Meetings Act against the commissioners in their individual capacities and that those claims were barred by the doctrines of official and legislative immunity.
On appeal,2 Williams contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the members of the governing authority in their individual capacities for acting unlawfully in increasing their own pay. He argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim that the County Home Rule Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I, precludes county governing authorities from having the power to increase their own pay. Williams also argues that, even if the General Assembly can statutorily delegate the power to county governing authorities to increase their own pay, see OCGA § 36-5-24, the salary ordinance is still invalid because the commissioners did not follow the statute's guidelines and because the statute's guidelines were insufficient to prevent a conflict of interest. We do not reach the merits of these claims of error because, as discussed in Division 3, Williams lacks standing to sue the members of the governing authority for declaratory relief, he lacks standing to sue the commissioners for injunctive relief, and whether he has standing to seek injunctive relief against Thurmond requires proper analysis by the trial court on remand.
Williams also contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims against the commissioners for violating the Open Meetings Act, see OCGA § 50-14-1 et seq., before passing the salary ordinance, making them individually liable for civil penalties under the Act. For the reasons set forth in Division 4, we agree.
Thus, we affirm those portions of the court's order dismissing Williams’ claim for declaratory judgment against the members of the governing authority and for injunctive relief against the commissioners; we vacate that portion of the trial court's order dismissing Williams’ claim for injunctive relief against Thurmond; we reverse that portion of the court's order dismissing Williams’ claim against the commissioners for civil penalties under the Open Meetings Act; and we remand the case to the trial court.
1. Facts and procedural history . Williams alleged the following facts in his second amended complaint.3 At about 2:00 p.m. on January 18, 2018, the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners announced that it would hold a "special call" meeting at 9:00 a.m. the following morning. The printed meeting agenda did not include a proposed pay increase for the commissioners or the Chief Executive Officer, but the commissioners discussed the desire for a pay increase at the meeting. The meeting minutes did not record the discussion, nor did they record any vote to take official action based on the discussion. The minutes also did not reflect the reason for calling the meeting on less than 24 hours’ notice. About a week later, in an email exchange with the subject line "Salary Meeting Follow-Up," the Board's presiding officer asked the Board's attorney to contact the Champion Newspaper, the legal organ of the county, and place an advertisement giving statutorily required notice of the intent to increase the salaries of the governing authority.4 The Board's attorney arranged for the notice to be published on three consecutive Mondays, February 8, 15, and 22, 2018, giving notice of the County's intent to increase the salary and other compensation of the governing authority at the regular meeting of the Board to be held on February 27, 2018, with the fiscal impact of the change estimated to be approximately $229,660.22 per year. The agenda published for the February 27 meeting, however, did not list the proposed salary ordinance or otherwise mention increasing the Chief Executive Officer's or commissioners’ pay.
Well into the February 27 meeting, a commissioner moved to add the proposed salary increase to the agenda as a "walk-on" resolution, and the commissioners voted unanimously to add the salary ordinance to the agenda. The fiscal impact statement for the ordinance reflected that the Chief Executive Officer's pay would be set at 90 percent of a DeKalb County superior court judge's total compensation, and that the commissioners’ base salary would increase from $40,530.55 to $65,000, effective January 2, 2019. Six commissioners voted in favor of the resolution, and one voted against it.
Williams, who is a citizen and taxpayer of DeKalb County, filed his complaint in August 2018. He claimed that the commissioners violated the Open Meetings Act by not giving proper notice of their intent to pass the pay increase, thus invalidating the increase and subjecting the commissioners to civil and criminal penalties. He also claimed that, even though the General Assembly had given county governing authorities the power to increase their members’ pay through OCGA § 36-5-24 (b), the Georgia Constitution and the DeKalb County Organizational Act precluded the commissioners from having the power to increase their pay. Williams asked the trial court to order mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief; to impose civil and criminal penalties under the Open Meetings Act; and to award attorney fees and litigation costs.
In January 2019, the trial court held a hearing to address both Williams’ request for mandamus relief and Appellees’ motion to dismiss.5 After the hearing, the trial court denied Williams’ petition for mandamus and granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss.6 With respect to Williams’ claim that the county governing authority lacked the power to pass an ordinance raising its own members’ pay, the trial court held that Williams lacked standing to seek prospective injunctive or declaratory relief because, as a result of the ordinance, he suffered no "particularized injury" nor were his "individual rights" implicated. The court held that the General Assembly did not violate the DeKalb County Organizational Act or the Georgia Constitution when it gave county governing authorities, through OCGA § 36-5-24, the power to increase their members’ pay. Finally, the court found that the commissioners followed the procedures set forth in OCGA § 36-5-24 when passing the ordinance increasing their salaries.
With respect to Williams’ claims under the Open Meetings Act, the court held that the commissioners are not subject to liability for civil penalties under the Act.7 First, the court held that official immunity protected the commissioners from liability under the Open Meetings Act, because official immunity precludes liability for the negligent performance of a discretionary act. Specifically, the trial court held that deciding at a meeting to consider an item not on the pre-published agenda, based on a determination that it is "necessary" to do so, requires the exercise of judgment and is therefore a discretionary act. The court also found that legislative immunity precluded liability because the commissioners were exercising their legislative authority when they passed the ordinance. In addition, the trial court determined that "the Commission acts as a whole, not as individual commissioners[.]" Because "only individuals – not agencies –" can be held liable for civil penalties under the Act, the court reasoned, Williams’ complaint "failed to state a claim for any individual's violation of the [Act]."
2. Standard of Review .
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly...
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