Williams v. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 21 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20140623–CA,20140623–CA
• Citation: 380 P.3d 340,2016 UT App 156
• Parties: Reginald Williams, Appellant, v. Department of Corrections, Matthew B. Anderson, David J. Angerhoffer, Alfred C. Bigelow, Larry Bussio, Wayne A. Freestone, Paul Gardner, and Steven Turley, Appellees.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

380 P.3d 340

2016 UT App 156

Reginald Williams, Appellant,

v.Department of Corrections, Matthew B. Anderson, David J. Angerhoffer, Alfred C. Bigelow, Larry Bussio, Wayne A. Freestone, Paul Gardner, and Steven Turley, Appellees.

No. 20140623–CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed July 21, 2016

Reginald Williams, Appellant Pro Se

Sean D. Reyes and Brent A. Burnett, Attorneys for Appellees

Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr. authored this Opinion, in which Judge Michele M. Christiansen and Senior Judge Russell W. Bench concurred.¹

Opinion

VOROS

, Judge:

¶1 Reginald Williams appeals the district court's order dismissing his petition for extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

.² We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Williams filed a “Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Independent Action, Petition for Review of Records Denial.” See Williams v. Department of Corrections , 2013 UT App 159, ¶ 3, 306 P.3d 821

. He also filed a motion to disqualify the Utah Attorney General's Office. Id. The district court dismissed his petition without ruling on the motion to disqualify. Id. Williams appealed, and we reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for a ruling on the motion to disqualify. Id. ¶ 12. We also addressed Williams's contention that the district court “erred in treating the entire petition as one brought under rule 65B.” Id. ¶ 10. We held that the district court “had discretion to dismiss from a petition for extraordinary relief any claims seeking ordinary relief.” Id. After we issued our decision, Williams moved for, and this court granted, an award of costs pursuant to rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

¶3 On remand, the district court considered and denied Williams's motion to disqualify the Attorney General's Office. Williams filed an amended petition under rule 65B

, but the court struck the amended petition on the ground that it “contain[ed] claims that [were] not in compliance with the standards of Rule 65B, i.e., it contain[ed] ordinary claims.” The court gave Williams 20 days to amend his petition “in strict compliance with Rule 65B.” Williams filed a second amended petition, asserting ten causes of action under rule 65B(d)(2). The district court dismissed Williams's second amended petition. It also ruled that Williams failed to timely file, itemize, and verify his bill of costs. Williams appeals from both decisions.

ANALYSIS

¶4 Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

allows a person to petition for extraordinary relief when “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Williams filed his second amended petition under rule 65B(d)(2), subsections (B) and (C). Subsection (B) provides for relief “where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station”; subsection (C) provides for relief “where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled.” Id. R. 65B(d)(2)(B), (C).³

¶5 “[R]ule 65B(d) is the equivalent of a common law petition for a writ of mandamus and provides the equivalent remedy.” Hogs R Us v. Town of Fairfield , 2009 UT 21, ¶ 11, 207 P.3d 1221

. “The common law writ of mandamus was designed to compel a person to perform a legal duty incumbent upon him by virtue of his office or as required by law.” Renn v. Board of Pardons , 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995). “In order to obtain extraordinary relief under rule 65B(d), a petitioner must establish two things: (1) ‘a clear legal right to the performance of the act demanded,’ and (2) ‘a plain duty of the officer, board, or other tribunal to perform as demanded.’ ” Hogs R Us , 2009 UT 21, ¶ 12, 207 P.3d 1221 (quoting Garcia v. Jones , 29 Utah 2d 409, 510 P.2d 1099, 1100 (1973) ). “Though a plaintiff may request the district court to direct the exercise of discretionary action, the writ is not available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way.” Id. ¶ 11 (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). “While the decision to grant or deny extraordinary relief is within the district court's discretion, we review the legal reasoning of the court for correctness.” Id. ¶ 6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

I. Contract Attorney Claims

¶6 Williams first contends that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed his claims that the Utah Department of Corrections failed to provide him with constitutionally mandated legal assistance. Williams asserts that the attorneys contracted by the Department to assist inmates in legal matters (the contract attorneys) “refused to prepare the initial pleadings,” “failed to conduct any research regarding [Williams's] claims, and refused to provide him requested case law.” He further contends that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed his claims that the Department failed to perform acts required by law. He argues that the Department should have required the contract attorneys to assist him in preparing his claims.

¶7 Williams relies on Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977)

. In Bounds, the United States Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id. at 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491. “The right that Bounds acknowledged was the (already well-established) right of access to the courts,” Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 350, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), not “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance,” id. at 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Accordingly, “the tools [Bounds ] requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174. In other words, “[o]ther than habeas corpus or civil rights actions regarding current confinement, a state has no affirmative constitutional obligation to assist inmates in general civil matters.” Carper v. DeLand , 54 F.3d 613, 616–17 (10th Cir. 1995)

. Furthermore, “an inmate's right of access does not require the state to supply legal assistance beyond the preparation of initial pleadings in a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 617 ; see also

Bounds , 430 U.S. at 828 n. 17, 97 S.Ct. 1491.

¶8 The Department contracts with outside counsel to provide legal assistance to prison inmates. See Utah Admin. Code R251–707–3(4)

. These contract attorneys “assist inmates in preparing and filing ... an initial pleading in habeas corpus and civil right suits challenging conditions of confinement arising from incarceration at the prison.” Id. R251–707–3(1). They are required to “screen inmate claims for meritorious legal content”; “[c]onduct the amount of legal research reasonably necessary to support inmate claims having legal merit,” which may include copying “cases and/or court rules for pleadings that the contract attorneys are helping draft”; “[a]ssist inmates in drafting pleadings setting forth inmate legal claims having legal merit”; and “[a]ssist inmates in securing case law and other authority relevant to pending legal actions being handled by the contract attorneys.” (Emphasis omitted.) To facilitate the review of inmates' legal claims, the contract attorneys use forms to gather necessary information.

¶9 Williams argues that the contract attorneys should have prepared petitions for him “to vindicate condition of confinement civil rights claims, including religious freedom violations and equal protection violations which he wanted to file under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and a rule 65B action to compel [the Department] to comply with its own rules.” The record shows that, although Williams requested and received information forms for causes of action under both section 1983 and rule 65B from the contract attorneys, he returned blank forms to the contract attorneys. While Williams's claims may have had legal merit, he was required to provide the necessary information to the contract attorneys to receive their assistance. Without Williams's explanation of the facts underlying his proposed petition, the contract attorneys were not required to provide assistance in preparing initial pleadings, conducting legal research, or providing copies of requested case law and other authorities.⁴

¶10 Williams next argues that the contract attorneys were required to assist him in preparing an appeal under the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), see Utah Code Ann. § 63G–2–404(2)(a)

(LexisNexis Supp. 2015), and a notice of claim against a government entity, see id. § 63G–7–401(2) (2014). But these requests were not made “in order to attack [Williams's] sentences” or “to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.” See

Lewis , 518 U.S. at 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174. As previously stated, “[o]ther than habeas corpus or civil rights actions regarding current confinement, a state has no affirmative constitutional obligation to assist inmates in general civil matters.” Carper , 54 F.3d at 616–17.

¶11 Williams also contends that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed his claim that the Department “failed to provide him alternative legal assistance to prepare an initial pleading regarding the [contract attorneys'] refusal to provide legal assistance.” He argues that the Department “has no regulations to ensure [he] receives legal assistance for claims against the [contract...