Williams v. Director, Patuxent Inst.

Decision Date07 November 1975
Docket NumberNo. 115,115
Citation276 Md. 272,347 A.2d 179
PartiesMelvin WILLIAMS and Madison Fulwood v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Michael E. Marr, Baltimore (Charles F. Morgan, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Donald R. Stutman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), Gilbert Rosenthal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued Jan. 14, 1975 before SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

Reargued May 6, 1975 before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

Appellants, Madison Fulwood (Fulwood) and Melvin Williams (Williams), were held in civil contempt of court by a Baltimore City trial judge when they refused to cooperate with the staff of Patuxent Institution in mental examinations to determine whether they were 'defective delinquents' within the meaning of Maryland Code (1957) Art. 31B, § 5. In order that we might address ourselves to the propriety of the trial court's action in holding them in contempt we granted the writ of certiorari prior to consideration of the appeals by Williams and Fulwood to the Court of Special Appeals, invoking the provisions of Code (1974) § 12-203 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. We had previously granted certiorari to consider the same issue after the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Savage v. State, 19 Md.App. 1, 308 A.2d 701 (1973), but we dismissed that case as moot prior to argument in this Court when Savage agreed to submit himself to the ordered Patuxent examination. We here reach a conclusion similar to that of the Court of Special Appeals in Savage in that we are of the opinion that Williams and Fulwood were properly held in contempt and are not entitled to their liberty.

Fulwood was convicted of arson and assault. Williams was convicted of storehouse breaking with intent to steal goods of the value of $100 or more. In each instance the judge who signed the order referring them to Patuxent was informed by letter that the individuals had precluded the submission of a report within the six-month period specified by § 7(a) of Art. 31B. Ultimately, written orders were passed on January 21, 1974, requiring each of them-on or before January 25-to cooperate with the staff and to submit to the series of tests which the institution had long sought to administer. Each order also specified 'that any information elicited . . . during the course of . . . examination and evaluation at Patuxent . . . sh(ould) not be used, directly or indirectly, as a basis for subsequent criminal prosecution. . . .' When these men still refused to comply, petitions were filed on January 31, 1974, asking that they be required to show cause why they sould not be held in contempt. Orders to that effect were passed on the same day.

The trial court found in each instance after hearing that the January 21 orders requiring Williams and Fulwood to cooperate with the professional staff at Patuxent and to submit to certain testing procedures had been validly issued and that they had willfully disobeyed those orders. As a consequence, each of them was adjudged in contempt on February 20, 1974, and ordered transferred to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for confinement until such time as he signified his willingness to obey the January 21 order. The court further ordered that if either of them expressed his willingness to comply, he sould be forthwith transferred to Patuxent for a period of 24 hours to be examined by the staff, and then returned to his place of confinement within the Division of Corrections, subject to further order of court. Accordingly, they were transferred to the House of Correction on March 7, 1974, where both remain at this time. These appeals are from the February 20 orders.

The original sentences of Fulwood and Williams have expired. Thus, they would be entitled to their liberty but for the defective delinquency proceedings. They contend here, as they did in the trial court:

(1) That Art. 31B does not confer jurisdiction upon the courts to compel submission to a personal examination at Patuxent;

(2) That the contempt orders must be vacated because their original sentences have now pxired; hence, they are no longer within the class of persons eligible for commitment as defective delinquents;

(3) That if allowance of credit were to have been given for good behavior, the sentences would already have expired when the order requiring submission to the examinations was passed; hence, for this reason, Williams and Fulwood were then no longer within the class of persons eligible for commitment as defective delinquents;

(4) That they were denied procedural due process because they had been confined at Patuxent for an unreasonable length of time-approximately 39 months-without a judicial determination that such confinement was 'warranted';

(5) That the orders requiring submission to the examinations, and the resulting punishment for refusal to obey them, violate their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Some of the contentions and some of the reasoning here may be better understood by reference to a table of events:

January 15, 1970-Williams sentenced to term of five years dating from October 16, 1969. On the same date he was ordered examined at Patuxent.

February 5, 1970-Fulwood sentenced to term of five years dating from June 13, 1969. On the same date he was ordered examined at Patuxent.

November 11, 1970-letter forwarded from Patuxent to the trial court to the effect that Williams had refused to cooperate in the diagnostic examination thus precluding a report as to his status as a defective delinquent within six months as required by Code (1957) Art. 31B, § 7(a). Specific reference was made to our holding in State v. Musgrove, 241 Md. 521, 532, 217 A.2d 247 (1966), that the time provision was directory rather than mandatory in a situation, as Patuxent put it, 'where the delay was attributable to the refusal of the inmate to cooperate with the procedures.' The court was advised that Patuxent 'w(ould) continue to take all allowable steps in Williams' case in order to enable (its staff) to complete the evaluation.'

January 19, 1971-similar letter forwarded to the trial court relative to Fulwood.

June 19, 1972-decision of the Supreme Court in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 92 S.Ct. 2083, 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972), holding it to be 'a denial of due process to continue to hold (an individual) on the basis of an ex parte order committing him for observation.' Under the decision in McNeil an undiagnosed person would be released when his sentence expired, absent other grounds for detaining him.

July 10, 1972-Williams and Fulwood applied for the writ of habeas corpus to Judge Plummer Shearin in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. (They were among the litigants in Director v. Cash, 269 Md. 331, 305 A.2d 833 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136, 94 S.Ct. 881, 38 L.Ed.2d 762 (1974).)

August 14, 1972-diagnostic staff report was prepared and forwarded to the trial court on Williams which stated, in essence, that, because of his refusal to cooperate, a diagnostic report as to his status as a defective delinquent could not be prepared.

August 15, 1972-similar diagnostic staff report as to Fulwood prepared and forwarded.

August 24, 1972-Fulwood was ordered to show cause on September 29, 1972, why he should not be held in contempt of court for his failure to cooperate with the Patuxent staff and to submit to a personal examination.

September 5, 1972-a similar order was passed relative to Williams and his hearing scheduled for September 20, 1972.

September 13, 1972-Williams filed a motion in proper person to dismiss the contempt proceedings.

September 19, 1972-an Assistant Attorney General addressed a letter to the Criminal Court of Baltimore advising that the pending contempt citations of Williams and Fulwood would be postponed because of the pending litigation in Montgomery County.

October 4, 1972-Judge Shearin ordered that certain inmates of Patuxent, including Williams and Fulwood, be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Division of Corrections on the ground that the time requirement in Art. 31B, § 7(a) is mandatory, notwithstanding the recalcitrance of an inmate. This was contrary to the holding of this Court in Musgrove that the language of § 7(a) relative to findings was directory and not mandatory.

October 20, 1972-Williams and Fulwood were transferred from Patuxent Institution to the Maryland House of Correction in accordance with the opinion and order of Judge Shearin.

December 14, 1972-Harlan Lee Savage, the litigant in the test case of Savage v. State, 19 Md.App 1, 308 A.2d 701, supra, was held in contempt by the Circuit Court for Caroline County for his failure to obey an order of October 3, 1972, requiring him to submit to the examinations at Patuxent. (He was also one of the litigants in Cash.)

June 14, 1973-our opinion in Cash was filed reversing Judge Shearin's order of October 4, 1972.

June 28, 1973-Fulwood was returned from the House of Correction to Patuxent pursuant to our opinion and order in Cash.

July 2, 1973-Williams was returned from the House of Correction to Patuxent Institution for the same reason.

August 20, 1973-opinion of the Court of Special Appeals filed in Savage upholding the circuit court's adjudication of Savage as in contempt.

September 18, 1973-report relative to Fulwood forwarded by Patuxent to trial court indicating lack of cooperation by Fulwood.

November 8, 1973-similar report relative to Williams was forwarded to the trial court.

January 21, 1974-hearing in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on the show cause orders relative to contempt previously mentioned. As it is put in the agreed statement of facts, Williams and Fulwood there...

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