Williams v. Delo, 96-1205

• Citation: 82 F.3d 781
• Decision Date: 09 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-1205,96-1205
• Parties: Doyle J. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Paul K. DELO, Superintendent, Respondent.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 781

82 F.3d 781

Doyle J. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Paul K. DELO, Superintendent, Respondent.

No. 96-1205.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

April 9, 1996.

Order Affirming District Court, Vacating Certificate of Probable Cause, and Denying Stay of Execution. Hon. Joseph Stevens U.S.D.C. Judge.

Charles W. German, Kansas City, MO, and Gregg F. Lombardi, for appellant.

Michael Joseph Spillane, Jefferson City, MO, for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

The district court denied Doyle J. Williams's third habeas petition and the Missouri Supreme Court scheduled his execution for April 10, 1996. Following the Supreme Court's order vacating this court's summary order granting Williams a certificate of probable cause and staying Williams's execution, Williams moves for a reasoned stay of execution or a ruling on the merits. This court carefully reviewed Williams's capital murder conviction six years ago, when Williams appealed the denial of his second federal habeas petition. See Williams v. Armontrout, 912 F.2d 924 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc). Because all the claims Williams raises now are abusive or successive and most of them are meritless, as well, we deny the relief sought by Williams.

Williams is not entitled to a certificate of probable cause unless he shows "the issues [in his petition] are debatable among reasonable [judges], a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings." Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir.1994). Further, Williams is not entitled to a stay of execution unless there are substantial grounds for relief. Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 321, 110 S.Ct. 1880, 1881, 109 L.Ed.2d 325 (1990) (per curiam). Williams has not met either standard. First, Williams's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of Williams's trial is abusive, because Williams did not raise the claim in his second habeas petition. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). Attempting to show cause and prejudice, Williams argues he did not attack the validity of his death sentence in the earlier petition because his conditions of confinement at the Missouri State Penitentiary (MSP) were so abysmal that he preferred dying to remaining in prison. Williams presented evidence that he did not give his counsel permission to challenge his death sentence until 1989, after Williams was transferred to a different prison. Williams's second habeas petition came before this court en banc in 1990, after Williams's transfer, but Williams did not tell the en banc court that his past conditions of confinement had prevented him from raising an ineffective assistance claim, and Williams did not request a remand to the district court so he could raise the claim. In our view, Williams has not excused his abuse of the writ.

Williams's argument about his conditions of confinement makes no sense, anyway. Williams claims he was too miserable and hopeless to raise a legitimate challenge to his death sentence, but undisputed evidence in the record shows Williams filed grievances and civil rights lawsuits in an attempt to improve his living conditions at the MSP. Williams also represented to the district court that Williams had raised all legitimate challenges to his death sentence. Accordingly, the district court found the prison conditions did not cause Williams to omit claims from his second habeas petition. The district court's finding is not clearly erroneous, and thus Williams's cause argument could not succeed on appeal. Contrary to Williams's contention, the district court was not required to accept the opinion of Williams's expert witnesses. The district court was entitled to give more weight to Williams's own actions and earlier statements about the prison conditions.

Williams also cannot prevail on his claim that the state trial court violated his due process rights by failing to instruct the jury on first degree felony murder. Because Williams raised this claim in his second habeas petition and received a thorough review on appeal, Williams, 912 F.2d at 928-30, the claim is successive. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337-39, 112 S.Ct. 2514-18, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir.1992). Williams asserts the "ends of justice" require us to re-evaluate the claim in light of some new...