WILLIAMS v. DUDLEY TRUST FOUNDATION
| Decision Date | 18 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-CV-116,93-CV-116 |
| Citation | 675 A.2d 45 |
| Parties | Gary WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. DUDLEY TRUST FOUNDATION, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (HON. RUFUS G. KING III, TRIAL JUDGE).
Morton A. Faller, Washington, DC, for appellant.
Lois R. Goodman, Atlanta, GA, for appellee.
Before SCHWELB, KING, and REID, Associate Judges.
Appellant Gary Williams entered into an installment land contract to purchase residential property from the Dudley Trust Foundation ("Seller"). When he stopped making the monthly interest payments because of alleged latent defects, the Seller filed a complaint against him for possession. Judgment was entered against him after a bench trial in the Landlord & Tenant Branch of the trial court. On appeal he: (1) challenges the jurisdiction of the Landlord & Tenant branch to adjudicate a counterclaim involving breach of an installment land contract, and a claim for possession of real estate due to non-payment of interest under an installment land contract; (2) asserts that the denial of his request to waive the undertaking (bond requirement) of his plea of title action, and the subsequent striking of his plea of title, violated his right to due process; and (3) complains that he was denied his Seventh Amendment constitutional right to trial by jury. We affirm.
In early 1991, appellant Gary Williams executed an installment land contract for the purchase of residential property located on Macomb Street, Northwest. The Seller was the personal representative of the Estate of Tilford Dudley.1 Williams agreed to purchase the property for $289,000, with a down payment of $28,900 and a promissory note of$260,100, payable in full within five years.2 Monthly interest payments were required. The contract specified that each monthly payment "constitutes interest payments only and does not constitute payment of principal." The same was true for the down payment. Paragraph 16 of the contract explicitly stated that these payments were "in lieu of rent."
Williams agreed to take the property in an "as is" condition, and the Seller made no warranties concerning the property. However, under Paragraph 7 of the contract, the Seller agreed to make certain repairs and improvements, including the replacement of all water supply galvanized pipes with copper pipes, and the installation of a new roof. The Seller was required to provide notice to Williams when the repairs and improvements were finished. Williams then had seven days in which "to notify the Seller of any complaint or defect in the work." Failure to give the requisite notice was deemed a waiver which relieved the Seller of any further liability. The contract further specified that: "[t]he Buyer's only remedy for any dissatisfaction with the work done is the assurance from the Seller that the Seller will enforce Seller's contractual rights with the contractor(s)."
Paragraph 12 of the contract placed sole responsibility for maintenance and repairs on Williams. Under Paragraph 14, Williams was obligated to "maintain sufficient fire and wind insurance to replace the structure in the event of total or partial destruction. . . ." Paragraph 15 provided that if Williams defaulted "on any term of [the] agreement" the seller had the right to terminate the contract and keep "all down payments and all other payments made prior to the default." Furthermore, under Paragraph 18, "at the election of the Seller," Williams was required to "execute a renunciation of any interest he shall have in the property" in the event of his default.
The Seller hired contractors to make the required repairs, and gave Williams due notice when they were completed. Williams did a walk-through of the property, but did not send the Seller any list of complaints or defects within the required seven day period. On March 18, 1991, Williams signed a document stating that the Seller's "preliminary obligations under the contract had been satisfied." Williams alleged that he made his own improvements to the property, and estimated their value at approximately $100,000.
On September 14, 1991, Williams discovered that a galvanized pipe, located under the bathroom flooring, had burst. Sometime in November 1991, Williams notified the Seller that leaking pipes existed in the house. However, he did not ask the Seller to take any action against any of the contractors whom Seller hired to do the repair work. During the week of February 16, 1992, he found wasp nests in the attic ceiling and other signs of water leaks. On February 22 and 25, 1992, a roofer, hired by Williams, uncovered large areas of rotten porous wood under the shingles. He recommended a new roof.
From October 1991 through February 1992, Williams did not make his monthly interest payments. From November 7, 1991 through August 1992, he failed to carry the requisite insurance on the property. On February 4, 1992, Seller filed a form complaint against Williams for possession of real estate. The complaint, which was filed in the Landlord & Tenant Branch of the trial court, alleged that Williams had failed to pay $9,613.08 in rent from October 1, 1991 to February 1992. The Seller sought possession of the property, as well as rent, fees and costs. Williams answered and counterclaimed on March 11, 1992. Based, in essence, on his "discovery" of "latent defects," he sought $26,054 in damages for "breach of contract, negligence, and other wrongful actions." His answer specified that he had entered into a contract with Seller for the purchase of the property.
Sometime in March 1992, the Seller wrote to Williams and requested documentation concerning the problem with the pipes and actions taken by the plumber. The Selleralso inspected the property on May 20, 1992, and concluded that a new roof had been placed on the property in April 1991 in a workmanlike manner.
The procedural history of this case is protracted.3 Williams handled his trial proceedings on a pro se basis.4 At the beginning of the litigation, the Seller filed a motion for a protective order to ensure monthly payments of interest under the agreement. The trial court issued an order on March 11, 1992, which required Williams to pay into the Court Registry the sum of $4,834 by May 5, 1992, and the sum of $2,304.75 on the 5th day of each month thereafter until the end of the case.5
Williams filed three motions that are relevant to his appeal. He filed a plea of title and request for waiver of undertaking on June 8, 1992. Super. Ct. L & T R. 5(c) provides that a defendant may interpose a plea of title but must also file an application for an undertaking or waiver of undertaking. On June 9, 1992, Williams filed several documents, including a notarized financial statement and a separation agreement to support his request for the waiver. A hearing on the waiver request took place on June 10, 1992, and the application for a waiver was denied on June 11, 1992. Neither the transcript of the hearing, nor the initial order denying the request for a waiver is part of the record on appeal. Williams filed an amended motion for reconsideration, on June 11, 1992. It was denied on June 12, 1992 by Judge Levie who found "no reasons justifying any reconsideration of the June 10 ruling."6
On June 16, 1992, Williams filed a motion for extension of time to file undertaking and an amendment to amended motion for extension of time to file an undertaking and motion to accept independent certified appraisal of property in lieu of an undertaking. However, on June 19, 1992, Williams' plea of title was stricken for failure to post a $48,000 bond as the undertaking. Later, during a July 14, 1992, proceeding before Judge Burnett, Williams mentioned that his latest motions regarding the undertaking were still pending. Judge Burnett certified the matter back to Judge Levie for a ruling on the outstanding motions. On July 16, 1992, the Clerk of the Court issued a certificate stating: "the motion for reconsideration is denied, by order of Judge Levie."
Second, on June 12, 1992, Williams filed a motion to certify the Seller's action against him as well as his counterclaim to the Civil Division under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 40-I and R. 40-II.7 Williams' motion was based upon his plea of title and his breach of contract counterclaim. Judge Kessler denied the motionon June 19, 1992, after Williams failed to show up for a hearing. In a motion for reconsideration, filed on July 1, 1992, Williams claimed that he did not appear because he thought his case already had been certified to the Civil Division.8
During the July 14, 1992 proceeding, Judge Burnett inquired whether the case was properly in the Landlord & Tenant Branch, and whether there had been a ruling on the merits with respect to the issue. Counsel for the Seller replied that Williams was a tenant by sufferance "because he no longer has a right to possession and we're moving to evict him." She further stated that Judge Kessler's ruling denying certification to the Civil Division was on the merits, and if not, the matter should be returned to Judge Kessler. Williams stated that he had an installment land contract and the matter should not be in the Landlord & Tenant Branch. Apparently there was no further consideration of Williams' motion to certify the case to the Civil Actions Branch until the conclusion of the bench trial before Judge Rufus King. The motion was denied on October 6, 1992.
Williams filed a demand for a jury trial on June 12, 1992, and an amended demand on July 1, 1992. The Seller moved to strike the demand on the ground of late filing.9 On July 14, 1992, Judge Burnett struck the jury demand. In doing so, he stated:
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