Williams v. Dunbar Sec. Sols.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action ELH-20-1803 |
| Parties | LAMAR WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. DUNBAR SECURITY SOLUTIONS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Lamar Williams, the self-represented plaintiff, filed suit against Dunbar Security Solutions (“Dunbar”) on July 7 2020. ECF 1 (“Complaint”). He amended the suit on August 26, 2020, prior to service of the original Complaint. ECF 5 (“Amended Complaint”). The suit is founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1. Williams alleges violations of “Plaintiff's 1st Amendment Constitutional Civil Right to Freedom of Speech” as well as “Section I of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, 42 U.S. Code § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S. Code § 1985, [and] 42 U.S Code § 12203.” Id. at 1-2.
In particular, Williams complains that Dunbar “illegally and unlawfully forbade the Plaintiff from addressing the baltimore county council [sic]…on the evening of July 3, 2017.” Id. at 1. He also asserts that his suit was timely filed. Id. Plaintiff seeks “lost income totaling approximately $400, 000 and $1 151 x ($3 x 106) in punitive damages to increase by ($3 x 106) for everyday this continues since July 3, 2017.” Id.
Dunbar has filed a motion to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF 10), supported by a memorandum. ECF 10-1 (collectively, the “Motion”). In addition to moving to dismiss the suit, the defendant also urges the Court to declare Williams “a vexatious litigant” and asks the Court to bar him from filing future claims against “Dunbar or anyone affiliated with Dunbar without court approval.” ECF 10-1 at 2. Williams opposes the Motion. ECF 18. Dunbar has not responded, and the time to do so has expired.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this case is one of several related matters that Williams has filed in the District of Maryland.[1] Of particular relevance here, in another case assigned to me, plaintiff sued Dunbar's Chief Operating Officer, Andrew Maggio, among others. See Williams v. Mayhew, et al., ELH-18-3545. By Memorandum Opinion and Order of February 13, 2020, I dismissed Maggio from the suit, because Maggio was not a “state actor” for purposes of bringing a suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The Fourth Circuit dismissed plaintiff's appeal. Id., ECF 20.
Plaintiff filed two cases that are closely related to ELH-18-3545. See Williams v. Gardina et al., ELH-18-3623; Williams v. Baltimore County Government, GLR-17-0066. Further, in the case of Williams v. Hanlon et al., RDB-19-cv-550, plaintiff sued a host of defendants, including Chief Judge Bredar; Robert Hur, then the U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland; then Magistrate Judge Stephanie Gallagher; Magistrate Judge Mark Coulson; and Assistant United States Attorney Michael Hanlon. Williams's claims in that case were dismissed by Judge Bennett (ECF 15; ECF 16) and his appeal to the Fourth Circuit was dismissed for failure to prosecute. ECF 23.[2]
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion.
Plaintiff is a Maryland resident. ECF 5, ¶ 7. Dunbar is a Maryland based company and, at the relevant time, it had a contract with the Baltimore County government. Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff alleges that on the evening of July 3, 2017, Dunbar “security guards obstructed” plaintiff “from addressing [the] Baltimore County Council.” Id. He contends that the “defendants[3]retaliated” and “threatened” plaintiff “with lethal force and brandished their weapons towards” plaintiff “to make an example of the Plaintiff and embarrass the Plaintiff in front of other Baltimore County residents.” Id. at 2.
According to Williams, the actions undertaken against him on that date “arose from a retaliatory animus because he demanded that his natural born rights as a United States citizen be protected and wanted to address the unlawful actions of baltimore county government et al. (case no. jkb-17-00066), paul m. mayhew et al.(case no. ELH-18-03545), vincent j. gardina et al.(case no. ELH-18-03623).” Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). Thus, plaintiff claims that Dunbar is “financially responsible for the intentional, reckless, extreme and outrageous actions they took against the Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 9.
As noted, Maggio has moved to dismiss. A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions' . . . .”); see also Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 10 (2014) (per curiam). But, mere “‘naked assertions' of wrongdoing” are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In other words, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, ” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” does not state a plausible claim of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Semenova v. MTA, 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 943 (2011). But, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Glassman v. Arlington Cty., 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
Courts generally do not “‘resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses'” through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243 (quoting Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)). However, “in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009). Because Rule 12(b)(6) “is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the complaint, ” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), “[t]his principle only applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.'” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250) (emphasis added in Goodman).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court ordinarily “may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly...
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