Williams v. Dist. of Columbia Hous. Auth.

Decision Date15 August 2019
Docket NumberNo. 17-AA-968,17-AA-968
PartiesGAIL WILLIAMS, PETITIONER, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

On Petition for Review of a Decision and Order of the District of Columbia Housing Authority

Gail Williams, pro se.

Mario Cuahutle was on the brief for respondent.

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, MCLEESE, Associate Judge, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.

NEBEKER, Senior Judge:

Petitioner Gail Williams seeks review of a decision by respondent District of Columbia Housing Authority ("DCHA") terminating her housing subsidy because she permitted a person who was not a member of her household to stay in her home. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse.

I. Procedural Posture

Ms. Williams resides in the District of Columbia and was receiving a housing subsidy from DCHA through the Housing Choice Voucher Program ("HCVP"). Following a hearing held on February 16 and April 25, 2017, a DCHA hearing officer issued an informal hearing decision, dated June 9, 2017, terminating Ms. Williams's participation in the HCVP program, as well as a supplemental memorandum, dated June 12, 2017, furthering explaining the informal hearing decision. Ms. Williams did not seek reconsideration by the Executive Director of DCHA. However, on August 28, 2017, she petitioned this court for review.

Based on representations from the parties, submitted in response to a show-cause order from this court, we held that, due to a factual dispute regarding whether the June 2017 informal hearing decision was timely mailed to Ms. Williams, we could not determine whether her petition for review by this court was timely filed. Williams v. District of Columbia Hous. Auth., No. 17-AA-968, Mem. Op. & J. at 2 (D.C. Oct. 10, 2018). We therefore "remand[ed] the record to the agency to hold a hearing and to determine the facts relevant to the timeliness of Ms. Williams's petition for review." Id. at 3. On remand, the DCHA hearing officer held a hearing on January 30 and February 12, 2019, and, on March 4, 2019, issued an informal hearing decision. The March 2019 decision found that DCHA did not mail a copy of the June 2017 decision to Ms. Williams, and that she did not learn of the June 2017 decision until her then-counsel called DCHA on July 28, 2017, and was provided with a copy of the decision.1 The hearing officer therefore held that DCHA had failed to provide timely notice of the June 2017 decision to Ms. Williams. Both Ms. Williams and DCHA requested reconsideration of the March 2019 decision by the Executive Director of DCHA.2 On April 2, 2019, the Executive Director affirmed the portion of the March 2019 decision finding that DCHA did not timely notify Ms. Williams of the June 2017decision, but vacated other portions that he determined exceeded the scope of the mandate on remand.3 With remand complete, the supplemental record was submitted to this court.

In light of DCHA's determination that Ms. Williams did not receive timely notice of the 2017 informal hearing decision, and its recitation of facts establishing that Ms. Williams did not receive the June 2017 decision until July 28, 2017 at the earliest, we construe her August 28, 2017 petition for review in this court as timely because, calculated according to this court's rules, she filed her petition on the thirtieth day after she received notice of the agency's decision. D.C. App. R. 15(a)(2) ("the petition for review [from an agency order or decision] must be filed within 30 days after notice is given"); D.C. App. R. 26(a)(1) ("in computing any period of time . . . [e]xclude the day of the act"); D.C. App. R. 26(a)(3) ("[i]nclude the last day of the period unless it is a Saturday [or] Sunday").

We therefore proceed to consider the merits of Ms. Williams's petition, in which she challenges the June 2017 decision to terminate her subsidy based on the agency's determination that she had violated applicable regulations pertaining toguest stays in her home.

II. Factual Background

In 2016, DCHA issued to Ms. Williams three recommendations for termination from the HCVP program. On July 6, 2016, DCHA issued a recommendation for termination based upon alleged violations of 14 DCMR § 5808.7 pertaining to non-payment of rent, disturbance of neighbors, destruction of property, and unauthorized occupants. On September 30, 2016, DCHA issued another recommendation based upon alleged violations of 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(c) pertaining to engagement in criminal activity by a household member. Finally, on November 15, 2016, DCHA issued a third recommendation based upon alleged violations of 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2) and 14 DCMR § 5808.3(c) pertaining to allowing unauthorized occupants in the home.4

Following an informal hearing held on November 16, 2016, a DCHA hearing officer issued an informal hearing decision dated November 18, 2016.That decision denied, for lack of sufficient evidence, DCHA's July 2016 recommendation for termination, but granted a continuance as to any issues raised in DCHA's recommendations for termination issued in September 2016 and November 2016.

A second informal hearing was held on February 16 and April 25, 2017, at which a different hearing officer considered evidence relating to the allegations remaining from DCHA's September 2016 and November 2016 recommendations for termination. As noted, the September 2016 recommendation was based upon alleged violations of 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(c) pertaining to engagement in criminal activity by a household member, and the November 2016 recommendation was based upon alleged violations of 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2) and 14 DCMR § 5808.3(c) pertaining to allowing unauthorized occupants in the home. In his June 2017 decision (discussed above), the hearing officer denied, for insufficient evidence, DCHA's recommendation for termination based upon criminal activity. However, the hearing officer affirmed the agency's recommendation for termination based on allowing unauthorized occupants in the home, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Burdette Campbell, who was not a member of Ms. Williams's household, stayed as an overnight guest more than thirty consecutive days or more than ninety days in one calendar year, in violation of 14

DCMR § 5320.

This determination was premised on the hearing officer's factual findings that:

¦ Mr. Campbell is a friend of Ms. Williams.
¦ Mr. Campbell lives at a different residence, not in Ms. Williams's home.
¦ Mr. Campbell owns two vehicles, both of which were registered to Ms. Williams's residence in 2012, one of which is currently registered to Ms. Williams's residence, and both of which "have been consistently found parked outside Ms. Williams'[s] residence."
¦ In 2012 (on an unspecified date and time), Mr. Campbell called the police to come to Ms. Williams's residence "in response to a public disturbance" and "listed Ms. Williams'[s] residence as his own."
¦ Mr. Campbell visits Ms. Williams's home three days a week "and sometimes watches [her] kids."
¦ Mr. Campbell "has spent the night at Ms. Williams'[s] home on multiple occasions."
¦ Mr. Campbell cuts the grass at Ms. Williams's home.
¦ Mr. Campbell receives mail at Ms. Williams's address.

The hearing officer first stated that "[a] thorough review of 14 DCMR [§] 5320 provides indications that the drafters intended guest stays to mean overnight stays versus mere visitation," and that DCHA was therefore "required to demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence" that "any alleged unauthorized occupant stayed . . . in the unit for more than 30 consecutive overnight stays or more than 90 overnight stays in a twelve-month period." He then concluded:

Despite having his own residence, Mr. Campbell admitted to spending 2-3 days a week at [Ms. Williams's residence]. He also admitted to spending some nights at [Ms. Williams's residence]. In one instance, it appears that he was the reporting person for an incident that occurred at 3 a.m. Mr. Campbell receives mail at and has two vehicles registered at [Ms. Williams's residence]. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Campbell was more than a landscaper to the property as there was also a close personal relationship with Ms. Williams. I find that Mr. Campbell has too many contacts with [Ms. Williams's residence] to turn a blind eye to the fact it is more likely than not that his connections to [Ms. Williams's residence] violate 14 DCMR [§] 5320.
III. Legal Framework

The HCVP is a federal rental housing subsidy program, referred to colloquially as "Section 8" because it was created by section 8 of the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983. Mathis v. District of Columbia Hous. Auth., 124 A.3d 1089, 1092 (D.C. 2015). It is funded by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and administered locally by Public Housing Agencies ("PHAs"); in the District, the PHA is DCHA, and the program is administered pursuant to federal and D.C. regulations. Id. at 1092, 1093 n.1; Bostic v. District of Columbia Hous. Auth., 162 A.3d 170, 172 (D.C. 2017). The HCVP was created to help low-income families obtain decent housing and to promote economically mixed housing; to that end, it provides subsidies in the form of portable vouchers that participants can use to rent existing apartments on the private market. Mathis, 124 A.3d at 1092; Bostic, 162 A.3d at 172.

When DCHA wishes to terminate a participant from the HCVP program, both federal and D.C. regulations require DCHA to provide an informal hearing at which the participant may contest the proposed termination. 24 C.F.R §§ 982.554-982.555 (2019); 14 DCMR §§ 8902-8905 (2019). Factual determinations relating to the individual...

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