Williams v. Duckworth

• Decision Date: 01 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-368.,84-368.
• Citation: 601 F. Supp. 1456
• Parties: Bill WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Jack R. DUCKWORTH, Indiana Attorney General, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

601 F. Supp. 1456

Bill WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Jack R. DUCKWORTH, Indiana Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 84-368.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

February 1, 1985.

Bill Williams, pro se.

Linley Pearson, Indiana Atty. Gen. by Robert B. Wente, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.

This petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Bill Williams, an inmate incarcerated at the Indiana State Prison, Michigan, City, Indiana. The matter is now before this court on respondents' motion to dismiss, filed as part of their Return to Order to Show Cause. In accord with the dictates of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), the complete state court record has been filed with, and carefully examined by, this court. Both sides having briefed their respective positions, this petition is now ripe for ruling.

Petitioner was convicted in a state court jury trial of rape, incest and sodomy in 1977. The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed and remanded on direct appeal because the state trial judge had handed the jury instructions to the foreman instead of reading them in open court. Williams v. State, 269 Ind. 430, 381 N.E.2d 458 (1978). Petitioner was retried by a jury and was again convicted on all three charges. He was sentenced in May of 1979 to life on the rape count, 2-14 years on the sodomy count, and 2-21 years for incest. On the second direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Indiana, the convictions were unanimously affirmed in a published opinion at Williams v. State, 273 Ind. 547, 406 N.E.2d 241 (1980).

Petitioner next filed a post-conviction relief petition on September 16, 1980. A hearing was held on December 30, 1980 and March 6, 1981. The petition was denied on March 11, 1981. Petitioner filed an appeal on the denial of the post-conviction petition with the Supreme Court of Indiana on December 21, 1983, the trial court was upheld on the denial of the post conviction petition, unanimously, in a published opinion at 442 N.E.2d 1063 (1982).

Petitioner raises the following issues in this application for habeas relief:

1. Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2. Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Denied the right to a court hearing on D.D. or never was afforded a hearing on such charge.

3. Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

4. Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioner's rights to a fair trial has been violated by the warrantless arrest.

I.

In petitioner's second direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Indiana, he raises the following issues as found in the Brief filed by his counsel.

1. Whether the jury's verdict is contrary to law and is not sustained by sufficient evidence of a substantive nature to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crimes of which he was convicted and because throughout the trial defendant Williams was denied his lawful presumption of innocence.

2. Whether the Court erred in allowing witnesses to testify as to certain events over defendant Williams' objection that said testimony should be excluded as not complying with defendant's alibi notice.

In his post-conviction relief petition the petitioner raised the following issues:

1. His arrest was unlawful, having been made without a warrant or probable cause.

2. His attorney on direct appeal was incompetent or uncooperative and ineffective in that he failed or refused to present certain issues.

3. He was denied the benefit of certain witnesses at the Post-Conviction Hearing.

4. He was denied the right to cross-examine the State's witness, Miss Sunny Weed and others unnamed.

5. That he was twice placed in jeopardy for the same offenses.

6. That he was convicted under ex post facto law.

7. That he was wrongfully sentenced for rape by force whereas he was convicted of statutory rape.

II.

Petitioner has requested an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition. The standard for determining the necessity of an evidentiary hearing have been well set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Essentially, the statute declares that an evidentiary hearing in federal habeas proceedings are necessary only when the petitioner establishes or the respondent admits, or it "otherwise appears, that the State court's determinations of factual questions evidenced by written findings lack sufficient indicia of reliability." Wickliffe v. Duckworth, 574 F.Supp. 979 (N.D.Ind.1983). In Rogers v. Israel, 746 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir.1984), the Seventh Circuit held:

Where material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing, the petitioner is entitled, under both 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), to an evidentiary hearing in federal district court, provided that the failure to develop the state court record was not due to inexcusable neglect or deliberate bypass. See Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977, 983-86 (11th Cir. 1983). See generally United States ex rel Jones v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261, 268-70 (7th Cir.1982) (Posner, J., concurring). Thus, in order to obtain this federal hearing, a defendant must show the district court that the undeveloped facts were material and that there was no inexcusable neglect or deliberate bypass in failing to develop these facts. Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d at 988. (footnote omitted)

Here, the petitioner has failed to show that the State court's determinations of factual questions evidenced by the well developed record lack sufficient indicia of reliability. Petitioner has further failed to show this court what facts are in dispute or what facts he would present to this court and for what purpose. Therefore, petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

III.

Petitioner challenges his conviction because he claims that his arrest, the search of his home, and the removal of his children were all done without warrants and the evidence used at trial from these events was inadmissible. He also claims that he was arrested for a charge of D.D. and lodged in jail without ever being tried on said charge.

This court will address the claim of the charge of D.D. which allegedly was never brought to trial. This claim has nothing to do with his present incarceration. The claim is irrelevant to this proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (They might afford some relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a matter not here at issue).

With regard to petitioner's claim of illegal arrest, search and removal of his children from his home, petitioner appears to have raised this issue in his post-conviction petition which was denied, and then affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court of Indiana held that if any errors under this claim were meritorious, petitioner was required to claim them at trial and present them on appeal. These claims were not available to petitioner in a post-conviction petition. The Court further found that petitioner did not claim that any evidence came in at the trial by virtue of either his arrest or any search.

An oft-cited and well known requirement in the bringing of a habeas petition is that it is axiomatic that the petitioner exhaust his available state remedies. Exhaustion of state remedies is considered to be a procedural prerequisite to the consideration of a habeas corpus claim by a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 18, 70 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). Comity requires that prior to presentation of an issue to the federal courts by way of habeas corpus, that issue must first have been exhausted in the state courts to the extent that state court remedies are available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The Court in Picard v. Connor, supra, held:

We emphasize that the federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts. If the exhaustion doctrine is to prevent "unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution," Ex Parte Royall, supra, 117 U.S. 241 at 251, 6 S.Ct. 734 at 740 29 L.Ed. 868, it is not sufficient merely that the federal habeas applicant has been through the state courts. The rule would serve no purpose if it could be satisfied by raising one claim in the state courts and another in the federal court.

For an issue to have been fairly presented to the state courts, that issue must be put before the state courts in a manner such that the constitutional issue is clear. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 103 S.Ct. 276, 277, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982). There is no exception for a "clear" constitutional violation. Duckworth v. Serrano, supra.

Comity further cautions against a federal court interfering with a state court in a matter, absent an actual abuse or discrimination. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).

The objection is to unwarranted anticipatory interference in the state criminal process by means of continuous or piecemeal interruptions of the state proceedings by litigation in the federal courts; the object is to sustain "the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law." Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120, 72 S.Ct. 118, 120, 96 L.Ed. 138 (1951). (footnote and other citations omitted)

Id., at 500, 94 S.Ct. at 678.

The Supreme Court has extended the exhaustion doctrine to include the "complete exhaustion" rule which requires the petitioner in a habeas action to exhaust remedies on all issues presented in the petition for habeas relief. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). In Rose, the Court held:

Where a petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims is presented to a federal district court, that court must dismiss the petition, thus giving the prisoner the

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