Williams v. Deleon
| Decision Date | 18 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:15-cv-00543-SKO (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | COREY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. DeLEON, et al., Defendants. |
(Docs. 7, 8)
Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction shortly after initiating this action. (Doc. 5.) On December 28, 2015, this Court screened Plaintiff's Complaint, dismissed his claim regarding a hot meal with prejudice, and granted Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint to cure a linkage deficiency. (Doc. 6.)
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint and the undersigned issued order screening it on December 15, 2016. (Doc. 8.) That order found Due Process and Eighth Amendment claims cognizable against Defendants Young, Perez, and DeLeon1 and dismissed Defendants King and Price as well as Plaintiff's Equal Protection claims. (Id.) This case has proceeded on Plaintiff's remaining claims.2 The defendants had neither been served, nor appeared in this action when theFirst Amended Complaint was screened.
On November 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) requires the consent of all parties named in a civil case before a Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction vests for dispositive purposes. Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, a Magistrate Judge does not have jurisdiction to dismiss parties, claims, or a case based solely on the plaintiff's consent. Id. The defendants were not yet served when the First Amended Complaint was screened, and had neither appeared nor consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. Because the named defendants had not consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, the screening and dismissal of this action is invalid under Williams. The undersigned stands by the analysis in the order that screened the First Amended Complaint and recommends that Plaintiff's Equal Protection Claims and Defendants King and Price be dismissed with prejudice.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plainstatement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
While "plaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ," Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Further, "repeated and knowing violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)'s 'short and plain statement' requirement are strikes as 'fail[ures] to state a claim,' 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), when the opportunity to correct the pleadings has been afforded and there has been no modification within a reasonable time." Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2013).
//
//
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant's actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff's allegations must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. However, prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342.
Plaintiff is a civil detainee at Coalinga State Hospital ("CSH") in Coalinga, California. He brings this suit against CSH Executive Director Audrey King, CSH Hospital Administrator Brandon Price, Psyche Techs Christopher DeLeon and Wendy Perez, Senior Psych Tech Ian Young, and Does 1 through 10 for violation of his constitutional rights with regard to his conditions of confinement at CSH.
In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that his rights were violated by a policy which was implemented at CSH on November 3, 2013, which required detainees to present their ID cardto receive a hot meal. If they failed to do so, they received a cold sack meal. Plaintiff alleged that he has a constitutional right to a hot meal, and it is a violation of his rights to require him to present his ID card to receive a hot meal.
Plaintiff's claims in the First Amended Complaint arise from a policy, implemented on March 5, 2015, that required diabetic detainees such as Plaintiff to submit to blood glucose level testing before meals. If a detainee failed to submit to the testing, he was denied the meal that was being served. Plaintiff alleges he was denied food when he stated he has the right to refuse medical treatment.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant's actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff, as a civil detainee, is entitled to treatment more considerate than that afforded pretrial detainees or convicted criminals, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d...
To continue reading
Request your trial