Williams v. Enterprise Leasing of Norfolk/Richmond, Civ. A. No. 2:95cv698.

Decision Date29 December 1995
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 2:95cv698.
Citation911 F. Supp. 988
PartiesRomain WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF NORFOLK/RICHMOND t/a Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bernard Travis Holmes, Holmes & Edmonds, P.C., Virginia Beach, VA, for plaintiff.

Sharon Maitland Moon, LeClair Ryan, Richmond, VA, D. Michael Linihan, Thomas E. Berry, McMahon, Berger, Hanna, Linihan, Cody & McCarthy, St. Louis, MO, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOUMAR, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon defendant's motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

In May of 1990, Plaintiff, an African-American, was hired by defendant Enterprise Rent-A-Car ("Enterprise"), and since that time has been employed by the defendant in the Hampton Roads-Peninsula-Williamsburg area. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed July 26, 1995, ("Amended Complaint") at ¶ 3.1 Plaintiff claims that between October, 1992, and July, 1994, he was ignored for consideration as an Assistant Manager by Enterprise because of his race, while Caucasian employees with less experience and with no higher qualification than plaintiff were promoted to that position, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.

In March of 1993, plaintiff orally complained to his supervisor, John Cooke, that he had been wrongly overlooked, and received no reason in reply. Id. at ¶ 7. A similar complaint was made in July of 1993, and this time Mr. Cooke's only response was that plaintiff needed to be made "more attractive." In September and October of 1993, plaintiff wrote letters to top management and met with these officials to complain about his non-selection in favor of Caucasian employees with less experience and seniority. Id. at ¶ 8-9.

Plaintiff claims that in response to plaintiff's numerous complaints about not being promoted, Enterprise subjected plaintiff to harassment and retaliation. Specifically, plaintiff was reprimanded and placed on probation with the threat of job termination "based on alleged attendance problems," although plaintiff's performance evaluations never reflected an attendance problem, nor was plaintiff ever given an oral or written warning regarding his attendance. Id. at ¶ 10.

Plaintiff is therefore claiming unlawful employment practices, including failure to promote the plaintiff on the basis of race, as well as retaliation against the plaintiff in the form of the reprimand, probation, and assignment of demeaning tasks because of his complaints of racially discriminatory practices, all in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13. Plaintiff asks for a permanent injunction against Enterprise ordering them to refrain from engaging in discriminatory practices, retroactive promotion of plaintiff, back pay, compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $300,000.00, and reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. Id. at 5-6.

For the purpose of this motion, the following undisputed facts are also relevant. Plaintiff filed two separate charges with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The first, No. XXXXXXXXX, attached as Exhibit A to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Defendant's Memorandum"), charges Enterprise with discrimination on the basis of race with respect to the failure to promote plaintiff. This charge was filed on or about December 21, 1993. Plaintiff's First EEOC Charge, dated December 21, 1993 ("Charge # 1"). The second, No. XXXXXXXXX, attached as Exhibit B to Defendant's Memorandum, charges discrimination on the basis of race and retaliation for having complained of racial discrimination. This charge was filed on January 10, 1994. Plaintiff's Second EEOC Charge, dated January 10, 1994 ("Charge # 2"). Both parties agree that plaintiff was issued a right-to-sue notice on March 31, 1995. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed June 30, 1995, and plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed July 26, 1995.

Enterprise subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, asserting various grounds for dismissal of different portions of plaintiff's Amended Complaint. First, Enterprise argues that because plaintiff filed his Complaint ninety-one days after the EEOC issued plaintiff his right-to-sue notice, plaintiff's Title VII claim should be dismissed in its entirety as having been untimely filed. Defendant further argues that, if not entirely dismissed as untimely, plaintiff's Title VII claims which were not encompassed within a timely filed charge should be dismissed. Finally, Enterprise argues that, with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, plaintiff's claims regarding events prior to June 30, 1993, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and should also be dismissed. The Court addresses each of these arguments below.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Motions to dismiss are to be granted sparingly. "A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support the claim and entitle the plaintiff to relief." Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1956, 131 L.Ed.2d 849 (1995); Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1307, 127 L.Ed.2d 658 (1994). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court should construe the complaint favorably to the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Martin Marietta, 991 F.2d at 97 ("In considering a motion to dismiss, the claims must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and its allegations taken as true.").

III. Title VII

To file an action under Title VII, an employee must first comply with the administrative filing requirements embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). After the alleged discriminatory events have occurred, the aggrieved party has one hundred and eighty days in which to file a charge to the EEOC. Id. Claims of discrimination in violation of Title VII must be filed in the district court within ninety days after the EEOC has thereafter terminated its investigation. Id.; Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family Crisis Center, 7 F.3d 40, 42 (4th Cir.1993). Failure to meet these filing deadlines renders the discriminatory occurrence without legal consequences. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1976); Harper v. Burgess, 701 F.2d 29, 30 (4th Cir.1983).

A. Timeliness of the Complaint

The ninety day period post-EEOC issuance of the right-to-sue notice does not begin to run until the plaintiff receives, either actually or constructively, the EEOC notice. See Watts-Means, 7 F.3d at 42 (holding that the statutory period begins to run at the time the letter became available to the plaintiff, not when the plaintiff actually picked it up from the post office). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) states the following:

Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon the party by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

Thus FRCP 6(e) provides the presumption that if the date of receipt is unknown or in dispute, courts will presume receipt three days after mailing. Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 1666, 48 L.Ed.2d 176 (1976). See also Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 1724 n. 1, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (applying presumption to receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue notice). Such a presumption is not automatic, but rather is only applicable if the parties dispute the date of receipt. Griffin v. Prince William Hospital Corp., 716 F.Supp. 919, 921 n. 7 (E.D.Va. 1989) (Ellis, J.). See also Mosel v. Hills Dept. Store, Inc., 789 F.2d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 1986); Robinson v. City of Fairfield, 750 F.2d 1507, 1510 n. 4 (11th Cir.1985); Stambaugh v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 844 F.Supp. 1431, 1433 (D.Kan.1994).

It is undisputed that the EEOC issued plaintiff's right-to-sue notice on March 31, 1995, and that plaintiff's initial complaint was filed June 30, 1995, or 91 days after the EEOC issued its right-to-sue notice. Defendant argues that, because plaintiff's complaint does not state the date of actual receipt of the EEOC notice, the Court must presume that receipt of the notice occurred the same day as its issuance, and therefore plaintiff's Title VII claim must be dismissed in its entirety. Defendant's Memorandum, at 3.

Without filing an affidavit or attempting to amend the Amended Complaint, plaintiff's counsel states that "plaintiff received his EEOC's Right to Sue Notice by mail several days after the date of its issuance," and therefore the complaint must have been filed within ninety days of the receipt of the notice. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiff's Opposition"), at 5 (emphasis added). Defendant responds by stating that argument of counsel is not evidence, and therefore the only date before the Court, again, is the date of issuance. Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Defendant's Reply"), at 2-3. Defendant further cites one case holding that the filing of the complaint on the ninety-first day after receipt of the notice warranted summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 3 (citing Peete v. American Standard Graphic, 885 F.2d 331, 331-32 (6th Cir.1989)). This Court has similarly held plaintiffs to the strict timing requirements...

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